that territory by telegraph with British possessions in the south. In the following year, 1893, it was found inevitable to fight the Matabele, and a war, prosecuted with a success that is perhaps unique of its kind, placed the country entirely in British hands. The territory thus added to the British empire covered an extent of 450,000 square miles, of which large portions consist of healthy uplands suitable for white colonization. The pioneer party who constructed the first road and founded the first British stations in the country received their orders to cross the frontier in the end of 1889. By the end of 1899, before the outbreak of the South African War, though the country had passed through the trial of a war, two native rebellions, and the scourge of rinderpest, it had become, under the name of Rhodesia, a well-settled province of the British empire, with a white population of some 12,000 to 13,000 persons.
The six years which followed the granting of the charter may be regarded as the most successful of a singularly successful life. In 1890, not many months after the granting of the charter, Mr Rhodes accepted the position of prime minister of the Cape. He was maintained in power very largely by the Dutch vote, which he spared no pains to conciliate; and having the confidence of both political sections of the colony, he found himself practically in a position to play the part of benevolent despot in South Africa. He used the position well so far as the public was concerned. While his scheme of northern expansion was making the rapid progress which has been indicated, he did much to elevate and to enlarge the field of local politics. He frankly declared and worked for the policy of uniting British and Dutch interests in South Africa; he took a keen interest in local education. He also during this period carried through some important reforms in native policy. He had the courage to restrict the franchise, introducing an educational test and limiting the exercise of voting power to men enjoying an income equal to a labourer's wage—thus abolishing, without making any distinction of colour, the abuses of what was known as the “blanket” vote.
But his native policy was far from being one of simple restriction. He liked the natives; he employed them by thousands in the mining industry, he kept native servants habitually about his person he seemed to understand their peculiarities and was singularly successful in dealing with them. The first canon of his native policy was that liquor should be kept from them; the second, that they should be encouraged to labour, and guaranteed the full possession of their earnings; the third, that they should be educated in the practical arts of peace. He appreciated the full importance of raising their territorial condition from one of tribal to individual tenure; and while he protested against the absurdity of permitting the uncivilized Kaffir to vote on questions of highly civilized white policy, he believed in applying to the native for his own native affairs the principle of self-government. Of these views some received practical embodiment in the much-disputed act known as the Glen Grey Act of 1894. In this connexion it may also be noted that he was one of the warmest and most convinced supporters of Lovedale, the very successful missionary institution for the education of natives in South Africa.
The position of benevolent despot has obvious drawbacks. In Mr Rhodes's case the dependence which the populations of Cape Colony were led to place on him had its reaction on the public in a demoralizing loss of self-reliance, and for himself it must be admitted that the effect on the character of a man already much disposed to habits of absolutism in thought and action was the reverse of beneficial. Mr Rhodes felt himself to be far stronger than any man in his own surroundings; he knew himself to be actuated by disinterested motives in the aims which he most earnestly desired to reach. He was profoundly impressed by a sense of the shortness of life, and he so far abused his power as to become intolerant of any sort of control or opposition. The inevitable result followed, that though Mr Rhodes did much of great and good work during the six years of his supreme power, he entirely failed during that period to surround himself, as he might have done, by a circle of able men fit to comprehend and to carry on the work to which his own best efforts were directed. To work with him was practically impossible for those who were not willing to accept without demur the yoke of dogmatic authority. He had a few devoted personal friends, who appreciated his aims and were inspired by his example; but he was lacking in regard for individuals, and a great part of his daily life was spent in the company of satellites and instruments, whom he used with cynical unconcern for the furtherance of his ends.
In 1896 the brilliant period of his premiership was brought to an end by the incident which became famous under the name of the Jameson Raid. The circumstances which led to the Raid belong properly to the history of the Transvaal. It is enough to say briefly here that the large alien population which had been attracted to the Transvaal by the phenomenal wealth of the Johannesburg goldfields, conceiving themselves to have reason to revolt against the authority of the Transvaal government, resolved towards the end of 1895 to have recourse to arms in order to obtain certain reforms. Mr Rhodes, as a large mine-owner, was theoretically a member of the mining population. In this capacity he was asked to give his countenance to the movement. But as prime minister of a British colony he was evidently placed in a false position from the moment in which he became cognizant of a secret attempt to overturn a neighbouring government by force of arms. He did more than become cognizant. The subsequent finding of a Cape committee, which he accepted as accurate, was to the effect that “in his capacity as controller of the three great joint-stock companies, the British South Africa Company, the De Beers Consolidated Mines, and the Gold Fields of South Africa, he directed and controlled the combination which rendered such a proceeding as the Jameson Raid possible.” He gave money, arms and influence to the movement; and as the time fixed for the outbreak of the revolution approached, he allowed Dr Jameson, who was then administrator of the British South Africa Company in Rhodesia, to move an armed force of some 500 men upon the frontier. Here Mr Rhodes's participation in the movement came to an end. It became abundantly clear from subsequent inquiry that he was not personally responsible for what followed. A cipher correspondence, seized and published by the Boers, left the civilized world in no doubt as to Mr Rhodes's share in the previous preparation, and he was for a time believed to be responsible for the Raid itself. Subsequent inquiries held by committees of the Cape parliament and of the British House of Commons acquitted him entirely of responsibility for Dr Jameson's final movement, but both committees found that he had acted in a manner which was inconsistent with his duty as prime minister of the Cape and managing director of the British South Africa Company.
He displayed, in the circumstances, characteristic qualities of pluck and candour. He made no concealment of his own share in the catastrophe; he took full responsibility for what had been done in his name by subordinates, and he accepted all the consequences which ensued. He resigned his premiership of the Cape (January 1896); and, recognizing that his presence was no longer useful in the colony, he turned his attention to Rhodesia. His design was to live in that country, and to give all the stimulus of his own presence and encouragement to the development of its resources. The Matabele rebellion of March 1896 intervened to prevent the immediate realization of his plans. In June Imperial troops were sent up, and by the end of July the result of the military operations had driven the natives to the Matoppo Hills, where they held a practically impregnable position. The prospect was of continued war, with a renewal of a costly campaign in the following year. Mr Rhodes conceived the idea that he might effect single-handed the pacification which military skill had failed to compel. To succeed, it was essential that he should trust and be trusted. He accordingly moved his tent away from the troops to the base of the Matoppo Hills. He lay there quietly for six weeks, in the power of the enemy if they had chosen to attack. Word was circulated among the natives
