but irresolute and pretentious as a commander in chief, was not the man to cope with the situation. Only the furious courage and patient endurance of hardships of the rank and file, and the good qualities of some of the generals, such as Clinchant, Crémer and Billot, and junior staff officers such as Major Brugère (afterwards generalissimo of the French army), secured what success was attained.
Werder, the German commander, warned of the imposing concentration of the French, evacuated Dijon and Dôle just in time to avoid the blow and rapidly drew together his forces behind the Ognon above Vesoul. A furious attack on one of his divisions at Villersexel (January 9) cost him 2000 prisoners as well as his killed andThe campaign
in the East. wounded, and Bourbaki, heading for Belfort, was actually nearer to the fortress than the Germans. But at the crisis more time was wasted, Werder (who had almost lost hope of maintaining himself and had received both encouragement and stringent instructions to do so) slipped in front of the French, and took up a long weak line of defence on the river Lisaine, almost within cannon shot of Belfort. The cumbrous French army moved up and attacked him there with 150,000 against 60,000 (January 15-17, 1871). It was at last repulsed, thanks chiefly to Bourbaki’s inability to handle his forces, and, to the bitter disappointment of officers and men alike, he ordered a retreat, leaving Belfort to its fate.
Ere this, so urgent was the necessity of assisting Werder, Manteuffel had been placed at the head of a new Army of the South. Bringing two corps from the I. army opposing Faidherbe and calling up a third from the armies around Paris, and a fourth from the II. army, Manteuffel hurried southward by Langres to the Saône. Then, hearing of Werder’s victory on the Lisaine, he deflected the march so as to cut off Bourbaki’s retreat, drawing off the left flank guard of the latter (commanded with much éclat and little real effect by Garibaldi) by a sharp feint attack on Dijon. The pressure of Werder in front and Manteuffel in flank gradually forced the now thoroughly disheartened French forces towards the Swiss frontier, and Bourbaki, realizing at once the ruin of his army and his own incapacity to re-establish its efficiency, shot himself, though not fatally, on the 26th of January. Clinchant, his successor, acted promptly enough to remove the immediate danger, but on the 29th he was informed of the armistice without at the same time being told that Belfort and the eastern theatre of war had been on Jules Favre’s demand expressly excepted from its operation.[1] Thus the French, the leaders distracted by doubts and the worn-out soldiers fully aware that the war was practically over, stood still, while Manteuffel completed his preparations for hemming them in. On the 1st of February General Clinchant led his troops into Switzerland, where they were disarmed, interned and well cared for by the authorities of the neutral state. The rearguard fought a last action with the advancing Germans before passing the frontier. On the 16th, by order of the French government, Belfort capitulated, but it was not until the 11th of March that the Germans took possession of Bitche, the little fortress on the Vosges, where in the early days of the war de Failly had illustrated so signally the want of concerted action and the neglect of opportunities which had throughout proved the bane of the French armies.
The losses of the Germans during the whole war were 28,000 dead and 101,000 wounded and disabled, those of the French, 156,000 dead (17,000 of whom died, of sickness and wounds, as prisoners in German hands) and 143,000 wounded and disabled. 720,000 men surrendered to the Germans or to the authorities of neutral states, and at the close of the war there were still 250,000 troops on foot, with further resources not immediately available to the number of 280,000 more. In this connexion, and as evidence of the respective numerical yields of the German system working normally and of the French improvised for the emergency, we quote from Berndt (Zahl im Kriege) the following comparative figures:—
| End of July | French | 250,000, | Germans | 384,000 | under arms. |
| Middle of November | ,, | 600,000 | ,, | 425,000 | ,, |
| After the surrender of Paris and the disarmament of Bourbaki’s army |
,, | 534,000 | ,, | 835,000 | ,, |
The date of the armistice was the 28th of January, and that of the ratification of the treaty of Frankfurt the 23rd of May 1871.
Bibliography.—The literature of the war is ever increasing in volume, and the following list only includes a very short selection made amongst the most important works.
