Ludendorff confesses now his qualms: " Our consumption of troops and of munition Had been extraordinarily high. We were not able to foresee what would result from the fighting or what efforts we should be called upon to make." He attributes his safety in the spring to Russian inaction during the Franco-Brit- ish attack, and in the summer to French inaction. " As I reflect, and imagine that the Russian success had been gained in April to May instead of in July, I do not see how the High Command could have been able to remain master of the situation. . . . The Russian offensive came too late, in July, two or three months after the beginning of the Franco-British offensive; there was no concerted Allied action, as in autumn 1916; each went his own way and we were able, acting as we were on interior lines, to repulse and defeat separately our adversaries who were not work- ing in conjunction." And, in fact, six German divisions were taken from the French front in June 1917, which contributed to a large extent in stopping Brussilov's offensive. It is true that the French Government was not in a position to cause the Russian army to act; however, the continuation of the French offensive would have produced the same effect in using up the German forces, and it is, moreover, quite certain that it was possible to attack again in July the German front, 'weakened as it was by these previous deductions, and, in consequence, to arrive at the final result foreseen by Ludendorff. In May 1917 the German army was in a*condition which only occurred again in Aug. 1918; but then the Entente knew how to profit by it.
The French Government had in their service at Rechezy, near Belfort, a most perspicacious intelligence agency, under the direc- tion of Dr. Buchert, which being as it was on the borders of Switzerland and Alsace-Lorraine made use of the most varied sources of information. This information, now published, testi- fies to the great anxiety of public opinion in Germany. M. Andre Hallays, who was stationed there, thus expresses himself: " On reading the German newspapers of the latter half of April it is impossible to make any mistake; behind the line everyone had then the feeling that the armies had just suffered a series of heavy set-backs before Arras and on the Aisne. Whilst at home a wave of pessimism swept over the country and the madness of certain politicians pervaded the Government, the press and the public; whilst false-rumour mongers, exaggerating the importance of our losses and the seriousness of certain mutinies, exerted themselves to give to France the impression of defeat whilst this was going on the German staff found itself obliged to multiply reports and comments in order to reassure the dismayed Germans." These attacks had come as a terrible surprise to them. When the stra- tegic withdrawal took place had it not been promised that " tre- mendous events " would result from that " stroke of genius "? Had it not been inferred that the areas so carefully devastated would become the theatre of a new offensive? And now it is the armies of the Entente who assault the German positions, capture thousands of prisoners and threaten new positions! In vain the communiques sang of victory; in vain the military critics an- nounced that, thanks to " an elastic withdrawal," the High Command had saved the blood of the soldier, that the attempt to break through had failed, that the communiques of the Entente were a tissue of lies, and finally that Hindenburg and Ludendorff knew how to husband reserves and to retain the initiative.
Public opinion, preoccupied by strikes, remained insensible to these consolations, and was only struck with the enormity of the losses. From May i, after the threat of revolution was definitely dispelled, news coming from France was read with more attention. Extracts from Paris papers were telegraphed by agencies, the accounts of debates in the French Parliament were noted; the enemy himself was proclaiming his defeat. The press bureau hastened to take advantage of the innumerable signs that the adversary showed of his discouragement. They persuaded Germany that she had just gained " a great defensive victory." Thus they succeeded in wiping out the disastrous impression which prevailed after the battles of the Aisne and in Champagne; nevertheless a " defensive victory " was not what the people expected; success of this nature did not bring the date of peace any nearer.
The French Government, however, shut its eyes to information which contradicted its preconceived opinion, whether it came from the French or British staffs, from the British Government, from French agents abroad or from the German newspapers. French public opinion, left without information or guidance, was more and more worked upon by enemy agents. " Treason stalks freely abroad," said M. Galli in a report to the military commis- sion in the Chamber; " from the lobbies of the Chamber, from the anterooms of ministers, the most foreboding rumours of dis- couragement ooze forth." Scapegoats were sought for; on the 27th, on this same commission, the French Minister of War was called upon to censure Gen. Mangin, around whose name had been conjured a very tissue of lies which a few months later had to be refuted by those of his colleagues who had arrived at un- justifiable conclusions. Yielding to pressure, which he believed at the time to be irresistible, the French commander-in-chief asked the Minister of War verbally that Gen. Mangin might be relieved of his command. The French council of ministers, taken unawares by the Minister of War before any report or written request had been made, agreed to this on the 2gth, and it was quite useless that M. Painleve became convinced that very eve- ning that none of the charges brought against the general com- manding the VI. Army could be justified. A later correspondence conducted between the commander-in-chief and the Minister of War cleared the position of Gen. Mangin.
The authority of the commander-in-chief had not ceased to be diminished after the arrival of M. Painleve at the Ministry of War. This authority, impaired by the conferences of ministers with the army group commanders, further shaken by the con- ference at Compiegne on April 6, the echoes of which still re- sounded, had been killed by the way in which the functions of the chief of the general staff were exercised, functions delegated to Gen. Petain, who, moreover, had been selected with his assent. The commander-in-chief was unable to order an attack, however small it might be, without being compelled to submit all the de- tails to a general who had openly found fault with all his opera- tions and who appeared to be his successor designate. The crise concerning the command had been no secret for a long time, but it was on May 9 that the President of the Council announced it to the military commission of the Senate; the following day, at the French War Cabinet, the Minister of War asked Gen. Nivelle to offer his resignation under any protest which he liked to choose. Considering that a change in the French High Command would be regarded by the enemy as a confession of defeat Gen. Nivelle refused to hand in his resignation, and hesitation on the part of the Government lasted several days. The threat, however, of resignation by the Minister of War and the attitude of the Presi- dent of the Council determined the council of ministers to re- lieve him on May 1 5 by appointing Gen. Petain. General Foch succeeded as chief of the general staff.
The Battle of Malmaison, Oct. 23-26 1917. Evacuation of the Chemin des Dames by the Germans, Nov. 2 1917. The hesitations which had succeeded the offensive of April 16 on the Chemin des Dames had cost the French much more dearly than the offensive itself. The German line formed a right-angled salient at the Laffaux mill and the safety of the position to the S. of the Ailette depended on its possession for which the two combatants had so hotly contested in May. The battle had slackened in intensity in June and gradually died away in July. Called upon to prepare an offensive with limited objectives at this front, Gen. Maistre, commanding the VI. French Army, had fully realized, since June, that his advance to the Ailette would render the whole position on the Chemin des Dames untenable to the Germans, and he had proved the advantages which the enveloping line continued to offer to the attack on this sector of the front. Ludendorff tells us in his War Recollections that the same thought had occurred to him and he had thought of withdrawal, but Gen. von Bochen, commanding the VII. Army, was certain that he would be able to repulse any attack; when, towards the middle of April, indications of attack were evident, he asked for two reenforcing divisions and additional artillery; after having re- ceived this help he believed himself to be absolutely certain of
