the second with the second and final capture on the night of the
4th of December.
Shortly after the fall of the empire the government of National Defence, having decided that it must remain in Paris in spite of the impending siege, dispatched a delegation to Tours to direct the government and the war in the provinces. This was originally composed (10–15 September) of two aged lawyers, Cremieux and Glais-Bizoin, and a naval officer, Vice-Admiral Fourichon, who had charge of both the war and the marine ministries. A retired general, de la Motte-Rouge, was placed in command of the “territorial division of Tours.” He found, scattered over the south and west of France, a number of regular units, mostly provisional regiments, squadrons and batteries, assembled from the depots, and all exceedingly ill supplied and equipped; but of such forces as he could muster he constituted the 15th corps. There were also ever-growing forces of mobiles, but these were wholly untrained and undisciplined, scarcely organized in battalions and for the most part armed with old-pattern weapons.
In these circumstances—the relative unimportance of the provincial war, the senility of the directors, the want of numbers, equipment and training in the troops available outside the walls of Paris—the rôle of the delegation was at first restricted to the establishment of a cordon of weak posts just out of reach of the German cavalry, with the object of protecting the formation of new corps and divisions in the interior. At the time of the investment of Paris part of the provincial forces were actually called in to reinforce the garrison. Only Reyau’s weak cavalry division was sent out from Paris into the open country.
On their side the Germans had not enough forces left, after investing the capital with the III. and IV. Armies and Metz with the I. and II., to undertake a long forward stride to the Loire or the Cher. The only covering force provided on the south side of their Paris lines was the I. Bavarian corps, which had also to act as the reserve of the III. Army, and the cavalry divisions (6th, 4th, 2nd), whose chief work was the collection of supplies for the besiegers.
Shortly after this, near the end of September, francs-tireurs and small parties of National Guards became very active in Beauce, Perche and Gatinais, and the Germ.an 4th cavalry division between Etampes and Toury was reinforced by some Bavarian battalions in consequence. But no important assemblies of French troops were noted, and indeed Orleans was twice evacuated on the mere rumour of the German advance. Moltke and every other German soldier gave no credence to rumours of the formation of a 15th corps behind the Loire—Trochu himself disbelieved in its existence—and the cavalry divisions, with their infantry supports, went about their ordinary business of gathering supplies.
In reality, however, the Delegation, unready as were its troops, was on the point of taking the offensive. In deference to popular clamour, a show of force in Beauce was decided upon. This was carried out by a force of all arms under Reyau on the 5th of October. It succeeded only too well. Prince Albert of Prussia, commander of the 4th cavalry division, which engaged Reyau at Toury, was so much impressed that he gave back 20 m. and sent alarming reports to army headquarters, which thereupon lost its incredulity and announced in army orders that the French “Army of the Loire” was advancing from Orleans. Von der Tann, the commander of the I. Bavarian corps, was ordered to take up a defensive position at Montlhery and to send out a detachment to cover Prince Albert’s retreat. The 22nd infantry division was added to his command, and the 2nd and 6th cavalry divisions warned to protect his flanks. Thus the Germans were led to pay attention to the existence of the 15th corps when that corps was not only itself incomplete but also unsupported by the 16th, 17th and other still merely potential formations.
The preparations of the Germans were superfluous, for the demonstration ended in nothing. Reyau drew away leisurely towards Fontainebleau forest, and only a part of the 15th corps was sent up from Bourges to Orleans. Further, the fears of a sortie from Paris, which had occupied the German headquarters for some time, having for a moment ceased, Moltke on the 7th ordered von der Tann, with the I. Bavarian corps, 22nd division, and the three cavalry divisions, to advance. Next day these orders expanded. Orleans and, if possible. Tours itself were to be captured.
The punishment for the military promenade in Beauce was at hand. The main body of the 15th corps, which had not been required to take part in it, was kept back at Bourges and Vierzon, and only the miscellaneous troops actually in Beauce were available to meet the blow they had provoked. On the 10th von der Tann attackedFirst capture of Orleans. Reyau, who had returned from Fontainebleau towards Orleans, at Artenay. Had it not been that von der Tann believed that the 15th corps was in front of him, and therefore attacked deliberately and carefully, Reyau’s resistance would have been even more brief than it was. The French were enormously outnumbered, and, after a brave resistance, were driven towards Orleans in great disorder. Being still without any real offensive intentions, the Delegation and La Motte-Rouge decided, the same night, to evacuate Orleans. On the 11th, therefore, von der Tann’s advance had to deal with no more than a strong rearguard on the outskirts of Orleans. But he was no longer on the plain of Beauce; villas, hedges and vineyards, as well as the outskirts of the great forest of Orleans, gave excellent cover to the French infantry, all of which showed steadiness and some battalions true heroism, and the attack developed so slowly that the final positions of the defenders were not forced till close upon nightfall. The Germans lost at least 1000 men, and the harvest of prisoners proved to be no more than 1500. So far from pressing on to Tours, the Germans were well content with the occupation of Orleans.
