or should be placed in positions selected as the attack develops itself. On the one hand the preparation of the positions beforehand, The question of artillery positions.which in many cases means the use of armour and concrete, increases very largely the initial expense of the defence, and ties the defender somewhat in the special dispositions that become desirable once the attack has taken shape. Moreover, such expenditure must be incurred on all the fronts of the fortress, whereas the results would only be realized on the front or fronts actually attacked. On the other hand much time and labour are involved in emplacing heavy and medium artillery with extemporized protection, and this becomes a serious consideration when one remembers how much work of all kinds is necessary in preparing a fortress against attack. Again, to avoid the danger of a successful attack on the intervals between the forts before their defences have been fully completed, the fire of the guns in the intermediate positions might be urgently required. The solution in any given case would no doubt depend on the importance of the place. In most cases a certain amount of compromise will come in, some preparation being made for batteries, without their being completed. Armoured batteries of whatever kind must in any case be prepared in peace time. It should not be overlooked that as, whatever theories may exist about successive lines of defence, the onus of the defence will now lie on the fort line, just as it formerly did on the enceintes, so that line should be fully prepared, and should not have to commence its fight in a position of inequality.
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| From Brialmont’s Progrès de la défense des états et de la fortification permanente depuis Vauban, by permission of M. le Commandant G. Meeüs. |
| Fig. 47. |
Defence of Intervals of Forts.—The frontal fire of the batteries in the intervals and the flanking fire of some of the guns in the forts will play an important part, but the main reliance should be on infantry defence. A fully prepared fortress would have practically a complete chain of infantry fighting positions and obstacles between the forts, at all events on the fronts likely to be seriously attacked. The positions would consist largely of fire trenches, with good communications; but it is pretty generally recognized that there must be some points d’appui in the shape of redoubts or infantry forts, and also bomb-proof shelter for men, ammunition and stores near the fighting line. This is usually included in the redoubts. If they are to resist the heaviest shell, such shelters must be built in peace time.
Communications are of the first importance, not merely to facilitate the movement of the enormous stores of ammunition and materials required in the fighting line, but also that defenders may fully utilize the advantage of acting on interior lines. They should include both railways and roads running from the centre of the place to the different sectors of defence, and all round, in rear of the line of forts; also ample covered approaches to the fighting line. Concealment is essential, and where the lie of the ground does not help, it must be got from earth parapets or plantations.
The principal use of barrier forts is in country where the necessary line of communication cannot be easily diverted. For instance, in a comparatively flat country a barrier fort commanding a road or railway is of little use because roads may be found passing round it, or a line Barrier forts. of railway may be diverted for some miles to avoid it. But in mountainous country, where such diversion is impossible, it will be necessary for the enemy to capture the fort before he can advance; and the impossibility of surrounding it, the few positions from which siege artillery can be brought into play, and the fact that there is practically only one road of approach to be denied, make these positions peculiarly suitable for forts with armoured batteries. Italy makes considerable use of such forts for the defence of frontier passes.
General Brialmont’s Theoretical Claim for the Defence of a Country.—Before going into details, it is worth while to state the full claim of strategic fortification advanced by General Brialmont, the most thorough of all its advocates. It is as follows:—
A. Fortify the capital.
B. Fortify the points where main lines of communication pass a strategic barrier.
C. Make an entrenched camp at the most important centre of communication in each zone of invasion: and support it by one or two places arranged so as to make a fortified district.
