very harmful among the French public, had not yet begun to
make itself felt in the aririy. In the meanwhile German exhaus-
tion continued very fast. Of 52 divisions in reserve on April i, 16
only remained unengaged. The anxieties of the German High
Command could be seen after April 16 in the unusual nature of
their communiques which appeared to prepare public opinion for
the worst eventualities. From that moment their moral declined
rapidly. The results were not such as had been anticipated, but
they were better than those resulting from previous offensives
and had been gained with fewer losses.
The number, however, of these losses were greatly exaggerated by rumours which were circulated among certain classes in France and even in certain districts where no information could have come from the front. Enemy agents worked freely and with the connivance of the highest authorities, as certain trials before the High Court and Council of War subsequently showed. In addition to this numerous French deputies had followed the at- tack on April 16, either from Gen. Micheler's battle headquarters or from the lookout at Roncq. Their accounts spread amongst their friends who shared all their sincere feelings. It is necessary to have a great experience of war not to allow oneself to be unduly influenced by the flock of wounded who pour back to the rear at every big attack after the first day. Having raised alarm in the French Chamber, these accounts, mutilated and exaggerated, spread amongst the public, strengthening the effects of enemy propaganda. The enemy cleverly exploited this.
It was a regular Austro-German counter-offensive, perfectly organized, which turned theiFrench success into failure. During the course of an operation both sides always exaggerate the num- ber of their losses, which later information diminishes as soon as the situation becomes more clear; but exceptional reasons for mistake vitiated all calculations. Precise numbers of the losses were given, very different but all enormous. The first official estimate had been obtained through wrong calculation based on an average of men killed; this calculation was arbitrarily aug- mented by adding thereto the number of missing. In the second estimate the wounded were counted several times over owing to their passing through the hands of various medical units, to which were added the enemy wounded who had been treated in the French ambulances. When eventually the casualty lists from the armies did arrive the wounded amongst the colonial troops and the Russian brigade had been counted twice over, and that mistake (although proved by documentary evidence) was long maintained before parliamentary commissions by the French Minister of War, who made no attempt to calm the agitation. The rumour spread that the terrible losses were due to insuffi- cient artillery preparation, that whole battalions had been thrown into the assault against uncut wire, that no precautions were taken for the evacuation of the wounded, and that numbers of wounded had succumbed through lack of medical attention. Scapegoats were looked for and guarantees demanded.
Continuation of the Offensive in the Middle of New Complica- tions. The commander-in-chief continued his operations in an atmosphere that became more and more hostile to him. However, the continuation of the offensive had raised no objections either at Compiegne on the iQth, when the French Minister of War came down to inform himself of his intentions, nor on the zoth at Paris, when Gen. Nivelle had been instructed to discuss matters at the Elysee. The X. Army under Duchesne had come into action between the V. and VI. Armies on the Craonne plateau.
General Micheler wrote on the 2ist that the offensive under- taken to the N. appeared to him to require forces superior to those which he had available, and pronounced the opinion that it would suit him if he could limit himself to local attacks which he set out in detail. Gen. Nivelle ordered then that he should limit himself to the relief of Reims by carrying Brimont and giving more freedom on the heights of Moronvilliers, already captured, and at the same time to complete the seizure of the Chemin des Dames. Preparations for these two attacks began, out each one of them gave rise to characteristic incidents.
The operation on the Chemin des Dames towards Craonne led to an overture on the part of a young French deputy, who was
serving as an officer on the staff of one of the army corps detailed for the attack, to the President of the Republic, in which he pointed out to him the anxiety experienced by the generals en- trusted with this operation. An exchange of notes between the Chief of the State and the commander-in-chief was the result and a consultation of generals summoned, an example of the re- grettable discussion which was going through the Government and the High Command.
The intended attack on Brimont gave rise to direct interven- tion on the part of the minister regarding the detail of the opera- tion. General Petain, who was selected to carry out the newly created functions of chief of the general staff attached to the Ministry, received in his department the scheme of all the opera- tion plans. M. Painleve, whilst conferring with Gen. Masel, commanding the V. Army, explained the detail of the operation against Brimont, and it seems that a misunderstanding arose between the two speakers regarding the probable number of losses. The scheme gave rise to conversations which lasted from April 22 to 29, and the minister instructed the commander-in- chief to suspend the attack on Brimont which the artillery had begun to prepare for. Generals Nivelle and Petain were invited to discuss this question on the 3oth, and the mutilated plan which appeared as a result of these conversations ended in the small attack of May 4 against two commanding positions. The French seized them, but they were driven off after losses which were really fruitless. Decisions taken affecting the direction of the French armies were the result of indifferent compromise between divergent wills; they were no longer commanded.
The British Government meanwhile, anxious regarding the results of the submarine war, were alarmed at the same time at the intentions which the French Government expressed.
Before the attack on April 16 they had learnt that the French War Cabinet intended to suspend the offensive at the end of a few days if the anticipated results were not attained, or at any rate nearly so. Also, as early as the i8th, Mr. Lloyd George asked Sir Douglas Haig " what would be, in his opinion, the effect produced if the French War Cabinet instructed Gen. Nivelle to cease offensive operations at a not-far-off date."
The noteworthy reply that Sir Douglas Haig made to this question on April 19 must be mentioned:
" In my opinion the decision to suspend immediately the offensive operations, until such a time when Russia and America should be in a position to join us (probably not before next spring) , would be most unwise. The struggle is following a normal course. Great results are never obtained in war so long as the enemy power has not been broken; and against an enemy both powerful and determined, operating with large effectives on a broad front, it is a matter of time and hard fighting." Sir Douglas Haig asserted afterwards " that the chances of success, this year, are remarkably good, if we do not relax our efforts," and he stated that " the future would confirm that forecast that the suspen- sion of the offensive would be more costly than the offensive itself." On the 26th Haig was called to Paris to confer with M. Ribot and M. Painleve, who pointed out to him the enormous losses of the French army: 25,000 killed and 95,000 wounded, they said, when the real numbers, confirmed at this time by the casualty lists of the armies, were 15,000 and 60,000; they con- sidered the necessity of stopping the offensive.
Before the members of the French Government Sir Douglas Haig maintained the view that he had expressed to his own Government; the results were not those that had been hoped for, but were such that he found them satisfactory. The German reserves were at this moment inferior to the Franco-British re- serves; it was therefore necessary " to continue the battle to the end." On being asked a definite question by Sir Douglas Haig the members of the French Government replied that " the battle should be continued without modification of the general idea of the plan of operations drawn up conjointly."
The British Government became more and more anxious owing to the hesitation displayed by the French Government, and instigated two conferences which were held at Paris. At the first Gens. Petain and Nivelle, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig
