were discussed in vain between August 1903 and February 1904, and finally negotiations were broken off on February 5th.[1] Japan had already on the 4th decided to use force, and her military and naval preparations, unlike those of Russia, kept pace with her diplomacy.
This was in fact an eventuality which had been foreseen and on which the naval and military policy of Japan had been based for ten years. She too had her projects of expansion and hegemony, and by the Chino-Japanese War she had gained a start over her rival. The reply of the Western powers was first to compel the victor to maintain the territorial integrity of China, and then within two years to establish themselves in Chinese harbours. From that moment Japanese policy was directed towards establishing her own hegemony and meeting the advance of Russia with a fait accompli. But her armaments were not then adequate to give effect to a strong-handed policy, so that for some years thereafter the government had both to impose heavy burdens on the people and to pursue a foreign policy of marking time, and endured the fiercest criticism on both counts, for the idea of war with Russia was as popular as the taxes necessary to that object were detested. But as the army and the navy grew year by year, the tone of Japanese policy became firmer. In 1902 her position was strengthened by the alliance with England; in 1903 her army, though in the event it proved almost too small, was considered by the military authorities as sufficiently numerous and well prepared, and the arguments of the Japanese diplomatists stiffened with menaces. Russia, on the other hand, was divided in policy and consequently in military intentions and preparations. In some quarters the force of the new Japanese army was well understood, and the estimates of the balance of military power formed by the minister of war, Kuropatkin, coincided so remarkably with the facts that at the end of the summer of 1903 he saw that the moment had come when the preponderance was on the side of the Japanese. He therefore proposed to abandon Russian projects in southern Manchuria and the Port Arthur region and to restore Port Arthur to China in return for considerable concessions on the side of Vladivostok. His plan was accepted, but “a lateral influence suddenly made itself felt, and the completely unexpected result was war.” Large commercial interests were in fact involved in the forward policy, “the period of heavy capital expenditure was over, that of profits about to commence,” and the power and intentions of Japan were ignored or misunderstood. Further, Dragomirov, a higher military authority even than Kuropatkin, declared that “Far Eastern affairs were decided in Europe.” Thus Russia entered upon the war both unprepared in a military sense, and almost entirely indifferent to its causes and its objects. To the guards and patrols of the Manchurian railway and the garrisons of Port Arthur and Vladivostok, 80,000 in all, Japan could, in consequence of her recruiting law of 1896, oppose a first-line army of some 270,000 trained men. Behind these, however, there were scarcely 200,000 trained men of the older classes, and at the other end of the long Trans-Siberian railway Russia had almost limitless resources.[2] The strategical problem for Japan was, how to strike a blow sufficiently decisive to secure her object, before the at present insignificant forces of the East Siberian army were augmented to the point of being unassailable. It turned, therefore, principally upon the efficiency of the Trans-Siberian railway and in calculating this the Japanese made a serious underestimate. In consequence, far from applying the “universal service” principle to its full extent, they trained only one-fifth of the annual contingent of men found fit for service. The quality of the army, thus composed of picked men (a point which is often forgotten), approximated to that of a professional force; but this policy had the result that, as there was no adequate second-line army, parts of the first-line had to be reserved, instead of being employed at the front. And when for want of these active troops the first great victory proved indecisive, half-trained elements had to be sent to the front in considerable numbers—indeed the ration strength of the army was actually trebled. The aim of the war, “limited” in so far that the Japanese never deluded themselves with dreams of attacking Russia at home, was to win such victories as would establish the integrity of Japan herself and place her hegemony in the Objectives of the Japanese attack. Far East beyond challenge. Now the integrity of Japan was worth little if the Russians could hope ultimately to invade her in superior force, and as Port Arthur was the station of the fleet that might convoy an invasion, as well as the symbol of the longed-for hegemony, the fortress was necessarily the army's first objective, a convincing Sedan was the next. For the navy, which had materially only a narrow margin of superiority over the Russian Pacific Squadron, the object was to keep the two halves of that squadron, at Port Arthur and Vladivostok respectively, separate and to destroy them in detail. But in February weather these objects could not be pursued simultaneously. Prior to the break-up of the ice, the army could only disembark at Chemulpo, far from the objective, or at Dalny under the very eyes of its defenders. The army could therefore, for the moment, only occupy Korea and try to draw upon itself hostile forces that would otherwise be available to assist Port Arthur when the land attack opened. For the navy, instant action was imperative.
On the 8th of February the main battle-fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral Togo, was on the way to Port Arthur. During the night his torpedo-boats surprised the Russian squadron in harbour and inflicted serious losses, and later in the day the battleships engaged the coast batteries. Repulsed in this attempt, the Japanese established a stringent blockade, which tried the endurance of the ships and the men to the utmost. From time to time the torpedo-craft tried to run in past the batteries, several attempts were made to block the harbour entrance by sinking vessels in the fairway, and free and deadly use was made by both sides of submarine mines. But, though not destroyed, the Port Arthur squadron was paralysed by the instantaneous assertion of naval superiority.
Admiral Alexeiev, the tsar's viceroy in the Far East and the evil genius of the war, was at Port Arthur and forbade the navy to take the risks of proceeding to sea.[3] For a time, when in place of Admiral Starck (who was held responsible for the surprise of February), Admiral Makárov, an officer of European reputation, commanded the fleet, this lethargy was shaken off. The new commander took his ships to sea every day. But his energetic leadership was soon ended by a tragedy. A field Makárov at Port Arthur. of electro-mechanical mines was laid by the Japanese in the night of April 12th-13th, and on the following day the Japanese cruisers stood inshore to tempt the enemy on to the mine-field. Makárov, however, crossed it without accident, and pursued the cruisers until Togo's battle-fleet appeared, whereupon he went about and steamed for port. In doing so he recrossed the mine-field, and this time the mines were effectual. The flagship “Petropavlovsk” was struck and went down with the admiral and 600 men, and another battleship was seriously injured. Then the advocates of passivity regained the upper hand and kept the squadron in harbour, and henceforward for many months the Japanese navy lay unchallenged off Port Arthur, engaging in minor operations, covering the transport of troops to the mainland, and watching for the moment when the advance of the army should force the Russian fleet to come out. Meantime seven Japanese cruisers under Vice-Admiral Kaimamura went in search of the Russian Vladivostok squadron; this, however, evaded them for some months, and inflicted some damage on the Japanese mercantile marine and transports. The Japanese had not waited to gain command of the sea before beginning the sea transport of that part of their troops allotted to Korea. The roads of that country were so poor that the landing had
