burden more and more difficult for nations to bear. It consequently seems evident that if this situation be prolonged it will inevitably result in the very disaster it is sought to avoid, and the thought of the horrors of which makes every humane mind shudder. It is the supreme duty, therefore, of all states to place some limit on these increasing armaments, and find some means of averting the calamities which threaten the whole world.”
A further Note submitting the programme proposed gave more precision to this item, which thereupon took the following form: “An understanding not to increase for a fixed period the present effectives of the armed military and naval forces, and at the same time not to increase the budgets pertaining thereto; and a preliminary examination of the means by which even a reduction might be effected in future in the forces and budgets above mentioned.”
When the subject came on for discussion at the conference the German military delegate stated his view that the question of effectives could not be discussed by itself, as there were many others to which it was in some measure subordinated, such, for instance, as the length of service, the number of cadres whether existing in peace or made ready for war, the amount of training received by reserves, the situation of the country itself, its railway system, and the number and position of its fortresses. In a modern army all these questions went together, and national defence included them all. In Germany, moreover, the military system “did not provide for fixed numbers annually, but increased the numbers each year.”
After many expressions of regret at finding no method of giving effect to the. proposal, the commission confined itself to recording its opinion that “a further examination of the question by the Powers would prove a great benefit to humanity.”
The Conference, however, were unanimous in the adoption of the following resolution: —
“The Conference is of opinion that the restriction of military budgets, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind;”
and it passed also the following vœu:
“That governments, taking into account the proposals made at the Conference, should examine the possibility of an understanding concerning the limitation of military and naval armaments, and of war budgets.”
The general public, more particularly in Great Britain and France, shows an ever-increasing distrust of the rapid growth of armaments as a possible cause of grave economic troubles. A high state of military preparedness of any one state obliges all the others to endeavour to be prepared on the same level. This process of emulation, very appropriately called by the late Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman “a policy of huge armaments,” unfortunately is a policy from which it is impossible for any country to extricate itself without the co-operation, direct or indirect, of other nations.
The subject was brought forward in view of the second Hague Conference in both the French and Italian parliaments.
The declaration of the French government stated that: —
“France hoped that other nations would grow, as she had done, more and more attached to solutions of international difficulties based upon the respect of justice, and she trusted that the progress of universal opinion in this direction would enable nations to regard the lessening of the present military budgets, declared by the states represented at the Hague to be greatly desirable for the benefit of the material and moral state of humanity, as a practical possibility.” (Chamber of Deputies, June 12, 1906.)
In the Italian Chamber of Deputies, an interpellation was addressed to the minister of foreign affairs about the same time asking “whether the Government had knowledge of the motion approved by the British House of Commons, and of the undertaking of the British government that, in the programme of the coming Hague Conference, the question of the reduction of armaments should be inserted, and in what spirit the Italian government had taken or proposed to take the propositions of the British government, and what instructions it would give to the Italian representatives at the conference.”
The minister of foreign affairs, M Tittoni, in reply expressed the adhesion of the Italian government to the humanitarian ideas which had met with such enthusiasm in the historic House of Parliament at Westminster. “I have always believed,” he said, “that, as far as we are concerned, it would be a national crime to weaken our own armaments while we are surrounded by strongly armed European nations who look upon the improvement of armaments as a guarantee of peace. Nevertheless, I should consider it a crime against humanity not to sincerely co-operate in an initiative having for object a simultaneous reduction of armaments of the great powers. Italian practice has always aimed at the maintenance of peace; therefore, I am happy to be able to say that our delegates at the coming Hague Conference will be instructed to further the English initiative.”
The only existing case of contractual reduction of armaments is that of the Disarmament Agreement of the 28th of May 1902 between the Chilian and Argentine republics, adopted “owing to the initiative and good offices of His Britannic Majesty,” which is as follows: —
Art. I. — In order to remove all cause of fear and distrust between the two countries, the governments of Chile and of the Argentine Republic agree not to take possession of the warships which they are having built, or for the present to make any other acquisitions. The two governments furthermore agree to reduce their respective fleets, according to an arrangement establishing a reasonable proportion between the two fleets. This reduction to be made within one year from the date at which the present agreement shall be ratified.
Art. II. — The two governments respectively promise not to increase their maritime armaments during five years, unless the one who shall wish to increase them shall give the other eighteen months' notice in advance. This agreement does not include any armaments for the purpose of protecting the shore and ports, and each party will be at liberty to acquire any vessels (maquina flotante) intended for the protection thereof, such as submarines, &c.
Art. III. — The reductions (i.e. ships disposed of) resulting from this agreement will not be parted with to countries having any dispute with either of the two contracting parties.
Art. IV. — In order to facilitate the transfer of the pending orders the two governments agree to increase by two months the time stipulated for the beginning of the construction of the respective ships. They will give instructions accordingly.
An agreement of this kind is obviously more feasible as among states whose navies are small and of comparatively recent origin than among states whose navies are composed of vessels of many and widely different ages. It may be difficult to agree in the latter case on a principle for assessment of the proportionate fighting value of the respective fleets. The break-up or sale of obsolete warships is a diminution of the paper effective of a navy, and their purchase by another state a paper increase of theirs. Even comparatively slight differences in the ages of ships may make great differences in their fighting value. It would be a hard, though probably not insurmountable, task to establish “a reasonable proportion,” such as provided for in Art. II. of the Chile-Argentina Agreement, as between large and old-standing navies like those of Europe.
On the other hand, as regards military power, it seems sometimes forgotten in the discussion of the question of armaments, that the conditions of the present age differ entirely from those of the time of the Napoleonic wars. With conscription a national army corresponds more or less numerically to the proportion of males in the national population. Great Britain, without conscription, has no means of raising troops in any such proportion. Thus, so long as she refrains from adopting conscription, she can only carry on defensive warfare. The object of her navy is therefore necessarily defensive, unless it act in co-operation with a foreign conscript army. As there are practically only three great armies available for the purpose of a war of aggression, the negotiation of contingent arrangements does not seem too remote for achievement by skilful and really well-meaning negotiation. The Hague Conference of 1907, owing to difficulties which occurred in the course of the preliminary negotiations for the conference, did not deal with the subject.
Principle and Capabilities of Neutralization. — Among the different methods which have grown up practically in our own
