aside the spasmodic opposition of such small detachments as came in its way. The Austro-German advance was facilitated by the fact that Cavaciocchi had filled his front lines too full, and sent all his reserves across the river, in immediate support of the 43rd and 46th Divisions. When Lequis was approaching Caporetto Cavaciocchi had nothing in hand but a squadron of cavalry and one battalion of infantry which had not yet reached its destination E. of the river. For some hours previously Cavaciocchi had been calling on the VII. Corps, but Buongiovanni was very slow, not without excuse. His Corps was a scratch formation; his original left-hand division had been broken up two days before to strengthen the IV. and XXVII. Corps, and the 62nd, which had been assigned to him in its stead, was only moving up to take its place N. of the 3rd, already aligned, but too far back, on the ridge running N.W. from the Passo di Zagradan. A further difficulty was that no definite plan of action had been agreed on between Cavaciocchi, Buongiovanni and Badoglio, whose close cooperation was clearly necessary. Or, if a plan had been made, it was one which had been completely upset by the rapid successes of the enemy. In fact, as has been shown already, Badoglio had little idea of how the fight was going on his front; Buongiovanni was in the dark regarding the general situation except for the calls which came from Cavaciocchi; and Cavaciocchi, who saw his own danger, had played his cards too soon, and had nothing left. Krauss records the satisfaction he felt when he observed that the additional troops given to the IV. Corps on the eve of the battle were sent forward instead of being held in reserve.
By the evening the situation was very favourable to the attacking forces. Stein was pouring troops through the breach made by the Silesians, and was making good headway with the 5oth Austrian division on their right, while the Alpenkorps, Berrer and Scotti had broken through the lines opposite Tolmino, and in several places had gained the high ridge dominating the head of the Judrio valley. Krauss was still held up at Saga and on Polounik, and the Bosnians had gained no more ground. But the break-through between Tolmino and Caporetto had made these positions untenable.
At Cividale, where Capello had his headquarters, and at the Comando Supremo in Udine, the first news that came from the IV. Corps and the absence of news from the XXVII. made a grave impression. Capello sent up the army reserves by the valley roads, and dispatched Montuori to direct the " left wing " (the IV. and VII. Corps). This was a step which might with advantage have been taken earlier; indeed, the II. Army might well have been further divided and, if necessary, made into an army group. It was too large, and covered too wide a front, for a single army command.
By evening the magnitude of the initial enemy success was clear, though it was not yet clear to what extent the whole Italian left wing was crumbling. There seemed good reason to hope that the advance might be blocked in the narrow valleys west of the Isonzo. But by nightfall both the IV. Corps and the igth Div. were practically broken in pieces. Saga had to be abandoned owing to the break farther S., and t'he 5oth Div., or what was left of it, retired into the Val d'Uccea and on to the ridge of the Stol, which was reached later by the remnants of the 43rd, who had held their own bravely, but were in great part cut off when they attempted to come back across the Isonzo. A gallant detachment (Alpini and details of the Etna brigade), finding retreat impossible, held out for days on Monte Nero till the battle had gone far to the W., and all their food and ammunition were gone. The 46th Div. was practically destroyed, many having surrendered when they found the enemy at their backs, and others having joined the masses of supply service troops which were now filling the roads. The 6znd Div. (VII. Corps) was beginning to be attacked at Luico, while its left was extending to occupy Monte Matajur and join hands with the 53rd, which had been dispatched by Capello to block the Natisone valley. The 3rd Div. was still in* its old position, but it was now being attacked in front and its right was uncovered by the defeat and practical destruction of the
The right wing of the igth was still holding on Globocak and had been reenforced by the ist Bersaglieri Brigade; Alpine troops still held a line down to the river, though they had been driven off their original positions on Krad Vrh, and troops of the 64th were being brought back from the left bank to strengthen this line. It was obvious that the positions on the Bainsizza could not be maintained. Capello had already transferred Badoglio's division beyond the river to the command of the XXIV. Corps (Caviglia), and the order had been given to Caviglia and Albricci to withdraw their troops to their main h'nes of defence and to the former to prepare for a retreat across the Isonzo.
At this moment the most dangerous point appeared to be the extreme left wing, where the 5oth Div. had lost touch with the Carnia force, and only the Potenza brigade, of three regiments, but much weakened by disease, was available as a reserve. And the Potenza brigade was wanted farther south. Two Alpine groups were already on the way to this critical point, having been dispatched the day before, but it was clear that Krauss would try to push through by this route, the shortest way to the Tagliamento. The occupation of Caporetto threatened to open another route nearly as short, but the possession of Monte Maggiore and the Stol, together with Monte Matajur, gave good hope that the advance of the enemy might be quickly brought to a halt when it had outrun the protecting fire of its own guns. Cadorna ordered the Carnia force to occupy Monte Maggiore and block the Val d'Uccea " at all costs," and sent up a division to support the troops on the Stol. He gave orders for resistance to be made on three successive lines, but all of these radiated from Monte Maggiore, which was the key position. He gave orders for resistance on these lines, but at the same time he directed that plans and orders should be drawn up for a general retreat to the Tagliamento. This was a precaution only; at the moment, though the situation looked grave, there seemed little reason to doubt the capacity of the II. Army, and the reserves already under way, to stem the enemy's offensive.
Next morning Cadorna warned the Duke of Aosta of the danger of the situation, and directed him to send his less mobile heavy artillery W. of the Piave and prepare for a retreat beyond the Tagliamento. Tassonj, who commanded the Carnia force, was also directed to prepare for a withdrawal of his troops.
The news on the morning of Oct. 25 was increasingly grave. Krauss was pressing upon the Stol, and finding a weak resist- ance; the Potenza brigade was falling back from Creda; Monte Matajur had fallen, practically undefended. Other positions were seriously threatened, and there was no confidence that they would be held. For it was now known in Cividale and Udine that the behaviour of some of the troops had been very un- satisfactory, that men of some units had been quick to surrender, while others had retreated before they were heavily attacked. And this unexpected lack of spirit was communicating itself to some of the reserves. These had a difficult task in getting to the scene of action, for as they marched up the narrow mountain roads they were met by ever-increasing masses of fugitives, the bulk of these belonging to the non-combatant services. The confusion and congestion on the roads may be estimated from the fact that in the area of the IV. Corps alone the number of non-combatant troops exceeded 30,000. Somehow the word went round, among combatants and non-combatants alike, that the war was over and that there was nothing to do but " go home." Perhaps the cry was raised by enemy troops disguised in Italian uniforms, for some of these were found; more probably it was started by some who had drunk in the Socialist catchwords, pronounced by the deputy, Signor Treves: " This winter no one must be in the trenches"; who had believed the promise that if they laid down their arms the enemy would do like- wise. It was an extraordinary case of collective deception, which hastened the break-up of Capello's whole left wing.
A gallant resistance was still being made at various points, notably at Luico and Globocak, but the enemy had broken through at several positions of vital importance, and, as has been said, the reserves were becoming entangled in the crowds of fugitives, and some of them were becoming infected. On the
