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UNITED STATES
[HISTORY 1865-1910

labour. Early in 1885 a law had been enacted forbidding the importation of labour under contract, and in 1888 the Chinese Immigration. Exclusion Act was continued. Immigration was exceptionally large in the decade from 1880 to 1890, amounting to about five and a quarter millions as compared with two million eight hundred thousand for the previous decade. But a large number of these new-comers settled on the newly opened lands of the Middle West. By 1890 the persons of German parentage in the Middle West numbered over four millions—more than half the total of persons of German parentage in the nation. Minnesota held 373,000 persons of Scandinavian parentage, and of the whole of this element the Middle West had all but about 300,000. The Irish constituted the largest element among the English-speaking immigrants. The population of foreign parentage amounted to one-third of the whole population of the United States in 1890. In the midst of this national development and turmoil President Cleveland struggled to unite his party on a definite issue. The silver question continued to divide each party, the continued fall of silver leading to renewed agitation for free coinage. In 1886 a bill for this purpose was defeated by a majority of 37 in the House, 98 Democrats favouring it, and 70 opposing, as against 26 Republicans for Cleveland's Vetoes. it and 93 against. The surplus led to extravagant appropriation bills, such as special pension bills, which Cleveland vetoed by the wholesale, thereby incurring criticism by veterans of the Civil War, and river and harbour improvement measures, particularly the act of 1886, to which the president gave reluctant assent and the bill of 1887 to which he gave a “pocket veto” by refusing his signature. But the retention of the surplus in the treasury would create a monetary stringency, its deposit in banks aroused opposition, and its use to buy bonds was unpopular with the Democrats. Cleveland boldly met the issue and gave purpose to his party Tariff Message. by his annual message of December 1887, which he entirely devoted to an exposition of the situation arising from the surplus, and to a demand for a revision of the tariff in order to reduce revenue. He did not profess free trade doctrines: “It is a condition which confronts us, not a theory,” he declared. The election of 1886 had reduced the Democratic majority in the House, but the president was able The Mills Bill. to induce his party to pass the Mills Bill (1888) through that body as a concrete presentation of policy. The bill put many important raw materials (including wool and unmanufactured lumber) on the free list, substituted ad valorem for specific duties to a large extent, and generally reduced the protective duties. It was believed that the measure would remit over fifty and a-half million dollars of duties, nearly twenty millions of which would result from additions to the free list. The Republican Senate also found party unity on the tariff issue and its committee on finance, under the leadership of Senator Nelson W. Aldrich of Rhode Island, drafted a counter proposal. They would reduce revenue by repealing the taxes on tobacco, and the taxes on spirits used in the arts and for mechanical purposes, and by revising the tariff so as to check imports of articles produced at home.

355. On the tariff issue the two parties contested the election of 1888, the Republicans denouncing the Mills Bill and the Benjamin Harrison elected President. Democrats supporting it. Blaine having withdrawn from the contest, and John Sherman having secured but little more than half the votes necessary to nominate, the Republicans picked from a multitude of candidates General Benjamin Harrison of Indiana, grandson of President William Henry Harrison, to run against Mr Cleveland. The popular vote was exceedingly close, but Harrison had an electoral majority of 65, having carried all of the states except the solid South, Connecticut and New Jersey. The increasing use of money to influence the election, and particularly the association of great business interests with such political “bosses” as Matthew S. Quay of Pennsylvania and Thomas C. Platt of New York, were features of the campaign. The Congressional elections ensured to the Republicans the undisputed control of all branches of the government when the Fifty-first Congress should convene, and it was generally agreed that the party had a mandate to sustain the protective tariff.

356. Lacking a large majority in either house the Republicans were not only exposed to the danger of free silver defections in Speaker Thomas B. Reed. the Senate, but to “filibustering” by the Democratic minority in the House as a means of blocking the victorious party's programme. These obstructive tactics were made possible chiefly by the use of privileged motions and roll calls to delay business, and the refusal to respond on the roll call for a vote, thus preventing a quorum. Speaker Thomas B. Reed of Maine, a virile and keen-witted leader, greatly strengthened the power of the speaker, as well as expediting the business of the House, by ruling that the Constitution required a present, not a voting, quorum; and in spite of disorderly protests he “counted a quorum” of those actually present. By securing rules sanctioning this action and empowering the speaker to refuse to entertain dilatory motions, that officer became the effective agent for carrying on the business of the party majority. As his power through the committee on rules, which he appointed, grew, he came, in the course of time, also to dominate the action of the House, refusing to recognize members except for motions which he approved, and through his lieutenants on important committees selecting such measures for consideration as seemed most desirable. This efficiency of action was secured at a loss to the house as a representative and debating body, responsive to minority proposals.

357. But the discipline of party caucus and House rules enabled the Republican leaders to put through with rapidity The Sherman Anti-Trust Act. a number of important laws. One of these was the measure known as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of the 2nd of July 1890, which declared combinations affecting commerce between the several states, or with foreign nations, illegal and punishable by fine of imprisonment or both. This act, the full power of which was not exhibited until later, was a response to the growing unrest of the nation as other corporations emulated the success of the Standard Oil Trust (formed in 1882). The members of a trust combined in an organization managed by boards of trustees whose certificates the former owners accepted instead of their shares of stock in the component companies. Competition was thus eliminated within the combination and the greatly increased capital and economies enabled it not only to deal with the increasing magnitude of business operation, but also to master the smaller concerns which opposed it. State legislation had proved unable to check the process, partly because the trust was an interstate affair. By putting into operation its power under the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce, Congress responded to the popular demand for Federal restraint of these great combinations which threatened the old American ideals of individualism and freedom of competition. The trusts, although embarrassed, soon showed their ability to find other devices to maintain their unified control. Nor was the act used, in this period, to prevent the railways from agreements and combinations which in large measure neutralized the anti-pooling clause of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.

358. Another important law was the so-called Sherman Silver Purchase Act of the 14th of July 1890. By 1889 the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. ratio of silver to gold had fallen to 1 to 22. In the twelve years of the Bland-Allison Act of 1878 over 378,000,000 silver dollars had been coined from bullion purchased at the market price. This bullion value was falling: it was $.89 in 1877 and $.72 in 1889. The production of gold in the United States in 1878 was about two and one-half million fine ounces, and of silver about thirty-five millions; in 1890 the gold production was 1,588,000 and the silver 54,500,000. The Silver Purchase Act authorized the secretary of the treasury to purchase each month 4,500,000 oz. of silver at its market price and to pay for it in treasury notes redeemable at his discretion, in silver or gold. This law, passed to placate the demands of the free silver men by increasing the use of silver, was insufficient to prevent the Senate from passing a free coinage bill by a combination of Democrats and the