reinforced from Cawnpore. Upon the fall of Delhi the troops before that city were freed for the operations in Oudh, and on the 24th of September a column of 2790 men under Colonel Greathed left Delhi. On the 29th a successful action was fought at Bulandshahr, and on the 10th of October the column reached Agra. Here they were surprised by the enemy, but drove them off with considerable loss. On the 14th of October the column left Agra under Colonel Hope Grant, and on the 26th reached Cawnpore, where news was received that the commander-in-chief was coming to take command of the operations. Sir Colin Campbell had been sent out from England to suppress the Mutiny, and had assumed command of the Indian army on the 17th of August, but could not immediately proceed to the front. It was his first task to reorganize the administrative and transport departments; only on the 27th of October did he leave Calcutta. On the 3rd of November he reached Cawnpore, and on the 12th marched upon Lucknow under the guidance of Thomas Henry Kavanagh, who had made his way from the residency disguised as a native for that purpose. Campbell had with him 4500 men with whom to raise a siege maintained by 60,000 trained soldiers occupying strong positions. On the 12th of November the force reached the Alam Bagh, and on the 14th advanced upon Lucknow, proceeding on this occasion across the open plain by the Dilkusha and Martinière instead of through the narrow and tortuous streets of Lucknow. On the 16th the Sikandra Bagh was stormed; on the following day Campbell joined hands with Outram and Havelock, and the relief of Lucknow was finally accomplished.
Sir Colin Campbell now decided to withdraw the garrison and women and children from the residency, and to hold Lucknow by a strong division operating outside the city. The residency was evacuated on the night of the 22nd of Capture of Lucknow. November; but the success of the operations was marred by the death of Havelock. On his return to Cawnpore Campbell found that General Windham was being attacked at that place by the Gwalior contingent. On the 6th of December he defeated the Gwalior contingent in the battle of Cawnpore, though he had only 5000 men against the enemy’s 25,000. His next task was to clear his line of communications with Delhi and the Punjab, and this he accordingly undertook. Lord Canning now decided that the next step should be the reduction of Lucknow, on the ground that it, like Delhi, was a rallying point of the Mutiny, and that its continuance in the hands of the enemy would mean a loss of prestige. General Franks’ column advanced to Lucknow from the eastern frontier of Oudh, defeating the enemy in four actions. Meanwhile Outram had held his own at the Alam Bagh for over three months with only 4000 men against 120,000 rebels. An offer of help from Nepal had been accepted in July, and now Jung Bahadur, the prime minister of Nepal, was advancing with 10,000 Gurkhas to aid in the operations againt Lucknow; but the lateness of his arrival delayed the opening of the siege until the 2nd of March 1858. The Martinière was captured on the 9th of March and the Begum Kothi on the 11th. On the 14th the Imambara was stormed, and the Kaisar Bagh, and on the 16th the residency was once more in British possession. The enemy were thoroughly routed, but Campbell lost the opportunity of pushing the victory home by forbidding Outram to cross the bridge in pursuit if he thought he would lose a “single man,” and by sending the cavalry away from the environs of the city at the critical moment. Upon the fall of Lucknow Lord Canning’s Oudh proclamation was issued, confiscating almost the entire lands of the province, and ensuring only their lives to those rebels who should submit at once. Outram considered the terms of this proclamation dangerously severe, and Lord Ellenborough, president of the board of control, thus criticized it in a hasty despatch, the publication of which necessitated his own resignation. It was afterwards acknowledged that the Oudh proclamation, interpreted as Canning meant it should be, was a wise piece of statesmanship. After the fall of Lucknow Canning insisted that Sir Colin Campbell should take immediate action against the rebels in Oudh and Rohilkhand, and a number of petty and harassing operations were carried out by detached columns; but Campbell moved too slowly to bring his guerrilla opponents to book, and the rebellion was really brought to a conclusion by Sir Hugh Rose’s brilliant campaign in Central India.
Though the two great princes of Central India, Sindhia and Holkar, wisely and fortunately remained true to the British, troops belonging to both of them joined the mutineers. The Gwalior contingent of Sindhia’s army mutinied in The Central India Campaign. the middle of June, and on the 1st of July Holkar’s troops revolted at Indore, and the resident, Henry Durand, was forced to leave the residency. The rani of Jhansi also rose in rebellion, to become known as “the best man upon the side of the enemy.” The rising in this quarter received little attention until January 1858, when Sir Hugh Rose was given the command of two brigades, to act in concert with Sir Colin Campbell, and he immediately began a campaign which for celerity and effectiveness has rarely been equalled in India. His principle was to go straight for the enemy wherever he found him, and pursue him until he had exterminated him. He was hampered by none of that exaggerated respect for the rebels which earned Sir Colin Campbell the nickname of Old Khabardhar (Old Take-Care); but carried to an extreme the policy of audacity. Advancing from Bombay Sir Hugh Rose relieved Saugor on the 3rd of February, after it had been invested by the rebels for upwards of seven months. On the 3rd of March he forced the pass of Madanpur, and took the whole of the enemy’s defences in rear, throwing them into panic. On the 21st he began the siege of Jhansi, the stronghold of the mutineers in Central India, with a garrison of 11,000 men. During the course of the siege Tantia Topi, the most capable native leader of the Mutiny, arrived with a fresh force of 20,000 men, and threatened the British camp; but Sir Hugh Rose, with a boldness which only success could justify, divided his force, and while still maintaining the siege of the fort, attacked Tantia Topi with only 1500 men and completely routed him. This victory was won on the 1st of April, and two days later Sir Hugh carried Jhansi by assault. On the 1st of May the battle of Kunch was fought and won in a temperature of 110° in the shade, many of the combatants on both sides being struck down by heat apoplexy. On the 22nd of May the battle of Kalpi was won, though the European troops were hampered by defective ammunition and Sir Hugh himself here received his fifth sunstroke. In five months he had beaten the enemy in thirteen general actions and sieges, and had captured some of the strongest forts in India. News now arrived that the rebel army under Tantia Topi and the rani of Jhansi had attacked Sindhia, whose troops had gone over to the rebels and delivered Gwalior into their hands. Sir Hugh marched against Gwalior at once, captured the Morar cantonments on the 16th of June, and carried the whole of the Gwalior positions by assault on the 19th, thus restoring his state to Sindhia within ten days of taking the field. This was the crowning stroke of the Central India campaign, and practically put an end to the Mutiny, though the work of stamping out its embers went on for many months, and was only completed with the capture and execution of Tantia Topi in April 1859.
The Indian Mutiny was in no sense a national rising. The great mass of the people in the affected districts either stood neutral, waiting with the immemorial patience of the East to accept the yoke of the conqueror, or helped the Not a national rising. British troops with food and service, in many cases also sheltering British fugitives to the best of their ability. The attempt to throw off the British yoke was confined to a few disaffected ex-rulers and their heirs, with their numerous clansmen and hangers-on, besides the badmashes and highwaymen who saw their way to profit by the removal of the British administration under which their peculiar talents found no safe outlet. The Bengal native army was their tool, which circumstances put into their hands at the psychological moment when British power seemed to be at its lowest point. But the fighting races of the Punjab saw no reason for casting in their lot with the mutineers, and the great majority of the independent princes who had nothing of which to complain, like Patiala in the Punjab,