to pursue, the storm broke. Kuropatkin had drawn together seven divisions on the left rear of the XVII. Corps, the strength of the whole being about 90,000. On the extreme left was Orlov’s brigade of all arms at Yentai Mines, then came the I. Siberian Corps (Stakelberg), then the X. Corps, then the XVII. But Orlov, perplexed by conflicting instructions and caught in an unfavourable situation by a brigade of the 12th division which was executing the proposed “pursuit,” gave way—part of his force in actual rout—and the cavalry that was with him was driven back by the, Kobi (reserve army) brigade of the Guard. The fugitives of Orlov’s command disordered the on-coming corps of Stakelberg, and the outer flank of the great counterstroke that was to have rolled up Kuroki’s thin line came to an entire standstill. Meantime the X. Corps furiously attacked Okasaki on the Manjuyama, and though its first assault drove in a portion of Okasaki’s line, a second and a third, made in the night, failed to shake the constancy of the 15th brigade. Misunderstandings and movements at cross-purposes multiplied on the Russian side, and at midnight Kuropatkin at last obtained information of events on the side of Yentai Mines. This was to the effect that Orlov was routed, Stakelberg’s command much shaken, and at the same time Zarubayev in Liao-Yang, upon whom Oku and Nozu had pressed a last furious attack, reported that he had only a handful of troops still in reserve. Then Kuropatkin’s resolution collapsed, although about three divisions were still intact, and he gave the order to retreat on Mukden.
Thus the Japanese had won their great victory with inferior
forces, thanks “in the first instance to the defeat of General
Orlov. But at least as large a share in the ruin of the Russian
operations must be attributed to the steadfast gallantry of the
15th brigade on Manjuyama.” The losses of the Japanese
totalled 23,000, those of the Russians 19,000. Coming,
Russian retreat
on Mukden.
as it did, at a moment when the first attacks on Port
Arthur had been repulsed with heavy losses, this
brilliantly successful climax of the four months' campaign
more than restored the balance. But it was not the
expected Sedan. Had the two divisions still kept in Japan
been present Kuroki would have had the balance of force on his
side, the Russian retreat would have been confused, if not
actually a rout, and the war would have been ended on Japan’s
own terms. As it was, after another day’s fighting, Kuropatkin
drew off the whole of his forces in safety, sharply repulsing an
attempt at pursuit made by part of the 12th division on the
4th of September. The railway still delivered 30,000 men a
month at Mukden, and Japan had for a time outrun her resources.
At St Petersburg the talk was not of peace but of
victory, and after a period of reorganization the Russians
advanced afresh to a new trial of strength. But the remainder
of the Manchurian campaign, like the second half of the war of
1850, was nothing more than a series of violent and resultless
encounters of huge armies—armies far larger than those which
had fought out the real struggle for supremacy at Liao-Yang and
Magenta.
At this time the siege of Port Arthur had only progressed so far
that the besiegers were able to realize the difficulties before them.
Nogi landed on the 1st of June, and his army (1st and 11th divisions)
gradually separated itself from Oku’s and got into position for the
advance on Port Arthur. Dalny, the commercial harbour, was
seized without fighting, and a month was spent in preparing a base
Nogi’s advance
on Port Arthur.
there. But so far from retiring within his fort-line Stessel
took up a strong position outside. Dislodged from this on
the 26th of June, the Russians checked Nogi’s further
advance on July 3–4 by a fierce, though unsuccessful,
counterstroke. Having been reinforced by the 9th division
and two extra brigades of infantry, Nogi advanced again on the
26th. The Russians, having had a month wherein to intrench
themselves, held out all along the line; but after two days and one
night of fighting amongst rocks and on precipitous hillsides, the
Japanese broke through on the night of July 27–28. Stessel then
withdrew in good order into Port Arthur, which in the two months
he had gained by his fighting manœuvre had been considerably
strengthened. Nogi had already lost 8000 men.
The defences of Port Arthur, as designed by the Russians in 1900, and owing to the meagre allotment of funds only partially carried out before the war, had some tincture, but no more, of modern continental ideas. There was a continuous enceinte of plain trace round the Old Town, at a distance of 1000 to 2000 yds. from it, which had not and could not have had any influence on the issue of the siege. The main line of defence followed the outer edge of the amphitheatre of hills surrounding the harbour. These hills had their greatest development on the N.E. side, their outer crests being some 4000 yds. from the Old Town. West of the Lun river the defensive line offered by the hills is less defined, and the line adopted for the permanent works was on the north only 3000 yds. from the harbour and 2000 yds. from the New Town. Running S.W. and S. back to the coast, it gradually draws in quite close to the S.W. end of the harbour. The total length of this line from sea to sea is some 12 m. Its most obvious weakness is that 5000 yds. N.W. of the harbour and New Town the now famous “203-Metre Hill” overlooks both. Here it had been intended to construct permanent works, but considerations of expenditure had caused this to be deferred.
