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is given to any combination by virtue of its greater influence in the community. It is not intended to convey the impression that managers of combinations are less moral than other business men, but merely that whenever they are dishonourable in their practices the influence reaches more widely.

The chief remedies for these evils enumerated would seem to be more rigid laws with reference to the methods of incorpora- tion and to the responsibility of directors to stockholders and to the public. This can perhaps best be brought about through greater publicity in both of these directions, probably under the inspection of government officials. The other line of remedies would seem to be the removal of special favours granted to these combinations either by the government or by railways or other bodies so situated that they can distribute favours to the larger combinations.

The movement towards consolidation of industries in the United States began to be noticeable soon after the Civil War (1861–65), but it had not reached noteworthy proportions, excepting in connection with the railways, until within the last twenty years of the 19th century. During the later years many consolidations The Movement Towards Consolidation. were made, the largest number during the years 1898–1900. From what has been said earlier, it is evident that certain classes of industries, especially those that require the investment of fixed capital to large amounts, are especially adapted for combination. Very little tendency towards consolidation is found in the farming industry, and, relatively speaking, little in industries that require the investment of but small capital. It is perhaps, however, not too much to say that in nearly all lines of industry which from their nature are adapted for consolidation combinations more or less firm have been made during the last few years. It is probable that as time passes we shall have many of these combinations reorganized, and that in many lines of industry there will be further consolidation of present combinations.

Experience has shown that when combinations are made in industries that from their nature do not seem well suited for consolidation, failure follows. In many individual instances corporation lawyers, who have had much practice in forming combinations, advise their clients in lines of business especially fitted for competition not to enter a combination, but to remain independent, assuring them that an individual is able to compete in such lines of industry with any combination, however large. Such advice, of course, would not be given were the industry one which was well adapted for consolidation.

Great Britain.—The tendency towards consolidation has been for several years very noticeable in Great Britain, although the form has been rather that of a pool or ring than that of a trust or of a single large corporation. In the coal and milling industries there have been agreements; and, particularly in London and other distributing European Experience. centres, these selling combinations have been able at times to control the market. This has also been true with reference to certain kinds of provisions, such as the bacon imported from Denmark.

Of late years there has been a marked tendency towards the formation of large corporations that buy up a very large proportion of competing manufacturing plant, and in this way secure at least a temporary monopoly of the market. The Salt Union was formed along these lines, but this has not proved successful, owing probably to the fact that new sources of supply were discovered. The dyeing industries in Bradford and in Yorkshire have been consolidated, so that in certain respects they have an absolute monopoly of the business, and in most directions of over 90% of it. The calico printers, the fine cotton spinners, the thread manufacturers, the bleachers, and others connected with the cotton manufacturing industries in Great Britain, have nearly all been brought together into large corporations which control from 90% upwards of the entire business. Similar combinations in cement, wall-paper, soap, tobacco and other trades have been formed. Most of these large corporations have been in existence for such a short time that one cannot yet judge accurately regarding their permanent success. Many of them seem to have been over-capitalized and their dividends have not always met shareholders' anticipations. There has been no active popular movement against consolidation in England, and the government has passed no laws opposed to it. Parliament, however, has passed stringent amendments to the Companies Acts, changes enforcing publicity regarding the organization of all limited liability companies and their methods of management. The amended law is expected to prevent most of the abuses of the combinations.

Germany.—Germany seems to be peculiarly the home of combinations so far as Europe is concerned. In 1897 Liefmann, writing regarding combinations in Germany, was able to mention combinations which were international in their scope in forty-one different branches of industry. Of combinations that were confined to Germany alone he mentioned 345, although many of them were in the same line of industry; for example, he found 80 combinations in different branches of the iron industry, 82 in the chemical industries, 38 in the textiles, and so on. Of that number he thought that definite information could be secured, but he was of the opinion that very many more of less importance existed, and had excluded from his reckoning all of those that were purely local, as for example those among the breweries in the different cities, as well as those among firms engaged merely in trade. The form of combination in Germany is ordinarily that merely of contracts among independent establishments {Cartels, Kartells) regulating the amount of output for each, and in certain cases also the prices. As in Austria and in France, a central selling bureau for all the members of the combination is frequently found. The most successful combinations have been those among the coal-miners in western Germany and the four or five in the leading branches of iron manufacture, also in western Germany. Others of somewhat similar rank have been organized, one, for example, in the sugar industry, which includes both refiners and producers, and another among the manufacturers of spirits. The former, following that among the Austrian sugar manufacturers, is somewhat peculiar in that the refiners guarantee to the producers of raw sugar a fixed price for their output so far as the sugar is intended for the home market, the refiners expecting to recoup themselves from the consumers through the monopolistic power which they possess. The law does not seem to be hostile to these combinations. Contracts that are immoral in their nature are, of course, non-enforceable. But the courts have, on the whole, not taken an attitude inimical to the larger combinations, and the government seems at times to have been inclined to favour them. In one or two cases where the government is itself a producer, as of soda, it is a member of a combination. Indeed, a Prussian minister in a speech in the Landtag has expressed himself favourably regarding the coal and iron combinations. The facts seem to show that the coal combination, at any rate, has used its power of fixing prices in a conservative way, and it has at times held prices somewhat lower than they probably would have been had free competition existed in that industry. So long as the combinations are managed conservatively, and so long as the government is able to secure a careful supervision over them, it is not to be expected that there will be much hostility in Germany on the part of the government.

France.—The number of combinations in France is probably much less than in Great Britain or Germany. In the penal code there has been a provision for many years against monopoly brought about by unfair means, and in one or two rather prominent instances there seem to have been convictions under this article. Consequently, the agreements that have been made, so far as they are intended to control prices, are usually kept secret. There have been, however, notably in the case of the iron industries, agreements made among the leading manufacturers, under which the proportion of output assigned to each was fixed. A single selling bureau has also in such cases been established, which receives all orders and fixes the prices for all of the different establishments concerned. So far this form of organization, although in certain localities it seems to have