Calvinism, and led him to formulate the doctrine that as repentance and faith are the divinely decreed conditions of eternal life, God has determined to give that life to all whom He foresees as fulfilling these conditions According to Calvinism God's election unto salvation is absolute, determined by His own inscrutable will; according to Arminianism it is conditional, dependent on man's use of grace. The Synod of Dort (1618-1619) which affirmed the sublapsarian without excluding the supralapsarian form of Calvinism, condemned the views of Arminius and his followers, who were known as Remonstrants from the remonstrance “ which in four articles repudiates supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism (which regarded the Fall as foreseen, but not decreed), and the doctrines of ll'I'€SlSUbll1ty of grace, and of the impossibility of the elect finally falling away from it, and boldly asserts the universality of grace.” ln the Church of Rome the Dominicans favoured Augustimanism, the Jesuits Semi-Pelagianism; the work of Molina on the agreement of free-will with the gifts of grace provoked a controversy, which the pope silenced without deciding; but which broke out again a generation later when Jansen tried to revive the decaying Augustiuianism. The church of England has passed through several disputes regarding the question whether the Thirty-Nine Articles are Calvinxstic or not; while there is some ambiguity in the language, it seems to favour Calvinism. At the Evangelical Revival the old questions came up, as Wesley favoured Arminianism and George Whitelield Calvinism. In Scotland Calvinism was repudiated by James Morison, the founder of the Evangelical Union, who declared the three universalities, God's love for all, Christ's death for all, the Holy Spirit's working for all. While retained in the creeds of several denominations, in the public teaching of the churches the doctrine of predestination has lost its place and power. While the doctrine of election magnified God's grace, and so encouraged humility in man, it minimized man's freedom, and so produced either an over-confidence in those who believed themselves elect, or despair in those who could not reach the assurance. Now it is recognized that God's sovereignty must be conceived as consistent with man's liberty. While God fulfils His all-embracing purpose, that fulfilment leaves room for the exercise of individual freedom; the freedom God has bestowed on man He can so restrain and direct as to overrule even its abuse for His own gracious ends. That God desires that all should be saved, and that the salvation of each depends on his own choice-these are the general convictions of modern theology. The problem now is the reconciliation of human freedom with divine foreknowledge. Martineau accepts Dugald Stewart's solution. “There is no absurdity in supposing that the deity may, for wise purposes, have chosen to open a source of contingency in the voluntary actions of his creatures, to which no prescience can possibly extend.” Others hold the problem to be insoluble, and not needing grab; sgvted.
PREDICABLES (Lat. praedicabilis, that which may be stated or affirmed), in scholastic logic, a term applied to a classification of the possible relations in which a predicate may stand to its subject. The list given by the schoolmen and generally adopted by modern logicians is based on the original fivefold classification given by Aristotle (Topics, α iv. 101 b. 17-25): definition (ὅρος), genus (γένος), differentia (διαφορά), property (ἴδιον), accident (συμβεβηκός).[1] The scholastic classification, obtained from Böetius's Latin version of Porphyry's Eisagoge, modified Aristotle's by substituting species (εἶδος) for definition. Both classifications are of universals, concepts or general terms, proper names of course being excluded. There is, however, a radical difference between the two systems. The standpoint of the Aristotelian classification is the predication of one universal concerning another. The Porphyrian, by introducing species, deals with the predication of universals concerning individuals (for species is necessarily predicated of the individual), and thus created difficulties from which the Aristotelian is free (see below).
The Aristotelian classification may be briefly explained: (1) The Definition of anything is the statement of its essence (Arist. τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), i.e. that which makes it what it is: e.g. " a triangle is a three-sided rectilineal figure." (2) Genus is that part of the essence which is also predicable of other things different from them in kind. A triangle is a rectilineal figure; i.e. in fixing the genus of a thing, we subsume it under a higher universal, of which it is a species. (3) Differentia is that part of the essence which distinguishes one species from another. As compared with. quadrilaterals, hexagons, &c., all of which are rectilineal figures, a triangle is "differentiated" as having three sides. (4) A Property is an attribute which is common to all the members of a class, but is not part of its essence (i.e. need not be given in its definition). The fact that the interior angles of all triangles are equal to two right angles is not part of the definition, but is universally true. (5) An Accident is an attribute which may or may not belong to a subject. The colour of the human hair is an accident, for it belongs in no way to the essence of humanity.
This classification, though it is of high value in the clearing up of our conceptions of the essential contrasted with the accidental, the relation of genus, differentia and definition and so forth, is of more significance in connexion with abstract sciences, especially mathematics, than for the physical sciences. It is superior on the whole to the Porphyrian scheme, which has grave defects. As has been said it classifies universals as predicates of individuals and thus involves the difficulties which gave rise to the controversy between realism and nominalism (q.v.). How are we to distinguish species from genus ? Napoleon was a Frenchman, a man, an animal. In the second place how do we distinguish property and accident? Many so-called accidents are predicable necessarily of any particular persons. This difficulty gave rise to the distinction of separable and inseparable accidents, which is one of considerable difficulty.
See the modern logic textbooks.
PREDICAMENT, now used only in the sense of a dangerous or unpleasant position or situation. It meant properly that which is " predicated " or affirmed (Lat. praedicare) of anything, in logic, one of the ten Aristotelian categories (see Category), and so any definite state or condition. The use of " predicament " in the sense of " bad predicament," without the limiting adjective, is paralleled by " plight," for " bad plight," " success " for " good success."
PREDICATION (from Lat. praedicare, to state, assert), in logic, the term which denotes the joining of a predicate to a subject in a judgment or proposition. The statement “ all men are mortal ” is to predicate mortality of all men. In other Words a judgment is made up of a subject and a predicate joined by a copula. Since the true unit of thought is the judgment, since all concepts or universals exist only in continuous thinking
(judging), the theory of predication is a fundamental part of logic. The true relation of subject and predicate has not been determined with unanimity, various logicians emphasizing different aspects of the process (see LOGIC). The logical use of “ predicate
” is to be distinguished from the grammatical, which
includes the verb, whether it be the verb “ to be ” in its various
forms, or another verb. The simple grammatical sentence
“ he strokes the dog ” the first word is the subject, while “ strokes
the dog ” is the predicate, including verb and object. In logic
every proposition is reducible to the form “ A is B, ” “ B ” being
the predicate. Thus the logical form of “ he strokes the dog ”
would be “ he is stroking the dog ” or some other periphrasis
which liberates and determines the logical predicate. The
true significance of the logical copula is difficult. It cannot be
described simply as a third (i.e. separate part) of the judgment,
because until two terms are enjoined by it they are not subject
and predicate. Much discussion has raged round the question
whether the use of the verb “ to be ” as the copula implies that
existence is predicated by the subject. It may be taken as
generally agreed that this is not the case (see further LOGIC, and the textbooks).
PRE-EXISTENCE, DOCTRINE OF, in theology, the doctrine that Jesus Christ had a human soul which existed before the creation of the world-the first and most perfect of created things and subsisted, prior to His human birth, in union with the Second Person of the Godhead. It was this human soul which suffered the pain and sorrow described in the Gospels. The chief exposition of this doctrine is that of Dr Watts (Works, v.
274, &c.); it has received little support. In a wider form the doctrine has been applied to men in general-namely, that in the beginning of Creation God created the souls of all men, which were subsequently as a punishment for ill-doing incarnated in physical bodies till discipline should render them fit for spiritual
existence. Supporters of this doctrine, the Pre-exist ants or Pre-existiani, are found as early as the 2nd century, among
- ↑ Strictly Aristotle's classification is into four as διαφορά really belongs to γένος.
