views in a second memorandum of July 8 and counselled modera-
tion, laying stress on the danger of international complications.
This view should have been reenforced by the report drawn up
by Friedrich von Wiesner (b. 1871), who had been sent by the
Vienna Ballplatz to Sarajevo, on the circumstances in which the
murderous attack on the heir to the throne had taken place.
This report established the fact that no direct connexion could
be proved between the murderer and the Serbian Government.
But this report failed of its effect. Authoritative circles in
Vienna remained under the conviction that the Court and Gov-
ernment of Belgrade had for long lent their benevolent sup-
port to the Greater Serbian movement, and held to their deter-
mination of putting an end to an unbearable situation. The
dangers which might arise from drastic measures were indeed
weighed; the possibility of a world war was even considered.
But the opinion predominated that all must be staked on one
card. " Better an end by fear than fear without end," ("Lieber
ein Ende mil Schrccken, als ein Schrccken ohne Ende " ) was the
mot of a leading statesman. These circles were confirmed in
their resolve to appeal to arms by the pronouncements of
Conrad von Hb'tzendorff, who, in reply to a question, summed
up his judgment in the following sense: that the military pros-
pects of the Central Powers in a world war (Great Britain's
intervention on the side of the enemy not being yet reckoned
with seriously) were no longer so favourable as in previous
years, but were certainly more favourable than they would be
in the near future. That decided it. On July 14 the decision
was adopted of sending Serbia an ultimatum with a short time-
limit. Tisza, after long vacillation, acquiesced, but with the
condition that Austria-Hungary was to make a solemn declara-
tion that with the exception of necessary minor rectifications
of the frontier she sought no territorial gains at the expense
of Serbia. By this means Tisza hoped to placate Russia and to
deprive the Italians of any pretext for advancing any claim
to compensations under Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple
Alliance. This request of Tisza's was indeed taken into account
at the conference of ministers of July 19, but on the same occa-
sion Berchtold declared that Serbia was to be made smaller and
the provinces taken from her were to be divided among some
of the other Balkan States.
The note to Serbia, which had not found its final form till after repeated modification of its language, 1 was read out, and the time for its presentation to the Serbian Government appointed for the afternoon of July 23.
Its essential points ran as follows : Since the Greater Serbian move- ment directed against Austria-Hungary has been proceeded with in recent years with the ultimate object of separating from the Habs- burg Monarchy certain of its parts; and since the Serbian Govern- ment, in contradiction with the declarations handed in by it on March 31 1909, has not only done nothing towards its suppression, but has rather encouraged it, the Austro-Hungarian Government must formulate certain demands in order to put an end to this state of affairs. In these demands are included, amongst others, the condemnation of agitation having as its object the breaking away of portions of the monarchy and the admonition of the peoples against a continuance of this course: both to be accomplished through an announcement in the official press organ and through an army order on the part of the king; the suppression of the Greater Serbian agitation on Serbian soil ; the dissolution of societies working for this object; the dismissal of the officials and teachers com- promised; the participation of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the measures which the Serbian Government should be under the obligation to undertake with a view to the suppression of the Greater Seroian movement.
The presentation of the note took place at the appointed time; on July 24 the world was informed of its contents. Only Germany approved unreservedly the demarche of the Vienna Government; the remaining Powers raised objections. Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, broke into a violent outburst against Austria-Hungary, and declared it to be a matter of international concern. Sir E. Grey described the note as "the
1 A prominent part in the drafting of the ultimatum was played by Count Johann Forgach (b. 1870) and Baron Alexander Musulin (b- 1866), who had also, as Berchtold 's advisers, a decisive influence on the course of events generally at this time.
most formidable document " that one State had ever addressed to another. Negotiations began at once between the groups of Powers. They aimed at the extension of the time-limit of 48 hours which had been allowed to the Serbs. England and Russia were especially active in this sense. But Austria-Hungary refused any prolongation of the time-limit. On July 25, shortly before the expiry of the appointed interval, the Serbs handed in their answer. They declared themselves ready to comply with the majority of the demands of the Vienna Government, but with regard to certain points for instance, where it was a question of the participation of the Austro-Hungarian repre- sentatives in the judicial enquiry to be held in the territory of the kingdom of Serbia, and of the dismissal of the officers and officials who were compromised certain reservations were made; at the same time the Serbs emphasized their willingness to endeavour to reach a friendly solution of the conflict by referring the decision to the Hague Court of Arbitration, or to those Great Powers who had collaborated in the composition of the Serbian declaration of March 31 1909. But the Austro- Hungarian minister declared Serbia's answer to be unsatis- factory, and diplomatic relations were broken off between Vienna and Belgrade.
The Vienna Cabinet's harsh attitude nowhere met with approbation; the German Government itself did not approve it. The Emperor William indeed was of opinion that Austria-Hungary had gained a great moral victory, and that no cause of war remained. But neither his efforts, nor those of Sir Edward Grey, which were directed towards the mediation of the Great Powers not directly involved, met with success. On July 28 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. The Great Powers now strove to localize the con- flict. But all their attempts came to naught. Even the English proposal for direct negotiations with a view to an understand- ing between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg led to no result. On the evening of July 29 the order was given for mobilization in the military area on the S.W. front of Russia situated on the border of Austria-Hungary. On July 31 the Russian order for a general mobilization was issued, and answered by similar measures on the part of Austria-Hungary and Ger- many. On Aug. 2 Germany declared war on Russia, and the day after on France; on Aug. 4 England and Bel- gium on Germany; on the 6th Austria-Hungary on Russia; other Powers followed suit. The World War, so long dreaded by the Great Powers of Europe, had broken out.
The Central Powers had now to make sure of the aid of their allies and to win new combatants to their side. But the efforts which they made towards this end brought them disappointment upon disappointment. The conversa- tions which had taken place with Italy in July 1914 had made them realize that they could not reckon on an imme- diate participation of the Italian troops on the side of the Triple Alliance. As early as July 25, moreover, San Giuliano had. announced that he would open the question of compensa- tion for Italy in case of an Austro-Serbian war. This announce- ment he repeated after the declaration of war, but made it clear at the same time that Austria-Hungary was not to expect active support from the Italians, since she had taken the offen- sive against Serbia. Under pressure from the .German Govern- ment, which still cherished the hope of deciding Italy, by far- reaching concessions, to take part in a world war on the side of the Central Powers, Berchtold declared himself ready in prin- ciple to recognize the Italian claims to compensation for every annexation made by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, but in any case only on the assumption that Italy would observe a friendly attitude towards the Habsburg Monarchy in an Austro- Serbian war, and in case of a world war fulfil her obligations as a member of the Triple Alliance. But as early as Aug. i San Giuliano insisted that the casus foederis had not arisen for Italy in the case of the Russians also; for the time being she would remain neutral; but cooperation with her allies at a later time was referred to as not excluded. It was in the same sense, though in the most cordial terms possible, that Victor
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