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MARSHALL, A.—MARSHALL, J.

time of peace they preceded the king on a journey and arranged for his lodging and maintenance. In France maréchal des logis is the title of superior non-commissioned officers in the cavalry.

Similarly at the king’s court the marescalcus aulae or intrinsecus was responsible for order, the admission or exclusion of those seeking access, ceremonial arrangements, &c. Such “marshals” were maintained, not only by the king, but by great lords and ecclesiastics. The more dignified of their functions, together with the title, survive in the various German courts, where the court marshal (Hofmarschall) is equivalent to the English lord chamberlain. Just as the marescalcus intrinsecus acted as the vicar of the marshal for duties “within” the court, so the marescalcus forinsecus was deputed to perform those acts of serjeanty due from the marshal to the Crown “without.” Similarly there appears in the statute 5 Edw. III. cap. 8, a marescalcus banci regii (maréchal du Banc du Roy), or marshal of the king’s bench, who presided over the Marshalsea Court, and was responsible for the safe custody of prisoners, who were bestowed in the mareschalcia, or Marshalsea prison. The office of marshal of the queen’s bench survived till 1849 (see Lord Steward; and Marshalsea). The official known as a judge’s marshal, whose office is of considerable antiquity, and whose duties consisted of making abstracts of indictments and pleadings for the use of the judge, still survives, but no longer exercises the above functions. He accompanies a judge of assize on circuit and is appointed by him at the beginning of each circuit. His travelling and other expenses are paid by the judge, and he receives an allowance of two guineas a day, which is paid through the Treasury. He introduces the high sheriff of the county to the judge of assize on his arrival, and swears in the grand jury. For the French maréchaussée see France: § Law and Institutions.

In the sense of executive legal officer the title marshal survives in the United States of America in two senses. The United States marshal is the executive officer of the Federal courts, one being appointed for each district, or exceptionally, one for two districts. His duties are to open and close the sessions of the district and circuit courts, serve warrants, and execute throughout the district the orders of the court. There are United States marshals also in Alaska, Hawaii, Porto Rico and the Philippines. They are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of four years, and, besides their duties in connexion with the courts, are employed in the service of the internal revenue, public lands, post office, &c. The temporary police sworn in to maintain order in times of disturbance, known in England as special constables, are also termed marshals in the United States. In some of the southern and western states of the Union the title marshal has sunk to that of the village policeman, as distinct from the county officers known as sheriffs and those of the justices’ courts called constables.

In England the title of marshal, as applied to an executive officer, survives only in the army, where the provost marshal is chief of the military police in large garrisons and in field forces. Office and title were borrowed from the French prévot des maréchaux, the modern equivalent of the medieval praepositus marescalcorum or guerrarum.


MARSHALL, ALFRED (1842–  ), English economist, was born in London on the 26th of July 1842. He was educated at the Merchant Taylors’ School and St John’s College, Cambridge, being second wrangler in 1865, and in the same year becoming fellow of his college. He became principal of University College, Bristol, in 1877, and was lecturer and fellow of Balliol College, Oxford in 1883–1884. He was professor of political economy at Cambridge University from 1885 to 1908, and was a member of the Royal Commission on Labour in 1891. He became a fellow of the British Academy in 1902. He wrote (in conjunction with his wife) Economics of Industry (1879), whilst his Principles of Economics (1st ed., 1890) is a standard English treatise.


MARSHALL, JOHN (1755–1835), American jurist, chief-justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, was born on the 24th of September 1755 at Germantown (now Midland), in what four years later became Fauquier county, Virginia. He was of English descent, the son of Thomas Marshall (1732–1806) and his wife Mary Isham Keith. Marshall served first as lieutenant and after July 1778 as captain in the Continental Army during the War of Independence. He resigned his commission early in 1781; was admitted to the bar after a brief course of study, first practised in Fauquier county; and after two years began to practise in Richmond. In 1786 we find him counsel in a case of great importance, Hite v. Fairfax, involving the original title of Lord Fairfax to that large tract of country between the headwaters of the Potomac and Rappahannock, known as the northern neck of Virginia. Marshall represented tenants of Lord Fairfax and won his case. From this time, as is shown by an examination of Call’s Virginia Reports which cover the period, he maintained the leadership of the bar of Virginia. He was a member of the Virginia Assembly in 1782–1791 and again in 1795–1797; and in 1788, he took a leading part in the Virginia Convention called to act on the proposed constitution for the United States, with Madison ably urging the ratification of that instrument. In 1795 Washington offered him the attorney-generalship, and in 1796, after the retirement of James Monroe, the position of minister to France. Marshall declined both offers because his situation at the bar appeared to him “to be more independent and not less honourable than any other,” and his “preference for it was decided.” He spent the autumn and winter of 1797–1798 in France as one of the three commissioners appointed by President John Adams to adjust the differences between the young republic and the directory. The commission failed, but the course pursued by Marshall was approved in America, and with the resentment felt because of the way in which the commission had been treated in France, made him, on his return, exceedingly popular. To this popularity, as well as to the earnest advocacy of Patrick Henry, he owed his election as a Federalist to the National House of Representatives in the spring of 1799, though the feeling in Richmond was overwhelmingly in favour of the opposition or Republican party. His most notable service in Congress was his speech on the case of Thomas Nash, alias Jonathan Robbins, in which he showed that there is nothing in the constitution of the United States which prevents the Federal government from carrying out an extradition treaty. He was secretary of state under President Adams from the 6th of June 1800 to the 4th of March 1801. In the meantime he had been appointed chief-justice of the Supreme Court, his commission bearing date the 31st of January. Thus while still secretary he presided as chief-justice.

At the time of Marshall’s appointment it was generally considered that the Supreme Court was the one department of the new government which had failed in its purpose. John Jay, the first chief-justice, who had resigned in 1795, had just declined a reappointment to the chief-justiceship on the ground that he had left the bench perfectly convinced that the court would never acquire proper weight and dignity, its organization being fatally defective. The advent of the new chief-justice was marked by a change in the conduct of business in the court. Since its organization, following the prevailing English custom, the judges had pronounced their opinions seriatim. But beginning with the December term 1801, the chief-justice became practically the sole mouthpiece of the court. For eleven years the opinions are almost exclusively his, and there are few recorded dissents. The change was admirably adapted to strengthen the power and dignity of the court. The chief-justice embodied the majesty of the judicial department of the government almost as fully as the president stood for the power of the executive. That this change was acquiesced in by his associates without diminishing their goodwill towards their new chief is testimony to the persuasive force of Marshall’s personality; for his associates were not men of mediocre ability. After the advent of Mr Justice Joseph Story the practice was abandoned. Marshall, however, still delivered the opinion in the great majority of cases, and in practically all cases of any importance involving the interpretation of the Constitution. During the course of his judicial life his associates were as a rule men of learning and ability. During most of the time the majority were the appointees of