The defeated enemy disappeared into Sologne, whither the assailants could not follow. Rumours of all sorts began to assail the German commander, who could not collect reliable news by means of the agencies under his own control because of the fluctuating but dense cordon of mobiles and francs-tireurs all around him. Moltke and Blumenthal wished him to strike out southward towards the arsenals of Bourges, the depots of vehicles at Chateauroux and the improvised government offices at Tours. But he represented that he could not maintain himself nine or ten marches away from his nearest supports, and he was therefore allowed to stay at Orleans. The 22nd division and the 4th cavalry division, however, were withdrawn from him, and under these conditions von der Tann became uneasy as to his prospects of retaining even Orleans. His uneasiness was emphasized by reports of the appearance of heavy masses of French troops on the Loire above and below Orleans—reports that were true as regards the side of Blois, and more or less false as regards the Gien country. This news was obtained by the III. Army headquarters on the 19th of October, and next day von der Tann was ordered “not to abandon Orleans unless threatened by a greatly superior force.” Such a threat soon became pronounced.
A new directing influence was at work at Tours in the person of
Leon Gambetta, who arrived there by balloon from Paris and took
control of the Delegation on the 11th. With de Freycinet (who was
appointed deputy minister of war) as his most valued assistant,
Gambetta at once became not merely the head of the government
in the provinces, but the actual director of the war, in virtue of the
fact that he was the very incarnation of the spirit of resistance to
the invader. De la Motte-Rouge was replaced at the head of the
15th corps by General d’Aurelle de Paladines, under whom at the
same time the embryo 16th corps was placed. The new commander
with practically dictatorial powers occupied himself first of all with
the organization and training of his motley troops. The Delegation
indeed planned an advance from Gien on Fontainebleau, but this
was given up on d’Aurelle’s representations, and the 15th corps
drew back to a strong position at Salbris in front ofThe Camp
of Salbris.
Bourges. There by dint of personal ascendancy, relentless
drilling and a few severe courts-martial, d’Aurelle
produced an enormous improvement in the quality of his troops.
Gambetta reinforced the troops at Salbris to the figure of 60,000,
for the camp there was not merely a rendezvous but a school, the
atmosphere of which profoundly affected even troops that only
spent three or four days within its bounds. Meantime the 16th
corps was formed at Blois and Vendome, covered by a screen of
francs-tireurs and National Guards. On October 23 a large force
was sent over to the 16th corps from Salbris. This step was the first
in a new plan of campaign.
A few days before it was taken, there had occurred an incident which led Moltke to a fresh misunderstanding of the situation towards the Loire. As mentioned above, the 22nd infantry and 4th cavalry divisions had been withdrawn from von der Tann’s command and ordered back to Paris, and on their way thither they were told to clear the country roundChâteaudun. Chateaudun and Chartres. General von Wittich, therefore, with the 22nd division and some cavalry, appeared before Châteaudun on the 18th of October. The little town was strongly held and repulsed the first attack. Wittich then prepared a second assault so carefully that sunset was at hand when it was made. It would seem indeed that at this period, when the Germans were hoping for a speedy return to their fatherland, the spirit of the offensive in all ranks had temporarily died away. The assailants carried the edge of the town, only to find themselves involved in a painful struggle in the streets. House-to-house fighting went on long after dark, but at last the inhabitants gave way, and the Germans punished the town for its unconventional resistance by subjecting it to what was practically a sack.[1] After this von Wittich passed on to Charters, which, making his preparations more carefully, he was able to occupy after a few shells had been fired. These events, and the presence of a French force at Dreux, as a matter of fact signified nothing, for the
15th and 16th corps were still on the Loire and at Salbris, but they- ↑ In 1879 the government added the cross of the Legion of Honour to the town arms of Chateaudun.
