the limitations of sea-power. It became evident, and it was
made still more evident in the next century, that for a great
country to be strong it must not rely upon a navy
alone. It must also have an adequate and properly
Limitations of sea-power.
organized mobile army. Notwithstanding the number
of times that this lesson has been repeated Great
Britain has been slow to learn it. It is doubtful if she has learned
it even yet. English seamen in all ages seem to have mastered it
fully; for they have always demanded—at any rate for upwards
of three centuries—that expeditions against foreign territory
oversea should be accompanied by a proper number of land-troops.
On the other hand, the necessity of organizing the army
of a maritime insular state and of training it with the object of
rendering effective aid in operations of the kind in question, has
rarely been perceived and acted upon by others. The result
has been a long series of inglorious or disastrous affairs, like the
West Indies voyage of 1595–1596, the Cadiz expedition of 1625
and that to the Île de Ré of 1627. Additions might be made
to the list. The failures of joint expeditions have often been
explained by alleging differences or quarrels between the naval
and the military commanders. This way of explaining them,
however, is nothing but the inveterate critical method of the
streets by which cause is taken for effect and effect for cause.
The differences and quarrels arose, no doubt; but they generally
sprang out of the recriminations consequent on, not producing,
the want of success. Another manifestation of the way in which
sea-power works was first observed in the 17th century. It
suggested the adoption of, and furnished the instrument for,
carrying out a distinct maritime policy. What was practically
a standing navy had come into existence. As regards
Appearance of standing navies.
England this phenomenon was now of respectable
age. Long voyages and cruises of several ships in
company had been frequent during the latter half
of the 16th century and the early part of the 17th. Even the
grandfathers of the men who sailed with Blake and Penn in 1652
could not have known a time when ships had never crossed the
ocean, and squadrons kept together for months had never cruised.
However imperfect it may have been, a system of provisioning
ships and supplying them with stores, and of preserving discipline
among their crews, had been developed, and had proved
fairly satisfactory. The parliament and the Protector in turn
found it necessary to keep a considerable number of ships in
commission, and make them cruise and operate in company.
It was not till well on in the reign of Queen Victoria that the
man-of-war’s man was finally differentiated from the merchant
seaman; but, two centuries before, some of the distinctive marks
of the former had already begun to be noticeable. There were
seamen in the time of the Commonwealth who rarely, perhaps
some who never, served afloat except in a man-of-war. Some
of the interesting naval families which were settled at Portsmouth
and the eastern ports, and which—from father to son—helped
to recruit the ranks of bluejackets till a date later than
that of the launch of the first ironclad, could carry back their
professional genealogy to at least the days of Charles II., when,
in all probability, it did not first start. Though landsmen
continued even after the Civil War to be given naval appointments,
and though a permanent corps, through the ranks of which
every one must pass, had not been formally established, a body
of real naval officers—men who could handle their ships, supervise
the working of the armament and exercise military command—had
been formed. A navy, accordingly, was now a
Sea-power and territorial expansion
in the “New World.”
weapon of undoubted keenness, capable of very effective
use by any one who knew how to wield it. Having
tasted the sweets of intercourse with the Indies,
whether in the occupation of Portugal or of Spain,
both English and Dutch were desirous of getting a
larger share of them. English maritime commerce had increased
and needed naval protection. If England was to maintain the
international position to which, as no one denied, she was
entitled, that commerce must be permitted to expand. The
minds of men in western Europe, moreover, were set upon
obtaining for their country territories in the New World, the
amenities of which were now known. From the reign of James I.
the Dutch had shown great jealousy of English maritime
enterprise. Where it was possible, as in the East Indian Archipelago,
they had destroyed it. Their naval resources were great
enough to let them hold English shipping at their mercy, unless
a grand effort were made to protect it. The Dutch conducted
the carrying trade of most of the world, and the monopoly of
this they were resolved to keep, while the English were resolved
to share in it. The exclusion of the English from every trade-route,
except such as ran by their own coast or crossed the
Narrow Seas, seemed a by no means impossible contingency.
There seemed also to be but one way of preventing it, viz. by
war. The supposed unfriendliness of the Dutch, or at least
of an important party amongst them, to the regicide government
in England helped to force the conflict. The Navigation Act of
1651 was passed and regarded as a covert declaration of hostilities.
So the first Dutch war began. It established England’s claim
to compete for the position of a great maritime commercial
power.
The rise of the sea-power of the Dutch, and the magnitude
which it attained in a short time, and in the most adverse
circumstances, have no parallel in history. The case
of Athens was different, because the Athenian power
had not so much been unconsciously developed out
of a great maritime trade, as based on a military marine
Sea-power
of the Dutch.
deliberately and persistently fostered during many years.
Thirlwall believes that it was Solon who “laid the foundations
of the Attic navy” (Hist. Greece, ii. p. 52), century before
Salamis. The great achievement of Themistocles was to convince
his fellow-Citizens that their navy ought to be increased.
Perhaps the nearest parallel with the power of the Dutch was
presented by that of Rhodes, which rested largely on a carrying
trade. The Rhodian undertakings, however, were by comparison
small and restricted in extent. Motley declares of the
Seven United Provinces that they “commanded the ocean”
(United Netherlands, ii. 132), and that it would be difficult to
exaggerate the naval power of the young Commonwealth. Even
in the days of Spain’s greatness English seamen positively declined
to admit that she was stronger than England on the sea;
and the story of the Armada justified their view. The first two
Dutch wars were, therefore, contests between the two foremost
naval states of the World for what was primarily a maritime
object. The identity of the cause of the first and of the second
war will be discerned by any one who compares what has been
said about the circumstances leading to the former, with Monk’s
remark as to the latter. He said that the English wanted a
larger share of the trade enjoyed by the Dutch. It was quite
in accordance with the spirit of the age that the Dutch should
try to prevent, by force, this want from being satisfied. Anything
like free and open competition was repugnant to the
general feeling. The highroad to both individual wealth and
national prosperity was believed to lie in securing a monopoly.
Merchants or manufacturers who called for the abolition of
monopolies granted to particular courtiers and favourites, had
not the smallest intention, on gaining their object, of throwing
open to the enterprise of all what had been monopolized. It
was to be kept for the exclusive benefit of some privileged or
chartered company. It was the same in greater affairs. As
Mahan says, “To secure to one’s own people a disproportionate
share of the benefits of sea commerce every effort was made to
exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of
monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by
direct violence.” The apparent wealth of Spain was believed
to be due to the rigorous manner in which foreigners were excluded
from trading with the Spanish oversea territories. The
skill and enterprise of the Dutch having enabled them to force
themselves into this trade, they were determined to keep it to
themselves. The Dutch East India Company was a powerful
body, and largely dictated the maritime policy of the country.
We have thus come to an interesting point in the historical
consideration of sea-power. The Elizabethan conflict with
Spain had practically settled the question whether or not the
