use of delicate apparatus] becomes necessary to bring the process out for observation " (Watson). Even then it is diffi- cult to interpret the data owing to much abbreviation and short-circuiting.
Now, many who would not care to be labelled behaviourists might provisionally agree that language, expressed or sup- pressed, is the outcome of thought. But this is not good enough for the physiological behaviourist pur sang. Language behaviour and thought must be identified. Thus Watson contended that " thought is the action of language mechanisms." It is not, as .some assume, " something, no one knows quite what, that can go on in the absence of all muscular activity. It is a con- stituent part of every adjustment process. ... It is not differ- ent in essence from tennis-playing, swimming, or any other overt activity except that it is hidden from ordinary observa- tion and is more complex and at the same time more abbrevi- ated." If then thought is the action of the laryngeal mechan- isms just as swimming is the action of other bodily mechanisms, it clearly follows that thought, for this behaviourist " psychol- ogy," in which the word " consciousness " is taboo, is a mode of bodily behaviour. In what sense can this be accepted on behav- iourist principles? Not without diffidence it may be suggested that to get the answer to this question it is essential to recog- nize that the organism responds as an integrated whole, and that all that follows on stimulation in some life-situation must be regarded as behaviour. Laryngeal behaviour is the out- come of the behaviour of effectors; their behaviour is the out- come of that of a nervous system with its inherited and acquired neuronic pattern; this behaviour in turn is due to that of many receptors under adequate stimulation. All human conduct, including speech, overt or implicit, is the final expression of the behaviour of the organism, man, as a whole; and this organ- ism is what it is, and finally does what it does as the result of all that has happened to it during development under the environ- ing conditions of life up to date. Watson seems to lay chief stress on what has been spoken of above as the final expression the business end of the whole business. And perhaps he would regard what has been said as involving an unwarrantable ex- tension of the concept of behaviour. But there is much, even in his treatment, which lends colour to such an interpre- tation of that which he would regard as the cardinal policy of behaviourism.
The physiological story above outlined is a familiar one. Watson tells it admirably and adds effective and illuminating touches. He is honest in confessing that much still remains conjectural. One is left in wonder, however, why when the ship of psychology is lightened by throwing consciousness over- board, thought also should not be silently dropped over the stern. Then the vessel thus rendered thoroughly seaworthy might be rechristened and given some more appropriate name under which to pursue her voyage. Psychology seems a mis- nomer.
The name is, however, retained. So let that pass. Revert to the emphasis on the final expression in act and deed. Here is a bit of sound policy. It is this final expression which is of prime importance in animal behaviour and in human conduct. Herein lies the pragmatic value of behaviourist treatment. Men have, for example, to be selected for vocational work, for service in the social community, as promising for this job or for that, on occasion as likely to be efficient in the army. They must be chosen for what they can do, and do rapidly, surely and well. It is claimed, and there is evidence to substantiate the claim, that the behaviourist with his stress on the effective output in conduct, is able to make a wiser choice than the " orthodox " psychologist who is said to be obsessed with the older intellec- tualistic methods which involve too much reliance on the methods of introspection only whose " pure psychology " is of slender value in its application to the current problems of busy life. In another field of practical application it is urged that the methods of behaviourism will be fruitful. Both Watson (1916) and Holt seek to apply them in the procedure of psycho- analysis; and the latter author interprets the Freudian Wish in
terms of his special form of behaviourism and his relational treatment of consciousness. One may hazard the opinion that a judicious dose of behaviourist interpretation may serve as a corrective of some of the tenets of what now goes by the name of the New Psychology.
Of late years in England it is instinct in man, rather than in animals, that has occupied the attention of psychologists and sociologists. For this purpose the definition of instinctive behaviour as that which is unlearnt the form of which is not acquired in the course of individual experience, coming by nature and not through nurture has been found not only difficult of application in human life but scarcely serviceable for marking a contrast which calls for emphasis. Instead therefore of using the word " instinctive " to mark those forms of behaviour which are unlearnt and not individually acquired, some use it to distinguish those modes of behaviour which take form unreflectively from those which are the outcome, of rational thought under fully deliberate choice. Thus the in- stincts of the herd, with which W. Trotter has dealt in an able and illuminating manner, are, in part at least, modes of behaviour which have been learnt under the social conditions of gregarious life, which are in large measure due to tradition, and which are only endorsed under the long-familiar process which has of late been called rationalization. Here the bolstering up by some assigned reason is subsequent to the " instinctive " perform- ance of the act. In all this there is nothing which cannot, under appropriate definition, be interpreted on behaviourist principles.
There is, however, another way of dealing with instinct, either in the unlearnt or in the not-reflective sense, which will be rejected by most, if not all, behaviourists nay more which is rejected by many of the leading American psychologists and philosophers who would not wish to be regarded as exponents of behaviourism. This is the increasingly prevalent doctrine in England according to which instincts are forces of character, modes of psychic energy, prime movers of human conduct, types of true mental activity, exemplars of genuine impulse, as the rational psychologist and not the physiologist under- stands this word. It finds able expression in W. McDougall's Social Psychology, in A. F. Shand's Foundations of Character, and in J. Drever's Instinct in Man. It is traceable in W. Trot- ter's Instincts of the Herd, in L. T. Hobhouse's Mind in Evolu- tion, and in W. H. R. Rivers' Instinct and the Unconscious. For those who advocate a new psychology, this seems to be a pivotal concept in the increasing literature of psycho-analysis. Its spiritual father in this country is James Ward, whose article PSYCHOLOGY in the E.B., gth Ed., marked a turning-point in thought. It has been fostered through the influence of Henri Bergson. It involves the concept of a " kind of causality so connected with the nature of conative consciousness that it can belong to nothing else " (G. F. Stout, to whose Manual an im- portant chapter on Instinct has been added, 1913).
If there is any validity in the characterization of behaviour- ism outlined above, this is the psychology which its supporters seek to supplant, since it involves, as they aver, a bifurcation of nature through the introduction of trans-empirical con- cepts. And assuredly those who hold this creed will, on their part, utterly reject behaviourism.
See J. B. Watson, " Psychology as the Behaviourist views it," Psych. Rep. xx., 1913 (to this article may probably be assigned the introduction of the word); Behaviour (1914); Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviourist (1920); E. B. Holt, The Concept of Consciousness (1914), The Freudian Wish (1915). See also Jour, of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods from 1904 to date. The dates in the text after the names of Bode, Weiss, Yerkes and others refer to articles in this journal under the years of publication. W. James's "Does Consciousness Exist? " appeared in the first volume and is reprinted with other pertinent papers in Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912). (C. LL. M.)
BEILBY, SIR GEORGE THOMAS (1850- ), British physicist, was born at Edinburgh Nov. 17 1850, his father being a physician. He was educated at Edinburgh University and trained as a civil engineer. When quite young he developed, in collaboration with the late William Young, a new method
