States to the various Powers to attend a general conference later in the year on the subject of disarmament and the political questions connected therewith gave the opportunity for the whole question to be discussed from every point of view.
With regard to the question of naval defence the Conference resolved " that, while recognizing the necessity of cooperation ... to provide such naval defence as may prove to be essential for security, and while holding that equality with the naval strength of any other Power is the minimum suggested for that purpose, this Conference is of opinion that the method and ex- tent of such cooperation are matters for the final determination of the several Parliaments concerned, and that any recommenda- tions thereon should be deferred until after the coming con- ference on disarmament."
It should further be noted that the dominion Prime Ministers attended the Cabinet Council at which the reply to the French note on Upper Silesia was considered. It had been intended to hold a special constitutional conference in 1922, but, having regard to the constitutional developments since 1917, the meeting saw no advantage in holding such a conference. They recognized, however, the necessity of continuous consultation, which could only be secured by an improvement in the communications between the different parts of the Empire.
Whether or not an Imperial Cabinet, on the model of the Imperial War Cabinet, be found to be practicable, it should be noted that a more elaborate method of solving the problem has been put forward. The " Round Table " movement took its rise from a small body of able and hard-working men who, having helped to bring about the union of South Africa, trans- ferred their energies to the solution of the British imperial prob- Jem. A patient and detailed investigation of the whole subject was made by groups of inquirers, mainly belonging to the univer- sities, throughout the Empire; and the results were recorded in carefully annotated volumes. The final outcome of the views of the majority in most groups there was a dissentient minority was the volume, The Problem of the Commonwealth, by Lionel Curtis, published in 1917. Though the book bound no one to the author's individual views, it is not likely ever to be superseded as a solution of the problem, from the point of view of an im- perial federationist. Whilst the necessity of an Imperial Parlia- ment and Executive was insisted upon, the necessity was also recognized of limiting, as far as was compatible with imperial safety, the functions of such Imperial Parliament and Executive. Dominion nationalism forbade that questions other than the management of foreign affairs, Imperial defence and finance in its relation with defence, along with the control of subject races, should be the province of the central authority. Thus the sub- ject of the tariff was held to be outside its province.
Whatever its logical merits, the proposal failed to secure the support of public men and of the electors in the dominions; largely on the ground that the people of the dominions would never tolerate any form of taxation imposed by a Parliament not sitting within their own borders.
But, though imperial federation be in the existing state of public opinion an impossibility, it does not follow that a satis- factory scheme is not any nearer than it was before the war. The effects of the war seemed indeed in 1921 to be working in two directly opposite directions. On the one hand the war brought about a greater knowledge of Great Britain and its people among the many thousands of dominion soldiers who were in England when training or on leave, and had thus created bonds of mutual affection and sympathy. (The feeling embodied in the well- known warning, " No Englishman need apply," is now, we are told, in Canada a thing of the past.) Again, the visits of the Prince of Wales to the dominions in 1919-21 called forth an expression of loyalty and devotion to the monarchy, as embody- ing imperial unity, and to the individual Prince, as embodying in its most attractive shape at once the youth and the demo- cratic spirit of these new nations, such as promised well for the permanence of the British connexion.
Upon the other hand, the war, with its consequences, was, as was inevitable, a forcing-house in the development of the
political status of the dominions, and hastened the putting for- ward of claims which might otherwise have lain dormant for many more years. During the peace negotiations dominion statesmen sat at the council table as representatives of their own communities, and not as mere assessors to the British representa- tives, their countries being recognized, for certain purposes, as separate states. At the signing of the Peace, King George, in each case, acted on the advice of the minister representing each individual dominion separately. Lastly, the dominions became full members of the League of Nations, undertaking, individually, the many serious obligations involved by such membership. These privileges, Sir Robert Borden has explained, were not obtained without struggle; but the opposition in no case came from the British Government.
Moreover, whilst the international position of the British Empire was thus being modified, General Smuts, the protagonist of the movement to reconcile complete local autonomy with the permanence of the Empire, was explaining the measures neces- sary to make theory to harmonize with practice. (It should be remembered that General Smuts was at the same time denouncing secession as at once a violation of the South African Constitution and a blow aimed at the British population.) No shred of author- ity, General Smuts insisted, must remain with the British Parlia- ment or the Colonial Office. When dominion matters were in question the King must act exclusively on the advice of his dominion ministers, and, accordingly, the Governor-General must be appointed on their recommendation. Whence it follows that the only link left between Great Britain and the dominions is the personal link of the Crown, and that, logically, the domin- ions should have separate diplomatic representation in every capital. A beginning had been made in 1921 in the latter direc- tion by the decision to appoint a Canadian minister at Washing- ton, though it was doubtful how far such an appointment was really demanded by Canadian public opinion.
It is obvious how difficult under the new system might become the position of a constitutional monarch who found himself called upon to act in several different ways, on the advice of separate ministers, whose policies might be wholly discordant. When General Smuts first broached his views in 191 7 he laid great store on the necessity for frequent meetings of the Prime Minis- ters of the British Commonwealth of Nations, with the object of insuring a common and collective policy; but latterly, under the stress of local conditions in South Africa, and perhaps under the influence of a natural impatience with the situation in Europe, this side of the shield seems to have been less before his attention.
At the Imperial Conference of 1917 it was agreed that the readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire should form the subject of a special imperial conference, to be summoned as soon as possible after the cessa- tion of hostilities; and it was settled provisionally that the con- ference should take place in 1922; but it seemed clear by 1921 that, in the reaction following upon the efforts of the war, any immediate attempt to draw closer the bonds of union would not meet with a favourable reception. To judge from the criticisms made on Lord Jellicoe's suggestions, the dominions were not yet prepared to contribute a fixed proportionate quota to the cost of the imperial navy. Underlying, however, this attitude of caution and distrust, there was still in reserve that spirit which made the Empire one in the supreme crisis of its history, the World War.
Other difficulties, besides the constitutional problem, beset the British Empire during the decade. Of these none caused greater anxiety than the treatment accorded to British Indians in the British dominions. With regard to immigration, it had become generally recognized in 1921 that each dominion had the right to make, and to enforce, such rules as it deemed necessary for its own individual interests. No sane Englishman would ven- ture to quarrel with the policy of a white Australia, or with the consequences it may entail. Similarly, if the Union of South Africa, with its huge black population, refuses admission to British Indians, no complaint can be made. But it is a matter