On this main line of defence some seven or eight permanent works
had been disposed (it is difficult to define with accuracy, as some of the
concreted works were little better than semi-permanent in character).
Some of these had been prepared with interior parapets and platforms
of concrete for medium guns. Fort Erh-Lung was of this
character. The general design appears to have been grounded on
the French detached forts of the ’seventies (see Fortification),
as the front parapet was designed for infantry and the interior,
10 ft. higher, for guns. The ditch, 30 ft. deep, excavated in the rock,
was flanked by a counterscarp galleries. The living casemates were
under the gorge parapet. A grave defect in the design was that
there was no covered communication between these casemates
and the parapets. Fort Chi-Kuan had no artillery parapet. The
Defences of
Port Arthur.
ditch, 12 to 15 ft. deep, was defended by counterscarp
galleries. The casemates in the gorge, partially cut
off from the terreplein by a couple of deep sunk yards
or areas, could be defended in the last resort as a keep. In
addition to this the terreplein was retrenched. In both of these forts
there was an apparently meaningless projection at the gorge. It
is possible that these were embryonic “batteries traditores” to flank
the intervals. Fort Sung-Shu was of the same type as Chi-Kuan.
These three were the only permanent forts seriously attacked.
The permanent works were supplemented before the siege began by a prodigious development of semi-permanent works and trenches. Every knoll had its redoubt or battery, and the trenches were arranged line behind line, to give supporting, cross and enfilade fire in every direction. Thus on the north front, from Chi-Kuan battery to Sung-Shu, a distance of about two miles, there were three permanent forts and seven semi-permanent works and batteries. Behind these was the “Chinese Wall,” and behind that more batteries and trenches. On the north-west front, 203-Metre Hill, in advance of the main line, was occupied by strong semi-permanent works, with trenches and redoubts to either flank; and 174-Metre Hill, 1500 yds. beyond it, was also held. The Lun-Ho valley where it cut through the line was closed by entanglements and fougasses, and swept by batteries on each side. In front of the centre, the Waterworks Redoubt, a semi-permanent work covering the Port Arthur water supply, and connected by trenches with the four Temple Redoubts a mile away to the west, formed a strong advanced position. Wire entanglements were disposed in repeated lines in front of the defences, but they were not of a strong type. The Russians, with the resources of the fleet at their disposal (just as at Sevastopol), used great numbers of machine guns and electric lights, and the available garrison at first was probably, including sailors, 47,000 men.
Such were the defences that the Japanese attacked, with a force at the outset (30th of July) little more than superior numerically to the defenders, and an entirely inadequate siege train (18 6-in. howitzers, 60 4·7-in. guns and howitzers, and about 200 field and mountain guns). They were imperfectly informed of the strength of the garrison and the nature of the defences. Recollections of their easy triumph in 1894 and perhaps thoughts of Sevastopol, German theories of the “brusque attack,” the fiery ardour of the army, and above all the need of rapidly crushing or expelling the squadron in harbour, combined to suggest a bombardment and general assault. The bombardment began on the 19th of August and continued for three days, while the infantry was spreading along the front and gaining ground where it could. The real assault was made on the night of the 21st on the two Pan-Lung forts (semi-permanent) on the centre of the north-eastern front. The fighting was of the utmost severity, and continued through the 22nd; and although the stormers captured the two forts they were absolutely unable to make any further progress under the fire of the permanent forts Erh-Lung and Chi-Kuan on either side of, and the Wan-tai fort behind, Pan-Lung. Every attempt to bring up supports to the captured positions failed, and the Russians concentrated on the spot from all quarters. On the night of the 23rd–24th, just as the assault was being renewed, Stessel delivered a fierce counter-attack against the lost positions, and the result of an all-night battle was that though the forts were not recaptured, the assault was repulsed with over 5000 casualties, and the Japanese in Pan-Lung were isolated. This sortie raised the spirits of the Russians to the highest pitch. They seemed indeed to have broken the spell of defeat. On the Japanese side 15,000
