back, but one of great masses of cannon and machine-guns moving by her side and over her head.
So far we have dealt with the strength: the examination of the losses is still more conclusive.
Losses
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Arm.
I9H-
1915-
1916.
1917.
1918.
Infantry . Cavalry . . . Artillery . . . Engineers Air Service
283,320 3,79 8,560 2,880 32
323,160 3,620 11,100 6,960 260
221,920 2,830 16,800
5,475 620
I34,7io 3,180 I5,5oo
4,415 820
182,120 7,690
27,725 7,155 1,965
The variations in the losses of the cavalry are practically without meaning, for the cavalry fought sometimes as infantry in the trenches, sometimes on foot, at other times on horse. Still it should be noted that in 1914 as in 1918, when the cavalry had occasion to engage in open warfare, i.e. to work as mounted men, their losses were considerably increased. During the pursuit- battles of 1918 the losses were particularly heavy.
Whilst the strength of the artillery increased from May 1915 to Oct. 1918 in the ratio of four to six, the proportion of the losses rose in ratio eleven to twenty-seven. For the air service the strength increased in the ratio of 8 to 52, that is to say i to 6-5 the losses increased in the proportion of 260 to 1,965, i.e. i to 8. The queen of battles, magnificently escorted in 1918 by the gun and the aeroplane, suffered less than before; it was she, however, who still ran relatively the greatest danger. She remained queen. It is of interest also to notice that the war of movement was more murderous than trench warfare. The year 1916 was for the French army the year of Verdun and the Somme, fantastic battles when artillery projectiles fell like rain in a storm. However, this battle of a year cost far less than the six months' battle in 1914, although the strengths engaged were practically the same. In 1918 the infantry lost 182,000 men out of a strength of 850,000 men; in 1916 the proportion was 220,000 out of a strength of 1,450,000. Strong souls were and always will be needed to lead men in the battle of open warfare; and the education of an army must be directed accordingly.
Man-Power. The evolution of the French army from 1910 to 1914 would not be sufficiently indicated, nor would one understand the defeats from Aug. 18-24 1914, followed by the victories of Sept. 5-12, if one were only to study a table of strengths. How could it happen, one might say, that Gen. Joffre, to whom by Aug. 15 1914 France had entrusted 3,780,000 men not to mention the precious aid and increment of strength brought by the British and the Belgians was beaten in the battles of the Frontiers? On the Sam- bre, the French army, swelled by reserve divisions attached to it, had during Aug. 22-23 a numerical equality with the troops of the German II. Army to whom they were opposed. In the Woevre the III. French Army, augmented by the reserve divisions attached to it, was equivalent in strength to the opposing V. German Army. In many places in the great battle that took place from Mulhausen to Maubeuge, German units triumphed easily over French units of the same strength. At the Marne the contrary happened.
To find the explanation of this curious paradox, it is sufficient to follow the evolution of the French army before the war, and to compare the age of the combatants who were fighting respectively in the two camps. To obtain the numbers sent to her armies France had to incorporate all the recruit classes from class 1889 (men born in 1869) to the 1916 class. The men of the classes 1889-1905 had done three years' service, or in certain cases six months only. Re- called twice for a period of 28 days, and once for a period of 13 days, the men who had remained with the colours for a short time were not in Aug. 1914 sufficiently trained to be battle-worthy. That is why the army given to Gen. d'Amade for ensuring the defence of France between the Oise and the sea was valueless. Field-Marshal French obviously could not count on it for ensuring the protection of his left flank. It was necessary to have several months of war to give any fighting value to the units of the territorial army. 1 The men belong- ing to the classes 1905-13 had uniformly served two years with the colours, and would have been able without difficulty to bear their share in battle if they had had proper cadres. But even though two years' training suffices to make an excellent soldier, one cannot in that time turn out good non-commissioned officers with the aptitude to command sufficiently well established to be recovered quickly after several years spent in civil life. . As the army in times of peace had not enough cadres of N.C.O.'s and of subalterns to give suffi-
1 In France the " territorial army " is formed on mobilization from reservists (officers and men) of the older classes.
cient for the formation of reserves, these reserve formations had to acquire cohesion before being in a state fit for fighting. To command these territorial and reserve units it was necessary to draw officers from civil life or older officers from the active army. In the reserve divisions, indeed, it had been possible to place a certain number of officers of the active army. But no steps had been taken to provide any for the territorial army. The profession of a soldier, like any other, requires an apprenticeship ; but officers of the reserve or terri- torial army in times of peace might have resigned if compelled to attend frequent trainings; and so there was nothing for it but for them to serve their apprenticeship in war a matter of many weeks. As for the older officers of the active army, retired under the age limit, they were not sufficiently young to pass on their energy to the others. The reserve divisions in Aug. 1914, therefore, were not in a condition to be considered as combatant, for lack of good cadres and also lack of youth.
