point of view, more near to the state system of the continent
of Europe than to that of the United Kingdom. The people
make a more complete surrender of power to the government
(State or Federal) than is done in England.
Cabinet Government.—The peculiar functions of the English cabinet are not easily matched in any foreign system. They are a mystery even to most educated Englishmen. The cabinet (q.v.) is much more than a body consisting of chiefs of departments. It is the inner council of the empire, the arbiter of national policy, foreign or domestic, the sovereign in commission. The whole power of the House of Commons is concentrated in its hands. At the same time, it has no place whatever in the legal constitution. Its numbers and its constitution are not fixed even by any rule of practice. It keeps no record of its proceedings. The relations of an individual minister to the cabinet, and of the cabinet to its head and creator, the premier, are things known only to the initiated. With the doubtful exception of France, no other system of government presents us with anything like its equivalent. In the United States, as in the European monarchies, we have a council of ministers surrounding the chief of the state.
Change of Power in the English System.—One of the most difficult problems of government is how to provide for the devolution of political power, and perhaps no other question is so generally and justly applied as the test of a working constitution. If the transmission works smoothly, the constitution, whatever may be its other defects, may at least be pronounced stable. It would be tedious to enumerate all the contrivances which this problem has suggested to political societies. Here, as usual, oriental despotism stands at the bottom of the scale. When sovereign power is imputed to one family, and the law of succession fails to designate exclusively the individual entitled to succeed, assassination becomes almost a necessary measure of precaution. The prince whom chance or intrigue has promoted to the throne of a father or an uncle must make himself safe from his relatives and competitors. Hence the scenes which shock the European conscience when “Amurath an Amurath succeeds.” The strong monarchical governments of Europe have been saved from this evil by an indisputable law of succession, which marks out from his infancy the next successor to the throne. The king names his ministers, and the law names the king. In popular or constitutional governments far more elaborate precautions are required. It is one of the real merits of the English constitution that it has solved this problem—in a roundabout way perhaps, after its fashion—but with perfect success. The ostensible seat of power is the throne, and down to a time not long distant the demise of the crown suspended all the other powers of the state. In point of fact, however, the real change of power occurs on a change of ministry. The constitutional practice of the 19th century settled, beyond the reach of controversy, the occasions on which a ministry is bound to retire. It must resign or dissolve when it is defeated[1] in the House of Commons, and if after a dissolution it is beaten again, it must resign without alternative. It may resign if it thinks its majority in the House of Commons not sufficiently large. The dormant functions of the crown now come into existence. It receives back political power from the old ministry in order to transmit it to the new. When the new ministry is to be formed, and how it is to be formed, is also clearly settled by established practice. The outgoing premier names his successor by recommending the king to consult him; and that successor must be the recognized leader of his successful rivals. All this is a matter of custom, not of law; and it is doubtful if any two authorities could agree in describing the custom in language of precision. In theory the monarch may send for any one he pleases, and charge him with the formation of a government; but the ability to form a government restricts this liberty to the recognized head of a party, subject to there being such an individual. It is certain that the intervention of the crown facilitates the transfer of power from one party to another, by giving it the appearance of a mere change of servants. The real disturbance is that caused by the appeal to the electors. A general election is always a struggle between the great political parties for the possession of the powers of government. It may be noted that modern practice goes far to establish the rule that a ministry beaten at the hustings should resign at once without waiting for a formal defeat in the House of Commons.
The English custom makes the ministry dependent on the will of the House of Commons; and, on the other hand, the House of Commons itself is dependent on the will of the ministry. In the last result both depend on the will of the constituencies, as expressed at the general election. There is no fixity in either direction in the tenure of a ministry. It may be challenged at any moment, and it lasts until it is challenged and beaten. And that there should be a ministry and a House of Commons in harmony with each other but out of harmony with the people is rendered all but impossible by the law and the practice as to the duration of parliaments.
Change of Power in the United States.—The United States offers a very different solution of the problem. The American president is at once king and prime minister; and there is no titular superior to act as a conduit-pipe between him and his successor. His crown is rigidly fixed; he can be removed only by the difficult method of impeachment. No hostile vote on matters of legislation can affect his position. But the end of his term is known from the first day of his government; and almost before he begins to reign the political forces of the country are shaping out a new struggle for the succession. Further, a change of government in America means a considerable change in the administrative staff (see Civil Service). The commotion caused by a presidential election in the United States is thus infinitely greater and more prolonged than that caused by a general election in England. A change of power in England affects comparatively few personal interests, and absorbs the attention of the country for a comparatively short space of time. In the United States it is long foreseen and elaborately prepared for, and when it comes it involves the personal fortunes of large numbers of citizens. And yet the British constitution is more democratic than the American, in the sense that the popular will can more speedily be brought to bear upon the government.
Change of Power in France.—The established practice of England and America may be compared with the constitutionalism of France. Here the problem presents different conditions. The head of the state is neither a premier of the English, nor a president of the American type. He is served by a prime minister and a cabinet, who, like an English ministry, hold office on the condition of parliamentary confidence; but he holds office himself on the same terms, and is, in fact, a minister like the others. So far as the transmission of power from cabinet to cabinet is concerned, he discharges the functions of an English king. But the transmission of power between himself and his successor is protected by no constitutional devices whatever, and experience would seem to show that no such devices are really necessary. Other European countries professing constitutional government appear to follow the English practice. The Swiss republic is so peculiarly situated that it is hardly fair to compare it with any other. But it is interesting to note that, while the rulers of the states are elected annually, the same persons are generally re-elected.
The Relation between Government and Laws.—It might be supposed that, if any general proposition could be established about government, it would be one establishing some constant relation between the form of a government and the character of the laws which it enforces. The technical language of the English school of jurists is certainly of a kind to encourage such a supposition. The entire body of law in force in a country at any moment is regarded as existing solely by the fiat of the governing power. There is no maxim more entirely in the spirit of this jurisprudence than the following:—“The real legislator is not he by whom the law was first ordained, but he by whose will it continues to be law.” The whole of the vast repertory
- ↑ A government “defeat” may, of course, not really represent a hostile vote in exceptional cases, and in some instances a government has obtained a reversal of the vote and has not resigned.