General.—German official history, Der deutsch-französische Krieg (Berlin, 1872–1881; English and French translations); monographs of the German general staff (Kriegsgesch. Einzelschriften); Moltke, Gesch. des deutsch-französ. Krieges (Berlin, 1891; English translation) and Gesammelte Schriften des G. F. M. Grafen v. Moltke (Berlin, 1900– ); French official history, La Guerre de 1870–1871 (Paris, 1902– ) (the fullest and most accurate account); P. Lehautcourt (General Palat), Hist. de la guerre de 1870–1871 (Paris, 1901–1907); v. Verdy du Vernois, Studien über den Krieg . . . auf Grundlage 1870–1871 (Berlin, 1892–1896); G. Cardinal von Widdern, Kritische Tage 1870–1871 (French translation, Journées critiques). Events preceding the war are dealt with in v. Bernhardi, Zwischen zwei Kriegen; Baron Stoffel, Rapports militaires 1866–1870 (Paris, 1871; English translation); G. Lehmann, Die Mobilmachung 1870–1871 (Berlin, 1905).
For the war in Lorraine: Prince Kraft of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Briefe über Strategie (English translation, Letters on Strategy); F. Foch, Conduite de la guerre, pt. ii.; H. Bonnal, Manœuvre de Saint Privat (Paris, 1904–1906); Maistre, Spicheren (Paris, 1908); v. Schell, Die Operationen der I. Armee unter Gen. von Steinmetz (Berlin, 1872; English translation); F. Hoenig, Taktik der Zukunft (English translation), and 24 Stunden Moltke’schen Strategie (Berlin, 1892; English and French translations).
For the war in Alsace and Champagne: H. Kunz, Schlacht von Wörth (Berlin, 1891), and later works by the same author; H. Bonnal, Fröschweiler (Paris, 1899); Hahnke, Die Operationen des III. Armee bis Sedan (Berlin, 1873; French translation).
For the war in the Provinces: v. der Goltz, Léon Gambetta und seine Armeen (Berlin, 1877); Die Operationen der II. Armee an die Loire (Berlin, 1875); Die sieben Tage von Le Mans (Berlin, 1873); Kunz, Die Zusammensetzung der französ. Provinzialheeren; de Freycinet, La Guerre en province (Paris, 1871); L. A. Hale, The People’s War (London, 1904); Hoenig, Volkskrieg an die Loire (Berlin, 1892); Blume, Operationen v. Sedan bis zum Ende d. Kriegs (Berlin, 1872; English translation); v. Schell, Die Operationen der I. Armee unter Gen. v. Goeben (Berlin, 1873; English translation); Count Wartensleben, Feldzug der Nordarmee unter Gen. v. Manteuffel (Berlin, 1872), Operationen der Sudarmee (Berlin, 1872; English translation); Faidherbe, Campagne de l’armée du nord (Paris, 1872).
For the sieges: Frobenius, Kriegsgesch. Beispiele d. Festungskriegs aus d. deutsch.-franz. Kg. (Berlin, 1899–1900); Goetze, Tätigkeit der deutschen Ingenieuren (Berlin, 1871; English translation).
The most useful bibliography is that of General Palat (“P. Lehautcourt”). (C. F. A.)
FRANÇOIS DE NEUFCHÂTEAU, NICOLAS LOUIS, Count (1750–1828), French statesman and poet, was born at Saffais near Rozières in Lorraine on the 17th of April 1750, the son of a school-teacher. He studied at the Jesuit college of Neufchâteau in the Vosges, and at the age of fourteen published a volume of poetry which obtained the approbation of Rousseau and of Voltaire. Neufchâteau conferred on him its name, and he was
elected member of some of the principal academies of France. In 1783 he was named procureur-général to the council of Santo Domingo. He had previously been engaged on a translation of Ariosto, which he finished before his return to France five years afterwards, but it perished during the shipwreck which occurred during his voyage home. After the Revolution he was elected deputy suppléant to the National Assembly, was charged with the organization of the Department of the Vosges, and was elected later to the Legislative Assembly, of which he first became secretary and then president. In 1793 he was imprisoned on account of the political sentiments, in reality very innocent, of his drama Pamela ou la vertu récompensée (Théâtre de la Nation, 1st August 1793), but was set free a few days afterwards at the revolution of the 9th Thermidor. In 1797 he became minister of the interior, in which office he distinguished himself by the thoroughness of his administration in all departments. It is to him that France owes its system of inland navigation. He inaugurated the museum of the Louvre,
- ↑ Jules Favre, it appears, neglected to inform Gambetta of the exception.
