now met with a rival endowed with natural maritime resources
greater than her own. That rival also contained citizens who
understood the true importance of sea-power. “With a statesmanlike
sagacity from which succeeding generations might have
drawn a lesson, the leading men of the Roman Commonwealth
perceived that all their coast fortifications and coast garrisons
would prove inadequate unless the war-marine of the state were
again placed on a footing that should command respect”
(Mommsen, i. 427). It is a gloomy reflection that the leading
men of the United Kingdom could not see this in 1860. A
thorough comprehension of the events of the first Punic War
enables us to solve what, until Mahan wrote, had been one of the
standing enigmas of history, 'viz. Hannibal's invasion of Italy
by land instead of by sea in the second Punic War. Mahan's
masterly examination of this question has set at rest all doubts
as to the reason of Hannibal's action (Influence on Hist. pp. 13-21).
The naval predominance in the western basin of the Mediterranean
acquired by Rome had never been lost. Though modern
historians, even those belonging to a maritime country, may
have failed to perceive it, the Carthaginians knew well enough
that the Romans were too strong for them on the sea. Though
other forces co-operated to bring about the defeat of Carthage in
the second Punic War, the Roman navy, as Mahan demonstrates,
was the most important. As a navy, he tells us in words like
those already quoted, “acts on an element strange to most
writers, as its members have been from time immemorial a
strange race apart, without prophets of their own, neither
themselves nor their calling understood, its immense determining
influence on the history of that era, and consequently upon the
history of the world, has been overlooked.”
The attainment of all but universal dominion by Rome was
now only a question of time. “The annihilation of the Carthaginian
fleet had made the Romans masters of the
sea” (Schmitz, Hist. Rome, p. 256). A lodgment had
already been gained in Illyricum, and countries farther
east were before long to be reduced to submission.
Expansion
of Roman dominion furthered by sea-power.
A glance at the map will show that to effect this the
command of the eastern basin of the Mediterranean,
like that of the western, must be secured by the Romans. The
old historic navies of the Greek and Phoenician states had
declined. One considerable naval force there was which, though
it could not have prevented, was strong enough to have delayed
the Roman progress eastwards. This force belonged to Rhodes,
which in the years immediately following the close of the second
Punic War reached its highest point as a naval power (C. Torr,
Rhodes in Ancient Times, p. 40). Far from trying to obstruct
the advance of the Romans the Rhodian fleet helped it.
Hannibal, in his exile, saw the necessity of being strong on the
sea if the East was to be saved from the grasp of his hereditary
foe; but the resources of Antiochus, even with the mighty cooperation
of Hannibal, were insufficient. In a later and more
often quoted struggle between East and West-that which was
decided at Actium—sea-power was again seen to “have the
casting vote.” When the whole of the Mediterranean coasts
became part of a single state the importance of the navy was
naturally diminished; but in the struggles within the declining
empire it rose again at times. The contest of the Vandal Genseric
with Majorian and the African expedition of Belisarius—not
to mention others—were largely influenced by the naval operations
(Gibbon, Decline and Fall, chaps. xxxvi., xli.).
A decisive event, the Mahommedan conquest of northern Africa from Egypt westwards, is unintelligible until it is seen how great a part sea-power played in effecting it. Purely land expeditions, or expeditions but slightly supported from the sea, had ended in failure. The emperor at Constantinople still had at his disposal Extension westward of Mahommedan conquest. a fleet capable of keeping open the communications with his African province. It took the Saracens half a century (A.D. 647-698) to win “their way along the coast of Africa as far as the Pillars of Hercules” (Hallam, Mid. Ages, chap. vi.); and, as Gibbon tells us, it was not till the Commander of the Faithful had prepared a great expedition, this time by sea as well as by land, that the Saracenic dominion was definitely established. It has been generally assumed that the Arabian conquerors who, within a few years of his death, spread the faith of Mahomet over vast regions, belonged to an essentially non-maritime race; and little or no stress has been laid on the extent to which they relied on naval support in prosecuting their conquests. In parts of Arabia, however, maritime enterprise was far from non-existent; and when the Mahommedan empire had extended outwards from Mecca and Medina till it embraced the coasts of various seas, the consequences to the neighbouring states were as serious as the rule above mentioned would lead us to expect that they would be. “With the conquest of Syria and Egypt a long stretch of sea-board had come into the Saracenic power; and the creation and maintenance of a navy for the protection of the maritime ports as well as for meeting the enemy became a matter of vital importance. Great attention was paid to the manning and equipment of the fleet ” (Amir Ali, Syed, Short Hist. Saracens, p. 442). At first the fleet was manned by sailors drawn from the Phoenician towns, Where nautical energy was not yet quite extinct; and later the crews were recruited from Syria, Egypt and the coasts of Asia Minor. Ships were built at most of the Syrian and Egyptian ports, and “ also at Obolla and Bushire on the Persian Gulf,” whilst the mercantile marine and maritime trade were fostered and encouraged. The sea-power thus created was largely artificial. It drooped—as in similar cases—when the special encouragement was withdrawn. “In the days of Arabian energy,” says Hallam, “ Constantinople was twice, in 668 and 716, attacked by great naval armaments.” The same authority believes that the abandonment of such maritime enterprises by the Saracens may be attributed to the removal of the capital from Damascus to Bagdad. The removal indicated a lessened interest in the affairs of the Mediterranean Sea, which was now left by the administration far behind. “The Greeks in their turn determined to dispute the command of the sea,” with the result that in the middle of the 10th century their empire was far more secure from its enemies than under the first successors of Heraclius.” Not only was the fall of the empire, by a rational reliance on sea-power, postponed for centuries, but also much that had been lost was regained. “At the close of the 10th century the emperors of Constantinople possessed the best, an d greatest part” of southern Italy, part of Sicily, the whole of what is now called the Balkan Peninsula, Asia Minor, with some parts of Syria and Armenia (Hallam, chap. vi.; Gibbon, chap; li.).
Neglect of sea-power by those who can be reached by sea brings its own punishment. Whether neglected or not, if it is an artificial creation it is nearly sure to disappoint those who wield it when it encounters a rival power of natural growth. How was it possible for the Crusaders, in their various expeditions, to achieve even the transient success that occasionally crowned their efforts? How did the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem contrive to exist for more than three-quarters of a century? Why did the Crusades more and more become maritime expeditions? The answer to these questions is to be found in the decline of the Mahommedan naval defences and the rising enterprise of the seafaring people of the West. Venetians, Pisans and Genoese transported crusading forces, kept open the communications of the places held by the Christians and hampered the operations of the infidels. Even the great Saladin failed to discern the important alteration of conditions. This is evident when we look at the efforts of the Christians to regain the lost kingdom. Saladin “ forgot that the safety of Phoenicia lay in immunity from naval incursions, and that no victory on land could ensure him against an influx from beyond the sea” (Amir Ali, Syed, pp. 359-360). Not only were the Crusaders helped by the fleets of the maritime republics of Italy, they also received reinforcements by sea from western Europe and England, on the “arrival of Malik Ankiltar [Richard Cœur de Lion] with twenty shiploads of fighting men and munitions of war.”
Participation in the Crusades was not a solitary proof of the
