their march, at right angles to the line of the retreat and athwart the long streams of retiring troops and civilians, had been very difficult. Stein's troops, however, failed to cross the Tagliamento, their attempts being repulsed with heavy loss. It was left to Krauss's Bosnians, after vain attempts to ford the river, to cross by the half-broken railway bridge at Cornino, on the evening of Nov. 2. The Bosnians had crossed by nine o'clock, surprising and driving back the small detachment watching the bridge. The following morning Di Giorgio was strongly attacked at Pinzano and Krauss established a sufficient bridgehead. On Nov. 4 Di Giorgio's left was pushed back still farther, endangering the line of retreat for the Carnia force divisions, and once more threatening the whole Italian line with envelop- ment from the north. For Stein was sending troops across to reenforce Krauss, and incidentally, according to Krauss, to claim the credit which was due to the Bosnians alone.
On the morning of Nov. 4 Cadorna ordered the retreat to the line of the Piave, and that night the troops holding the line of the Tagliamento resumed their march westward. Cadorna's main preoccupation was now for the IV. Army, which had been slow in getting under way, and for the Carnia force. Di Robilant wished to hold on in Cadore. It was natural, perhaps, that he should not have realized fully and at once the urgent necessities of the situation, but his hesitation to act promptly in accordance with Cadorna's instructions exposed him to the danger of having the retreat of his right wing cut off. For the safety of his route to the new positions assigned to his army depended now on the ability of the left wing of the worn-out II. Army to hold back the pressure of Stein's troops. Krauss's group had been sent N.W. through the mountains to the Upper Piave, to establish contact with Krobatin's X. Army and try once more to envelop the Italian left wing. This move cut off the greater part of Tassoni's Carnia force, caught between Krauss and Krobatin.
Di Giorgio's force and the rest of the covering troops of the II. Army slowed down the enemy advance, holding for some time on the Livenza and the Monticano. The III. Army, to which the VI. Corps had now been attached, was coming back steadily, though Boroevic's advance guards were giving little peace to its covering troops. Cadorna had intended to put the battered units of the II. Army in reserve at once, to be reorgan- ized and refitted; but the delay in the retreat of the IV. Army made it necessary to keep the II. and XXIV. Corps as part of the river defence force, the II. Corps in line from the Vidor bridge to Norvesa, the XXIV. in reserve, both under the com- mand of Di Robilant, to whom was to be entrusted the sector from the Montello to the Brenta. The converging retreat of the IV. Army was being carried out with much skill, and Di Robilant's troops succeeded in bringing away with them a great amount of material, but several detachments were cut off, including remnants of the Carnia force, which had been attached to the IV. Army for the latter part of the retreat.
By Nov. 8 the bulk of the IV. Army had succeeded in coming into line between the I. and the III., though part of the I. Corps was still on the road between Ponte delle Alpi and Feltre. On Nov. 9 and 10 the last covering troops of the II. and III. Armies crossed the Piave, from Pederobba to the sea.
The line chosen to defend the fortunes of Italy implied a withdrawal of the right wing of the I. Army. This contingency had been studied, and preparations for a new line had begun, during the Austrian offensive in 1916, and Cadorna had ordered the work to be continued during the interval. Pecori-Giraldi retired from Asiago and Gallio, and based his right on the fortified lines of the Meletta group. This formed a salient, for the line marked out for the IV. Army E. of the Brenta ran considerably farther south. Di Robilant had taken over the XVIII. Corps from Pecori-Giraldi, and it had been gradually withdrawn from its old positions to hold a line that ran from near San Marino in the Brenta gorge nearly due E. towards the Piave, keeping always in touch with the IX. Corps as the latter came down from Cadore. The IV. Army now held the line from the Brenta to the Piave, and the short stretch of the river as far as the Montello. The rest of the river line was held by the
Duke of Aosta, with the VIII. Corps on the Montello, the II., which had been in line between Pederobba and the Montello, occupied in preparing defensive positions, going back to be rested and re-fitted with the rest of the II. Army.
Reserves were coming in fast from the depots, including the young class of 1899. French and British divisions were already in Italy, and others were on the way. Many units of the II. Army were being rapidly reorganized and were soon to come into line again. But for the moment the Italians had only the I., III. and IV. Armies to hold the new line; and the III. and IV. Armies had been sorely tried by the retreat. There had been a serious breakdown in the moral of a part of the II. Army, which had been largely responsible for the extent of the enemy's initial success, and the tremendous strain of the retreat had naturally been responsible for further breakdowns. The behav- iour of the majority of the troops had been beyond all praise, but all were now worn-out, physically fatigued by the long trial of the retreat and suffering from the great moral depression caused by unexpected defeat and retirement from the lines they had held so long. Diaz, who took over the command from Cadorna on the morning of Nov. 9, had to face a situation that seemed almost desperate. The Italian armies had lost some 320,000 men in killed, wounded and missing, the number of prisoners being estimated at 265,000. The bulk of the II. Army had to be counted out altogether, and the total number of troops to be reorganized and re-fitted was over 300,000. More than 3,000 guns had been lost, and over 1,700 trench mortars. There was shortage in equipment of every kind. It seemed scarcely possible that these greatly weakened forces could resist the renewed attacks of the victorious armies which had followed so closely upon their heels. Fortunately, the plans for defence had been well and truly laid by Cadorna in the limited time that was available, and, still more fortunately, his foresight had caused elaborate preparations to be made on Monte Grappa. Roads had been built and gun positions prepared, and reservoirs made for water; trenches had been dug and strong redoubts constructed at various important points, though the defensive system was not completely finished when the enemy attacked at Caporetto. These works had been ordered with the double object of strengthening the defences of the Val Brenta against an attack from the N., and of providing against the possibility of a retreat to the Piave, which Cadorna had been compelled to consider once before, in May 1916. It was due to this fore- thought that resistance on the line now chosen was possible.
Diaz had little breathing-space, though some days were required before the enemy could prepare for an attack in force upon the new line. For Conrad saw a chance, and, though he was short of troops, he struck at once, while calling for reen- forcements to be sent to him for the eastern armies. He attacked Pecori's troops on Nov. 10, as they were preparing to come back to the line already indicated. When they had taken up their positions in the Meletta-Badenecche salient, Conrad's attacks were renewed, and for 10 days the fight continued, but brought no success to the Austrians, who lost heavily. Conrad had brought to this sector of the front all the troops who had been in the Fassa Alps, but he still felt himself too weak for the end he had in view a break-through to the plain, and he urged continually the dispatch of further reenforcements. Meanwhile Boroevic had tested the river defences at various points. On Nov. 12 a crossing was effected at Zenson, some 17 m. from the mouth of the river, and a small bridgehead was established in the loop formed by the curving stream. Various other attacks at San Dona, Intestadura, and the Grave di Papadopoli were unsuccessful, and the troops at Zenson could make no headway. Down by the mouth of the river Hungarian troops succeeded in establishing themselves between the Old Piave and the main stream, but they were unable to gain any more ground. As the days went on, other attempts to cross the river were defeated by the III. Army, and on Nov. 16 an attack in force failed completely. The Austrians crossed at various points N. of Ponte di Piave, but were repulsed with heavy casualties, losing some 1,500 killed and nearly as many prisoners. After this
