Corps in the wings less so. The IX. Corps, attacking with the
6th and 1st Div. in line, despite difficulties in assembling its
forces, reached its first objectives by 9 A.M., but the 6th Division
was held up at Holnon, and was unable to maintain itself in Fresnoy, while the ist Div. got farther forward, but not as far as
Pontruet. The corps lost heavily, though some prisoners and
guns were taken. The Australian Corps (4th Div. on the right, 1st on the left) also had heavy fighting, particularly in Levercuier
village and the woods N. of it, before reaching its first objective,
and was checked in front of the final objective till darkness fell,
when the last hostile defences W. of the main Hindenburg line
were successfully secured under cover of night. The captures of
the corps came to over 4,000 prisoners and 87 guns; the attacking
strength of the Australians was less than 6,000 and the casualties
were just over 1,000 in all. The III. Corps' attack, carried out by
the 74th, 18th, 12th and 58th Div. in line from the right, met
with very stubborn opposition; the enemy were expecting the attack and fought well. As a result the progress made was less than had been hoped; only the 74th Div. in fact attained the first objective. The 18th was checked after capturing Ronssoy and the 12th and 58th after taking Epehy; 2,300 prisoners were taken and 10 guns.
It was decided, in view of the incomplete success attained on this day, that the IX. and III. Corps should continue the attack on the 19th, while the Australians consolidated their gains. A series of partial offensives were therefore undertaken on the succeeding days, on both wings of the army, but with little real result; neither corps could succeed in attaining the final objectives of the first day's attack or clear the enemy entirely from the advanced defences of the Hindenburg line.
Meanwhile it had been definitely decided by British G.H.Q. on Sept. 22 that that line should be attacked along the whole front from the Sensee to N. of St. Quentin by the First, Third and Fourth Armies. To the last named were assigned as reenforcements the XIII. Corps and the II. U.S. Corps; the former was maintained in reserve, but the latter was combined with the Australian Corps and took over the left of its front and the right of the III. Corps front, relieving the ist Australian, 74th and 18th Div. by Sept. 25. The 74th and 58th Div. now left the Fourth Army, which had thus undergone a net increase from 10 to 14 divisions.
During this redistribution the efforts of the IX. and III. Corps to gain further ground continued without cessation. Sept. 21 and 22 saw some progress by the latter formation, which was not, however, successful in completing the capture of the outer German defences before the right of its line was taken over by the 27th and 30th U.S. Div., nor were the new arrivals who carried out their first attack in France on the 26th and 27th able to advance the line to any real extent. On the other hand, during the period from Sept. 24 to 26 the IX. Corps, by repeated efforts, pushed their front to the E. of Gricourt and Pontruet, thus ensuring favourable conditions for the forthcoming offensive on the right wing of the army.
In the series of operations, described above, the Third and Fourth British Armies had engaged 15 divisions against 29 of the German Second and Seventeenth Armies, and had taken from them close on 12,000 prisoners and 100 guns.
4. Preparations for Attack against Hindenburg Line (Sept. 22-26). The Hindenburg line, which now faced the British armies, has been described in detail elsewhere; it will therefore suffice to say here that, together with the Masnieres-Beaurevoir line beyond it, it formed a fortified belt some four to six miles in depth, and was in all respects one of the most formidable defen- sive positions known to history. Despite the risks of failure and the probable consequences of such a failure, from the political and moral as well as the military point of view, it was considered essential both by Marshal Foch and Lord Haig that the attack on it should be carried out and that as soon as possible. In view of the fact that the First and Third British Armies were faced with strong positions in the Canal du Nord and the Scheldt canal, which it was advisable to carry prior to the general attack on the Hindenburg line behind the latter obstacle, it was decided that these two armies should open their operations a day earlier than the Fourth Army, so as to draw off the German reserves from the front of that army, which had to deliver the main attack and was faced with the most formidable defences.
Accordingly the following orders were issued on Sept. 22: "The First Army will attack on Sept. 27 with a view to capturing the heights of Bourlon Wood in the first instance. It will then push forward and secure its left on the Sensee river and operate so as to protect the left of the Third Army. The Third Army will operate in the direction of the general line Le Cateau Solesmes. It will attack on Sept. 27 in conjunction with the First Army and will press forward to secure the Canal de 1'Escaut, so as to be in a position to cooperate closely with the Fourth Army on Sept. 29. The Third Army will assist the Fourth Army with counter battery work on the enemy's guns in the region La Terriere-Villers Outreaux. The Fourth Army, protected on its right flank by the First French Army, will deliver the main attack against the enemy's defences from Le Tronquoy to Le Catelet, both inclusive, operating in the direction of the general line Bohain-Busigny. The bombardment will commence on Sept. 27 and the assault will be delivered on Sept. 29."
5. First Army's Advance to Cambrai (Sept. 27-Oct. 2). At the close of the operations E. of Arras at the beginning of Sept., the right wing of the First Army, consisting of the Canadian and XXII. Corps, stood S. of the Scarpe, facing the obstacle of the Canal duNord and the Sensee. Behind this strong line of defence the German Seventeenth Army had the I. Bavarian Reserve and the II. Bavarian Corps with five divisions in front line and about twice that number in support. The positions held by them were formidable to a degree; the Canal du Nord, although not completed along all its length, was some too ft. in width and its northern half full of water; all the bridges were destroyed, and the E. bank, which commanded the W., had been lined with machine-guns and strongly wired. To the E. of the canal the Germans had as successive defensive positions the Marquion trench line, running from Oisy by Marquion to the main Hindenburg line near Graincourt; the Marcoing line, covering Cambrai at a distance of some two miles from its outskirts; and the Scheldt canal, from the Sensee at Estrun by the western suburbs of the city to Marcoing, Crevecceur and the south.
The task in front of the First Army was thus an extremely difficult one; none the less it had to be tackled, and as early as Sept. 15 the preliminary measures were taken in hand. The XXII. Corps took over the front from the Sensee southwards to the Arras-Cambrai road, and the Canadians relieved the left of the Third Army as far as N. of Moeuvres. By this means the latter, who were to make the main attack, were brought opposite a portion of the Canal du Nord, which was dry along a front of 1½ miles. The plan was to cross the obstacle here and then to expand the front of attack to a frontage of some 9 m. by pushing out divisions fanwise to E., N.E. and N. It was hoped that the assembly of the attacking troops in the restricted zone opposite the crossing point, the rapid bridging of the dry canal, and the pushing forward of guns to cover the farther advance, and of reinforcements, ammunition and supplies to support it, could all be carried out with the necessary speed and security, although the difficulties to be faced were very great and the possible causes of contretemps numerous.
Zero hour was to be 5:20 A.M. on Sept. 27. The 4th Canadian Div. was in line on the right, and the ist on the left, and were to carry out the first phase of the attack, as far as the line Fontaine Notre Dame-W. of Haynecourt-Sauchy L'Estree. Up to this line four successive objectives were assigned; from there onwards the second phase of the advance was to carry the assailants to the line of the Scheldt canal and the Sensee. During the pause between these two phases the 3rd Canadian Div. was to come in on the right of the 4th, and the nth British Div. on the left of the 1st, so that the second phase would be carried out by the 3rd, 4th and 1st Canadian and nth British Div. in that order from the south.
Punctually at the appointed time, at dawn on Sept. 27, the assault was delivered. The crossing of the narrow defile over the
