about 14% for bill stamps, and 34% for London commission—altogether, 418%; and, as the money is loaned at 5%, there appears to be 78% profit to the drawer of the bill. This, however, is on the assumption that the cable rate is still 4.8734 when the bill falls due for payment and that the drawer would have to pay that price to telegraph the money to meet the draft. But exchange on London can go up or down between 4.84 and 4.8912, and if at the end of the three months the cable rate is 4.84 the New York banker will be able to cover his bill at almost the same rate at which he sold it and will only be out of pocket to the extent of the commissions and stamps, so that the accommodation will only cost him 112% and his profit will be 312%. If he has to pay more than 4.8734 for his cable at the maturity of the bill his profit will be less than 78%, and he may even be a loser on the transaction.
It is obvious, then, that a high rate of interest in New York, with a high rate of exchange on London and a low rate of discount in England, would induce the creation of these finance bills. The supply of these bills would prevent New York exchange reaching the limit point at which gold leaves the United States, and the maturity of these bills in the autumn would ensure a demand for the produce bills and possibly prevent exchange from falling to the other limit point at which London has to send gold to New York.
We have pointed out the essential difference between these finance bills and what we have called produce bills, but there is another very striking difference, that of the question of supply. These finance bills are obviously very difficult to limit in their amounts; produce bills are, of course, limited by the extent of the surplus crops of the United States and by the demand for the produce in Europe, but so long as it is mutually satisfactory to the big finance houses in both countries to draw on credit granted in London, so long may these accommodation bills be created, and the pressure of the bills in New York may depress exchange so much that gold leaves London at a time when it is required in other directions. In such a case the embarrassment caused by this artificial drain of the gold reserve would much more than offset the amount of the commission earned by the accepting houses. The Bank of England may have to raise its rate of discount at the expense of the entire home trade; probably, also, with the rise in the value of money, consequent on the diminished resources, all investment securities fall in value and more onerous terms must be submitted to by the government, corporations and colonies, in the issue of any loans they may require. It will, therefore, be appreciated that, although these finance bills may be perfectly safe, their excessive creation is viewed with great disfavour, and considerable apprehension is felt when the adventures of speculators in New York make great demands for loans against stocks and shares, and, through the instrumentality of these finance bills, shift the burden on to the shoulders of the London discount market. The effect of this is to level money rates as between New York and London, and in the process the pressure falls on London and the relief goes to America. Eventually, of course, the bills must be met and funds sent for that purpose from across the Atlantic, but in the meanwhile the disturbance of the gold supply is an inconvenience.
We have explained the process of employing credits granted in London to finance Wall Street; there are, also, many other types of bill to which the acceptor lends his name on the assurance that he will in due course be supplied with the funds required to meet the acceptance. In the case of the produce bills, a London banker will accept the bills in order that they may be more easily marketable than if they were drawn direct on the actual consignee of the cotton, tobacco or wheat. The consignees in Liverpool, &c., pay a commission for this assistance and reimburse the London bank as the produce is gradually disposed of. The transaction appears slightly more complicated when English bankers accept bills for produce shipped from the United States to merchants living in Hamburg, Genoa, Singapore and all other great ports, but the principle is the same, and the influence of such business on the exchange affects, in the first instance, the quotation between America and London, but afterwards, when money must be sent to London with which to honour the bills, the exchanges with Germany, Italy or the Straits Settlements bear their share in the eventual adjustment, the spinners, tobacco manufacturers and corn factors requiring drafts on London where so much of the trade of the world is financed.
We shall have to consider later the reasons which ensure to London this peculiar and predominant position. We have so far used the American exchange as an example to explain causes which produce fluctuations in all the principal exchanges on London and to show the points between which fluctuations are limited. The fact that America is still developing at a much greater rate than the Old World makes an important distinction between the financial position in New York and the financial position of the big capitals in Europe. There is not in America the huge accumulation of savings and investment money which the Old World has collected, so that whereas Europe helps to finance the United States, the latter country has so many home enterprises that she can spare none of her funds to assist Europe. It would not be possible for London to draw on New York such bills as we have described as finance bills, for they could never be discounted there except on the most onerous terms, and there is nothing in America which corresponds to the London money market.
We have to deal with dollars and cents in America, with francs in France, with marks in Germany, and different money units in nearly every country; but, given the mint regulations, the theoretical par of exchange and the theoretical limit points are arrived at by simple arithmetic. An exhaustive statement with reference to every country would involve an amount of tedious repetition, so that for the purposes of this article it is more instructive to consider the essential differences between the important exchanges than to go into the details of coinage, which would appeal rather to the numismatist than to the exchange expert.
The United States, offering as it does a vast field for profitable investment, must annually remit huge amounts for interest on bonds and shares held by Europeans; coupons and dividend warrants payable in America are offered for sale daily in London, and at the end of the quarters the amount of these claims, coupons and drawn bonds is very large, and a considerable set off to the indebtedness of Europe for American produce. It is often asserted that the United States is rapidly getting sufficiently wealthy to repurchase all these bonds and shares; but whenever trade conditions are exceptionally good in the States, fresh evidence is forthcoming that assistance from London and Europe is essential to finance the commercial development of the United States. This illustrates a feature common to all new countries, and the effect is that they make annual payments to the older countries and especially to England.
A government loan or other large borrowing arranged abroad will immediately move the exchange in favour of the borrowing country. A tendency adverse to the United States results from the drafts and letters of credit of the large number of holiday makers who cross the Atlantic and spend so much money in Europe. When remittance is made of the incomes of Americans who have taken up their residence in the Old World the exchange is affected in a similar manner.
In one respect the United States stands far superior to most of the older countries. There are no restrictions on the free export of gold when exchange reaches the limit point showing that the demand for bills on London exceeds the supply. New York (with London and India) is a free gold market, and this is undoubtedly one of the reasons why money is so readily advanced to the United States, and the finance bills, to which we referred above, would not be allowed to the same extent were it not for the fact that New York will remit gold when other forms of remittance are insufficient to satisfy foreign creditors. When exchange between Paris and London reaches the theoretical limit point of 25.32 (25 francs 32 centimes for the £1 sterling), gold does not leave Paris for London unless the Bank of France is
