the ministerial office to draw up a dossier against the offensive scheme, and he was disturbed about it. Nevertheless, none of the generals interrogated recommended that the offensive should be given up; they did not believe that it would lead to all the re- sults foreseen by their chief, but they did not take the responsi- bility of advising its abandonment. Their opinion, therefore, was limited to absolutely sterile criticism.
On March 24, M. Painleve also consulted Sir Douglas Haig and a number of British officers; without going into details of method, their unanimous advice was " to strike rapidly, with full force, a great blow at the enemy "; and he became convinced at the beginning of April, after the Russian revolution and the entry of the United States into the war, that the British were resolutely in favour of the great offensive.
It would have seemed that the Minister of War would be satisfied with that. But, on April 3, a conference took place at his instigation at the Ministry of War between M. Ribot, Presi- dent of the Council, the Minister of War, the Minister of Marine Adml. Lacaze, the Minister of Munitions M. Albert Thomas, the Minister for the Colonies M. Maginot, and Gen. Nivelle.
The question for discussion was to examine if the offensive, the date of which was fixed for April 8, should take place in the new situation following the German withdrawal, the Russian revolu- tion, and the entry of the United States into the war.
This conference, which took place five days before the date fixed for the offensive, was useless; it was unable to decide any- thing, unless it were the meeting of the War Committee to examine the same question that is to say, if there was any rea- son to interfere with the British, in order to modify the plans drawn up in agreement with them and of which M. Painleve had just learnt that they were firm supporters. Worried by questions concerning the way in which the attack would be un- folded, the commander-in-chief affirmed his unshaken belief in a rapid break-through, followed immediately by the foreshadowed exploitation which would, in the course of about three days, bring the group of armies under Micheler up to the Serre, 30 km. from his position of attack. In the course of the discussion, the necessi- ty of destroying the first and second lines was pointed out, as well as the advantage of attacking when the weather was favourable.
It was decided that " the commander-in-chief should attack on the front which he had selected, at a time when he judged his preparations were complete, and on a day to be chosen by him." He had accordingly a free hand.
Everything appeared to be settled, and Gen. Nivelle free at last to prepare for the coming offensive, when Gen. Messimy, Deputy and formerly Minister of War, commanding one of the bri- gades which was going to take part in the offensive, approached M. Ribot, president of the Council, and handed him a report which, he said, expressed accurately " the opinion of officers of the highest repute in the French army and notably even that of the general who was to direct the coming offensive, Gen. Miche- ler." This report called for the immediate despatch of eight French and British divisions to the Trentino, and affirmed that only limited results could be obtained from the offensive and only at the price of important losses. The report said further that the order should be given immediately to wait for fine weather before beginning offensive operations in France, and in conclusion the commanders of groups of armies should be listened to, either singly or together, commencing with Gen. Micheler.
This report did not bring out anything new, and it was fatal as in the end the irresolution of the Government communicated it self to the subordinate staffs. It was sufficient, however, to bring about the assembly at Compiegne on April 6 of an extraordinary council of war; the President of the Republic, the president of the Council, together with the three Ministers of National Defence, the commander-in-chief and the generals commanding army groups, Micheler, Petain, d'Esperey, were present. General Foch, who held the rank of commander of an army group, had been sent hastily the day before to Italy and was therefore not present. The Minister of War asked if the new situation did not modify the circumstances of the offensive. General Nivelle pointed out the necessity for an immediate offensive, carried
through to the end; the commanders of army groups were all of his opinion on this point, and Gen. Micheler, in direct contradic- tion to the memorandum which had brought about the war coun- cil, got up and said: " It is necessary to attack as quickly as possi- ble, as soon as we are ready and the weather is favourable." All expressed however, in different ways, their doubts concerning an immediate break-through.
General Petain was particularly explicit : there were sufficient forces to pierce the enemy front but not to develop success. General Nivelle thereupon said: " Since I am not in agreement with either the Government or with my subordinates, nothing remains for me to do except to place my resignation in the hands of the President of the Republic." Everyone then protested that it was impossible to change the commander-in-chief on the eve of an attack of which all had admitted the necessity, and Gen. Nivelle, after some hesitation, refrained from sending his letter of resignation. The net result was that the council of war broke up without deciding anything except the necessity of the offensive.
Before the commission of inquiry into the operations on the Aisne, which was called together in July 1917, Gen. Foch ex- pressed himself thus: " Nivelle indeed acted thoughtlessly in accepting the invitation to be present at the conference at Com- piegne; but I return to the point that the Government, having heard the opinions expressed at this conference, invited Gen. Nivelle to carry through the operations." General Petain, having recalled the fact that he had pronounced an opinion un- favourable to the offensive, first to the Minister of War and later to the president of the Council, concluded by saying: "The Government, fully informed, took no notice. The chief responsi- bility therefore rests on their shoulders."
The report of the commission, which comprised Generals Bru- gere, Foch and Gouraud, is severe on the conference: " The doubt which had crept into the minds of the chief actors would not have been dissipated by the meeting on April 6. They did not give that mutual confidence and that belief in success which give to the commander-in-chief that energy and incentive that enable him to overcome events." The report records that there was no intervention taken to counteract the action of the commander- in-chief nor to weaken his orders, although the majority of those who met at Compiegne considered them as unrealizable. General Nivelle was allowed a free hand, with the reservation which was not clearly expressed, that if, after 24 hours of fighting, the re- sults were indecisive and losses too heavy, the operation should be broken off. General Nivelle, however, reiterating his belief in a rapid penetration, declared that he did not wish to offer battle in half-measure, and that he did not know what form the struggle would take, once it was engaged. However, the two officers that Gen. Nivelle had taken with him to draw up the report had been dismissed and no written statement had been made. Everything remains, therefore, confused concerning this " extraordinary " council of war, the reason of the meeting, the debates and the conclusion. The memorandum of Gen. Messimy asked that the army group commanders might be consulted " either separately or together," but it did not ask that they should be confronted with their commander-in-chief before the foremost leaders of the State; it is necessary to point out, as well, a regrettable difference between this memorandum, which was based chiefly on the observations of Gen. Micheler, and "the attitude of that general before the conference; all the army group commanders had been consulted by the Minister of War, at the instigation of Gen. Messimy, who had received satisfaction without being aware of it. The raisnn d'etre of the conference thus vanished.
All the army group commanders considered that the offensive was absolutely necessary, and they thought that Gen. Nivelle an- ticipated from it results which it was not reasonable to hope for. They had spoken of this at the Ministry of War; they repeated it at the conference with different variations which, however, did not affect the essence of their declarations. With what object, then, to reproduce them? The Government are responsible for the general conduct of the war, but the commander-in-chief, their choice, has the command and the responsibility for the operations. The Government considered that the offensive was necessary and
