inces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been under Austro-
Hungarian government for 30 years past. The Young Turk
Revolution, in July 1908, served as a pretext for carrying into
effect the annexation of these territories, which had been planned
long since. It happened opportunely that at this very time
Russian statesmen wished to effect the realization of their
designs on the Dardanelles. Isvolsky, who directed Russian
foreign policy, knew indeed that it would not be easy to win over
Great Britain to his plan. But since he believed himself sure of
French support, he hoped to achieve at least his immediate aim,
the opening of the straits to Russian ships-of-war, so soon as
he had come to an understanding with the Central Powers,
and especially with Austria-Hungary. During the negotiations
entered upon, on Aehrenthal's initiative, between the Cabinets
of Vienna and St. Petersburg, Isvolsky expressed his consent to
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the event of the
Vienna Government's falling in with his plans as to the straits
question. Aehrenthal seized upon this proposal, for he hoped
that the annexation of these provinces would enable him to take
active measures in face of the Greater Serbia movement.
At the beginning of July 1908 Isvolsky handed in at Vienna a memorandum which guaranteed to the Habsburg Monarchy, besides Bosnia and Herzegovina, the greater part of the Sanjak of Novibazar as well. Aehrenthal accepted Isvolsky's offer in so far as it applied to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; but he demanded the same right for the warships of Rumania and Bulgaria as for those of Russia, and in addition a guarantee against an attack on Constantinople by a Russian fleet entering the Bosporus. In return he was ready to give up the Sanjak and the rights appertaining to Austria-Hungary in Montenegro, and therefore the plan of an advance on Salonika, the seizure of which Andrassy had had in view as the next objective in Austria- Hungary's policy of expansion in S.E. Europe. On Sept. 15 Aehrenthal met Isvolsky at the chateau of Buchlau in Moravia, informed him of the impending Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and promised him in return a free hand in his proceedings with regard to the question of the Dardanelles. The two ministers promised each other mutual support; Aehrenthal renounced the Sanjak of Novibazar, as a set-off for which Isvol- sky gave a promise that Russia would not take possession of Constantinople. A European conference was to give its sanction to their settlement. A binding written agreement was con- templated, but was not arrived at on this occasion.
When, however, at the beginning of Oct. 1908 Francis Joseph publicly announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- govina as a fait accompli, a storm of indignation burst forth in many quarters. It was insisted, especially in England, that agreements, settled by international treaties could only be modified with the agreement of all the contracting Powers. Both in Paris and in London, where Isvolsky had betaken himself in order to obtain the consent of the Western Powers to the meas- ures which he had concerted with Aehrenthal, he met with a decided refusal. Disappointed in his expectations, he now declared that he had been led astray by Aehrenthal.
Serbia lodged a protest against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, demanded autonomy for these territories under the Effect guarantee of the Great Powers, and a port on the the later- Adriatic for Serbia, with a strip of territory to connect national it with Serbia. Since Austria-Hungary showed no
ua on. i nc ij na tion to take these demands into consideration, Serbia now began to strengthen her military forces. At the same time a violent anti-Austrian movement began to make itself felt in Turkey. All goods coming from Austria-Hungary were boy- cotted, and Austro-Hungarian traders living in Turkey were subjected to annoyance. Bulgaria, whose prince, Ferdinand of Coburg, had assumed the royal crown on Oct. 5 1908, also took sides against Austria-Hungary. Aehrenthal had made himself personally offensive to that country, which now entered into negotiations with Russia and Serbia. In Italy, too, a hostile tendency towards Austria gained the upper hand. Victor Emanuel III. described the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- govina as a stab at the Treaty of Berlin, and Tittoni, who had
spoken on Oct. 7 in terms favourable to the annexation, declared in his great speech in the Consulta at the beginning of Dec. 1908 in contradiction with the tenor of a letter which he had addressed to Aehrenthal on Oct. 4 that he had entered into no engage- ments with regard to it. The nationalist press and the irredentists fanned the flames, and in the Austrian Parliament the Slavs, and above all the Czech leaders, raised loud complaints.
But Aehrenthal remained firm. He was convinced that Russia, which had not yet recovered from the defeat which she had suffered in the Russo-Japanese War, would not draw the sword, and that he would therefore succeed in achieving his ends without bloodshed. His own efforts were directed towards the preserva- tion of peace. In this point of view he was at odds with a power- ful party, led by Conrad von Hotzendorff, chief of the Austro- Hungarian general staff, which was in favour of a decision by force of arms. In order to meet Russia's views Aehrenthal ex- pressed his consent to the convening of a European conference, but insisted at the same time that he could only promise Serbia and Montenegro economic compensations, and made it a con- dition that the question of Austria-Hungary's sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be discussed at the con- ference, but only taken cognizance of by it. Aehrenthal's at- titude aroused violent indignation in London and Paris. But since Germany resolutely took its stand on the side of the Habsburg Monarchy, France, with an eye to her Moroccan interests, only gave a lukewarm support to the Russian demands; and Isvolsky found himself compelled to beat a retreat. As early as Dec. 1908 he agreed that the conference should recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina after a previous dis- cussion of the matter had taken place between the several Cabinets. Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey, the English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, advised the Turkish Government to give their consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be bought by a proportionate cash indemnity. Aehrenthal fell in with a suggestion in these terms, and on Feb. 26 1909 con- cluded an agreement with Turkey which secured to the Sultan, in return for his recognition of the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- govina by Austria-Hungary, a considerable sum of money in compensation for Ottoman State property in the annexed prov- inces. In the course of the month of March the negotiations as to the form of consent to the annexation to be given by the Great Powers concerned were brought to a conclusion. It was to be effected by official declarations on their part, a European con- ference being avoided. On March 24 declarations in this sense were handed in at Berlin and Vienna by the Russian Government ; those of England followed on March 28.
The danger of an Austro-Serbian war, which for some time had appeared inevitable, had fortunately passed by. Even after the settlement of the Austro-Turkish conflict the Serbs remained stubborn; Aehrenthal, however, wanted to stubborn
. . , . , , , , Attitude of
avoid war, and now, as before, hoped to reach his goal Serbia. by calm firmness and conciliation. At the beginning of March 1909 he declared that Serbia, in order to avoid the humiliation of having her fate settled by the statesmen of Vienna, might submit to the decision of the Great Powers. But the Serbian Government declined, and continued to arm. The Cabinet of Vienna then decreed that the troops in the S.E. of the Monarchy should be reenforced. Isvolsky now saw that Francis Joseph was in earnest. Since he could not venture on war, he accepted the proposal of the German Imperial Chancellor, Billow, that Russia herself should use her influence over Serbia in the direction of moderation. On Great Britain's initiative negotia- tions were entered upon with the Government of Vienna, which led to the drafting of a note which should secure to Austria- Hungary the satisfaction which she demanded.
After overcoming great difficulties it was possible to effect an agreement. On March 31 the Serbian Government handed in a note at Vienna in which it declared that Serbia had submts- not suffered any injury to her rights through the sion of annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria- Serbia. Hungary, and promised to change the attitude which she had hitherto taken towards the Habsburg Monarchy, to maintain
