that, as the British blockade prevented it from maintaining the provisioning of Belgium, it had no further concern in the matter.
A central committee was formed in Brussels, consisting of personages of the financial world, presided over by E. Solvay, and under patronage of the ministers for Spain and the United States. It took the title of Comiti centrale de secours el d 'ali- mentation. An executive committee was appointed with M. Francque as chairman, the first meeting taking place on Sept. 3 1914. It at once opened canteens and food depots, obtaining through the good offices of neutral ministers a guarantee that they would not be seized.
But by Sept. 1914 famine was already imminent. The Comitt centrale tried to get food from England; the British Government objected. Active negotiations procured an agreement: Marshal von der Goltz promised to exempt totally from requisition food so imported; the British Government on their side consented to the importations on conditions that the supplies should be con- veyed to the Belgian frontier under patronage of the ambassadors of Spain and the United States, and that once in Belgium they should be under the patronage of the Spanish and American ministers at Brussels. The Commission for the Relief of Belgium was constituted to organize this scheme. The importation of food supplies now made the Comile centrale a body of great im- portance, and its activities extended all over the country. In each province a Comit& d' alimentation was set up, its president sitting on the ComitS centrale in Brussels. The Comiti centrale now took the name of Comile national de secours el d' alimentation.
Permission to import food was not enough, a method must be found of paying for it. Von der Goltz would not allow money to be transmitted to the Allies; funds must be procured outside Belgium. The Belgian Government and the British Government each opened a credit of 100,000 to the C.N. The Societe Generale put its own foreign credits at the C.N.'s disposal. A consortium of bankers and of the firm of Solvay et Cie. provided a loan of 1 5 million francs in gold, advanced by the London branch of the Banque Nationale de Belgique. In addition donations to the amount of 60,000,000 francs were collected in Belgium itself, and zealous propaganda was made abroad with the result that 60,000,000 francs were collected in England, 30,000,000 in America, 10,000,000 in other countries.
Huge quantities of foodstuffs had to be imported; 60,000 tons were needed every month, which implied at the same time 180,000 tons purchased, stored, or in transit, representing a value of 70 to 80 million francs. The funds at the C.N.'s dis- posal were insufficient. True, the proceeds from the sales of the imported goods would have balanced expenses, but the German Government would not allow money thus received by the C.N. to leave the country. An arrangement was therefore made be- tween the C.N. and the Belgian Government, whereby the C.N. undertook to pay the salaries of the Belgian officials, while the Belgian Government in return paid over monthly an equivalent sum to the Commission for Relief in Belgium. This sum was fixed at 25,000,000 francs per month, but that proved in- sufficient, and in Jan. 1917 it was augmented to 37,500,000 per month. Just then, however, the submarine war stopped im- portations for several months, and the price of foodstuffs rose enormously in consequence. Moreover, the transference to Belgium of 150,000 French refugees who had to be supported by the C.N. further exhausted the latter's resources. New measures became necessary. The Belgian Government concluded an arrangement with the American Government, by which the latter gave 15,000,000 dollars per month to the C.R.B. to pay for purchases of food made in the United States. For purchases made in Holland the C.N. obtained use of the credits possessed in that country by all Belgian banks.
The functions of the C.N. did not consist in merely securing the arrival of supplies of food in Belgium, but also in distributing them throughout the country, and in those districts of northern France whose provisioning it undertook in 1915. The essentially private character of the C.N. and the refusal of the German authorities to allow it to organize a police de surveillance to safeguard its activities, made the situation very difficult. It is
true that the Cour de Cassation, by authorizing the courts to punish persons who contravened the C.N.'s regulations, gave it valuable help; but its task was only rendered possible by its admirable organization. At first decentral in system, the C.N. was forced by events to centralize. It was worked by its executive committee, whose president, M. Francque, possessed the widest powers. He in fact directed the vast organization, assisted by a general secretary. The C.N. was divided into two departments: the dipartement d' alimentation, responsible for provisioning the country, and the departement des secours, responsible for relief measures. These two departments worked in close col- laboration with the Commission for Relief in Belgium, formed in London in Oct. 1914, under direction of Mr. Hoover, and under patronage of the Spanish and American ambassadors at London, Paris, Berlin, Brussels, and The Hague. The C.R.B. had offices in New York, London, Rotterdam and Brussels. The three first effected the purchases for which they received orders from the C.N., the fourth supervised the distribution in Belgium.
The departement d' alimentation had a subsidiary department for the study of alimentary questions, and another for inquiry into the needs of the country. Guided by these it gave its orders to the C.R.B., received the goods, and distributed them among the provincial committees. The vast scope of its functions necessitated the creation of a goods book-keeping department and a financial book-keeping department, also the putting under public control of the manufacturing processes applied to some of the materials received.
To show the magnitude of its task it may suffice to mention that up to Dec. 31 1918 it had delivered food to the provincial committees to the value of over 3-5 milliards of francs, 2-5 milliards having been for Belgium and one milliard for France.
A bonus was deducted from the sales of goods and paid over to the departement des secours. The German authorities showing signs of intending to assume a share in the control of these sales, the C.N. asked the C.R.B. to deduct the bonus, so that it should escape German surveillance. Thanks to these bonuses, to which were added the voluntary donations from foreign countries, the departement des secours accomplished a vast amount of relief work. A commission for the purchase of clothing and materials, with workrooms for cutting and making and for the training of apprentices, also with technical courses for students, supplied the provincial committees. Grants of money were also given; up to Dec. 31 1918, 1-3 milliards of francs had been distributed to the necessitous poor. This department gave grants besides to the societies for aiding officers' and non-commissioned officers' wives, families deprived of means by the war, the unemployed, and the lacemakers, to the societies for providing food for infants, succouring war orphans, the homeless, foreign refugees, artists, wounded soldiers, etc. Under its patronage were the Societe cooperative d'avance et de prfts (formed to help State officials and employees), the Sociiti des habitations ouvribres, the Ligue centre la tuberculose, the Union des vttles et des communes beiges pour venir en aide aux sans-abris sinistres, the Agence de ren- seignemenls pour prisonniers et internes, the Cantine du soldat prisonnier, the Caissette du soldat beige. From Nov. 1917 its scope was widened further by fusion with the society for the relief of unemployment.
Delegates from the C.R.B. took an active part in the work of the C.N. They attended the meetings of the provincial com- mittees, and thus provided the necessary liaison between them and the central executive, which could not have been done by members of the C.N. as the Germans did not permit them to travel about freely. The collaboration of the C.R.B. was also valuable in regard to the transport within Belgium of provisions for the provinces. The C.N. placed the flotilla it had formed, of 137 vessels (45,000 tons) and of 29 tugs, beneath the flag of the C.R.B., thus avoiding requisitions.
The C.R.B. undertook the frequently necessary negotiations with the German and British Governments. The gravest dif- ficulty ever encountered was when in 1915 the German authori- ties prohibited the C.N. from dealing with the distribution of the indigenous foodstuffs. These were to be distributed by the