The three years' law was expected to furnish the cadres which the two years' law had failed to give ; but having been voted only the year previous to the war, it was not able to produce the effect which was hoped from this point of view. The three years' law called up the 1913 class in advance. Prior to this law the men of a class were called to the colours in the month of Oct. of the following year. Thus, under the regime of the two years' law, men born in 1893, being 20 years old in 1913, were called the 1913 class. Had they been summoned on Oct. I 1914 they would not have taken part in the battles of the Frontiers or those of the Marne. When the three years' law came into force these young men joined the colours in the month of Oct. 1913, and in consequence, at the moment of the com- mencement of the campaign, they had between nine and ten months' service, and they did splendidly in the battles of the Frontiers and the Marne. It will be noted that these young men were 20 years old at enrolment, instead of 21 as under the previous laws. Fears, therefore, had been entertained that enrolment at so early an age would adversely affect them. For this reason the calling-up was postponed in the case of any conscript whose physical condition left anything to be desired. The 1913 class did not provide, there- fore, at the moment of enrolment, more than 170,000 men instead of 210,000, which was the usual figure. Nevertheless, the three years' law was welcome at the moment, since it gave both the mobilized army and, in particular, the peace-time army an addition of strength equivalent to four army corps. From this aspect the vote of the three years' law was the capital point of the French army's evolution from 1910 to 1914.
The Germans, thanks to the greater size of their population and to their higher birth-rate, were able to increase each year their strength in peace-time; and, because in Germany the uniform was popular, the candidates for officers and non-commissioned rank of the active army and of the reserve were superabundant.
In these conditions it was feared in France that the weak units of the protective forces in the frontier regions might be suddenly overwhelmed, and the concentration of the armies behind them thereby made impossible. To build up in peace-time the strength of the units forming part of the couyerture, and to increase the number of units assigned to it, was the principal aim of the three years' law. Commencing in the month of Oct. 1913, the corps of the Covering Force were filled up with the numerous contingents of young soldiers of the 1912 and 1913 classes; this increase was so considerable that the peace strength became almost that of a war footing. The period of Oct. 1913 to May 1914 was extremely critical, owing partly to the overcrowding in the old barracks or in those being constructed and partly to the want of instructional facilities for the increased number of recruits. If the war had broken out during the transitional phase, difficulties without number would have had to be overcome. Fortunately, this did not happen.
At the same time that the three years' law increased the strength in men, it increased also the number of horses in the cavalry and artillery. In consequence of this, the units of the Covering Force found themselves able to take the field almost with their peace-time organization. The difference between peace and war strengths was about four to five. This allowed the reservist element to be easily absorbed in the active element. At no point in the immense field of battle of Aug. 1914 did any weakness manifest itself amongst the troops of the Covering Force; on the contrary, the II. Corps, XX. Corps, and Hache's Diy. of the VI. Corps displayed prodigies of valour and saved some situations which were extremely delicate.
The formations of the Covering Force were favoured with regard to cadres, in comparison with other units of the interior. Since they were liable to be attacked immediately after, and perhaps without, a declaration of war, it was desirable in the meanwhile to maintain them almost on a war footing not only with men but with cadres. But, without denying the value of the advantage of possessing cadres almost at war strength which the Covering Force enjoyed at the expense of the army of the interior, it must be recognized that the preponderant influence is the age of the troops. The corps of the Covering Force were younger than the corps of the interior, the latter were younger than the reserve divisions, and the divisions of the re- serve had not the age of the territorial army. This is not the place to argue that age freezes the courage that question lies in the domain of psychology and must be left to research in that branch of study. It may be affirmed, however, that the process of acclimatiza-
