There may be no abdominal distension, and no pain or tenderness. The patient may lie quietly in bed, flat on his back, with the legs down straight, and he may have no marked elevation of temperature. There may be no vomiting and no constipation or diarrhoea. In some cases, the neighbouring coils of intestine having been glued together, a collection of serous fluid takes its place in the midst of the mass, and, being walled in by the adhesions, forms a rounded tumour, dull on percussion, but not tender or painful. Such cases, especially when occurring in women, are apt to be mistaken for cystic disease of the ovary.
As regards the treatment of acute peritonitis, the first thing that the surgeon has to do is to assure himself that the disease is not due to some cause which itself should be dealt with, to a septic disease of appendix or Fallopian tube, for instance, or to a toxic condition of the uterus, the result, perhaps, of a criminal or innocent abortion, or to a perforated ulcer of stomach or intestine. In many obscure cases the safest treatment is likely to be afforded by an exploratory abdominal section. If the medical attendant has made up his mind that the question of exploration is not to be entertained—a decision which should be arrived at only after most deliberate consultation—the best thing will be to apply fomentations to the abdomen, and to administer small and repeated doses of morphia by the skin—⅛ or ¼ grain—repeated every hour or so until the physiological effect is produced. As regards other drugs, it may be a question as to whether calomel or Epsom salts should be given. As regards food, the only thing that can be safely recommended is a little hot water taken in sips. A bed-cradle should be placed over the patient in order to keep the weight of the bed-clothes from the abdomen. (E. O.*)
PERIZONIUS (or Accinctus), the name of Jakob Voorbroek
(1651–1715), Dutch classical scholar, who was born at Appingedam
in Groningen on the 26th of October 1651. He was the
son of Anton Perizonius (1626–1672), the author of a once well-known
treatise, De ratione studii theologici. Having studied
at the university of Utrecht, he was appointed in 1682 to the
chair of eloquence and history at Franeker through the influence
of J. G. Graevius and Nicolas Heinsius. In 1693 he was promoted
to the corresponding chair at Leiden, Where he died on
the 6th of April 1715. The numerous works of Perizonius
entitle him to a very high place among the scholars of his age.
Special interest attaches to his edition of the Minerva of Francisco
Sanchez or Sanctius of Salamanca (1st ed., 1587; ed. C. L. Bauer,
1793–1891), one of the last developments of the study of Latin
grammar in its pre-scientific stage, when the phenomena of
language were still regarded as for the most part disconnected,
conventional or fortuitous. Mention should also be made of
his Animadversiones historicae (1685), which may be said to
have laid the foundations of historical criticism, and of his
treatises on the Roman republic, alluded to by Niebuhr as
marking the beginning of that new era of historical study with
which his own name it so closely associated.
The article on Perizonius in Van der Aa's Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden contains full biographical an bibliographical particulars; see also F. A. Eckstein in Ersch and Gruber's Allgemeine Encyklopädie.
PERJURY (through the Anglo-Fr. perjurie, modern parjure, Lat. perjurium, a false oath, perjurare, to swear falsely), an
assertion upon an oath duly administered in a judicial proceeding
before a competent court of the truth of some matter of
fact, material to the question depending in that proceeding,
which assertion the assertor does not believe to be true when he
makes it, or on which he knows himself to be ignorant (Stephen,
Digest of the Criminal Law, art. 135). In the early stages of
legal history perjury seems to have been regarded rather as a
sin than as a crime, and so subject only to supernatural penalties.
The injury caused by a false oath was supposed to be done not
so much to society as to the Divine Being in whose name the
oath was taken (see Oath). In Roman law, even in the time of
the empire, the perjurer fell simply under divine reprobation,
and was not dealt with as a criminal, except where he had been
bribed to withhold true or give false evidence, or where the oath
was by the genius of the emperor. In the latter case punishment
was no doubt inflicted more for the insult to the emperor than for
the perjury. False testimony leading to the conviction of a
person for a crime punishable with death constituted the offence
of homicide rather than of perjury. In England, perjury, as
being a sin, was originally a matter of ecclesiastical cognisance.
At a later period, when it had become a crime, the jurisdiction of
the spiritual courts became gradually confined to such perjury as
was committed in ecclesiastical proceedings, and did not extend
to perjury committed in a temporal court. The only perjury
which was for a long time noticed at common law was the perjury
of jurors. Attaint of jurors (see Attaint, Writ of) who were
originally rather in the position of witnesses than of judges of
fact, incidentally subjected them to punishment for perjury.
Criminal jurisdiction over perjury by persons other than jurors
seems to have been first assumed by the Star Chamber, acting
under the powers supposed to have been conferred by an act
of Henry VII. (1487). After the abolition of the Star Chamber
by the Long Parliament in 1641 and the gradual diminution of
the authority of the spiritual courts, perjury (whether in the
strict sense of the word or the taking of a false oath in non-judicial
proceedings) practically fell entirely within the jurisdiction of
the ordinary criminal tribunals. At common law only a false
oath in judicial proceedings is perjury. But by statute the
penalties of perjury have been extended to extra-judicial matters
e.g. false declarations made for the purpose of procuring marriage
(The Marriage and Registration Act 1856), and false affidavits
under the Bills of Sale Act 1878. False affirmation by a person
permitted by law to affirm is perjury (The Evidence Further
Amendment Act 1869; The Evidence Amendment Act 1870).
In order to support an indictment for perjury the prosecution must prove the authority to administer the oath, the occasion of administering it, the taking of the oath, the substance of the oath, the materiality of the matter sworn, the falsity of the matter sworn, and the corrupt intention of the defendant. The indictment must allege that the perjury was wilful and corrupt, and must set out the false statement or statements on which perjury is assigned, subject to the provisions of the Prosecutions for Perjury Act 1749 (which also applies to subornation of perjury). By that act it is sufficient to set out the substance of the offence, without setting forth the bill, answer, &c., or any part of the record and without setting forth the commission or authority of the court before whom the perjury was committed. The matter sworn to must be one of fact and not of mere belief or opinion. It is not homicide, as in Roman law, to procure the death of another by false evidence, but the Criminal Code, ss. 118, 164, proposed to make such an offence a substantive crime of greater gravity than ordinary perjury, and punishable by penal servitude for life. It is a rule of evidence, founded upon obvious reasons, that the testimony of a single witness is insufficient to convict on a charge of perjury. There must be corroboration of his evidence in some material particular. Perjury is a common law misdemeanour, not triable at quarter-sessions. Most persons in a judicial position have the right of directing the prosecution of any witness, if it appears to them that he has been guilty of perjury (The Criminal Procedure Act 1851). The provisions of the Vexatious Indictments Act 1859 extend to perjury and subornation of perjury. By that Act no indictment for either of such offences can be preferred unless the prosecutor or accused is bound by recognisance, or the accused is in custody, or the consent of a judge is obtained, or (in the case of perjury) a prosecution is directed under the act of 1851.
Subornation of perjury is procuring a person to commit a perjury which he actually commits in consequence of such procurement If the person attempted to be suborned do not take the oath, the person inciting him, though not guilty of subornation, is liable to fine and corporal punishment. Perjury and subornation of perjury are punishable at common law with fine and imprisonment. By the combined operation of the Perjury Act 1728 and later statutes, the punishment at present appears to be penal servitude for any term, or imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding seven years (see Stephen, Digest, art. 148). The punishment at common law was whipping, imprisonment, fine and pillory.
