tack in the direction of Compiegne. The right wing of the main attack, LIV. Corps and VIII. Reserve Corps, had the task of pushing forward in a south-westerly direction on both sides of Soissons, after taking possession of the plateaux W. of Neuville- sur-Margival and the heights of Jouy and Ostel. The XXV. Reserve Corps was to make its way on both sides of Cerny-en- Laonnais direct towards Braisne, and on the E. to take as much country as possible towards the S.; the IV. Reserve Corps was to attack the " Winterburg " (i.e. the height at the extreme western end of the Chemin des Dames, immediately N. of Craonne) with the main force and advance farther in the general direction of Fismes; in concert with this on the left the LXV. Corps, especially charged with the attack on the hills N. of Pontavert, was to occupy with its left wing the river bend N. of Berry-au-Bac.
Of the I. Army at first only the XV. Army Corps, advancing simultaneously with the VII. Army, was to throw the opposing forces over the Aisne-Marne canal. The corps was to provide itself with bridgeheads in order to take the heights of Cormicy if the attack of the VII. Army proceeded favourably.
A further attack to the right of the main attack was prepared by the VII. Corps of the VII. Army, which with its centre of gravity on both sides of Guny was to push forward over the Ailette, making its way in a south-westerly direction towards the Oise. This enterprise was not, however, possible until a few days after the beginning of the main attack, since its execu- tion demanded that a section of the artillery used in the centre of the VII. Army should be moved to that position. The total number of divisions taking part in the attack was 41. The whole attack between the Oise and Reims was indeed planned on a wide front, but its aims were localized.
Measures for Securing Secrecy. The whole success of the undertaking depended on the element of surprise. It was all the more necessary to pay the most careful attention to the measures for the disguising and concealment of the attack as good flying weather and dominating observation posts favoured the enemy's intelligence service. It was necessary to overrun the Chemin des Dames at the first onset, before the local re- serves could come into action. The fundamental principle laid down was that the preparation for attack should involve no change of any kind in the landscape. The reconstruction of battery positions, roads, camps or shelters must be reduced to the minimum, or be so camouflaged as not to be visible on the airmen's photographs. The German fighting aircraft continually watched the ground of the front of attack, rail and road traffic, telephone, wireless and postal services receiving the closest at- tention. All assemblage of troops behind the new front of attack had to be effected with the utmost caution and generally only at night. Every troop, every column, entering the region under the command of the attacking armies received a sheet of instructions in which aE the measures necessary for secrecy were again expressly pointed out. There was to be no visible sign of the increase of the number of men bivouacked in any particular place. All transport was to be concealed under trees and ir- regularly placed. On the appearance of enemy airmen the roads must be empty of troops. No smoke from new positions was to be permitted by day, and at night bright firelight was to be avoided. Guides familiar with the locality were allotted to re- connoitring staffs, so that they might not make mistakes through ignorance of the country. In day-time road traffic was not to exceed its ordinary quantity. All movements for the advance, especially of battery reenforcements and munitions, were to take place only under cover of darkness. The greatest stress was laid on deadening the noise of transport in moving up batteries and munitions to forward positions. All orders and marked maps were kept under lock and key in quarters the farthest to the rear, and might not be taken either on reconnaissances in the foremost lines or into forward positions. Published orders repeatedly warned the troops of the probability of a hostile offensive, in order to maintain the belief that all the prepara- tions made were merely defensive. All the dispositions for secrecy were regularly tested by special officer patrols.
Artillery Preparations. The great difficulties of an infantry attack against the immensely strong positions on the heights of the Chemin des Dames were clearly realized. The ascent of the steep slopes was only possible if the German artillery had suc- ceeded in silencing the greater part of the opposing artillery. Therefore, the greatest attention must be given to the artillery preparation. Col. Bruchmuller, whose capacity had been already proved in the earlier offensive, was entrusted with this.
The ground over which the artillery was to advance con- sisted of the depressions N. of the heights N. of the Ailette and the valleys running up to the enemy position and partly over- looked by him. The preparations for the artillery advance were carried out by the divisions in line, the corps staffs en- trusted with the attack moving up early enough to be able to direct these preparations. The orders given for the artillery advance were so complete in every detail that a perfect co- ordination of the whole body of artillery was thoroughly ensured. The infantry had to be firmly convinced that their business in the attack would be substantially eased by the annihilating ef- fect of their own artillery. The numbers of the artillery provided by the Supreme Army Command proved on the whole sufficient.
The employment of the artillery was based on a calculation of the number of batteries, and the kind and calibre of gun re- quired. The reenforcing batteries and columns were brought up this time for the most part by rail, contrary to the practice in the March offensive. Transport arrived from the whole front; the batteries were in most instances placed, to begin with, be- hind the ground on which the advance was to take place and beyond the zone of the enemy fire. Extraordinary caution was ordered during the advance of batteries pushed up far to the front. The unnoticed advance of the foremost batteries was most effectually assisted by the deafening noise of the frogs of the Ailette valley as it effectually drowned the noise of trans- port. In the placing of artillery care had especially to be taken that the shelter of the barrage was assured to the infantry, not only over the summit of the ridge of the Chemin des Dames but over its southern spurs during the descent to the Aisne. For this purpose an exceptionally bold disposition of the batter- ies was necessary. The mass of the artillery had to be pushed un-usually far forward. Hundreds of batteries were brought into position, thickly massed in some parts, almost directly behind the foremost line of infantry. The unexpectedly great success was undoubtedly partly due to this exceedingly bold disposition of artillery. Single pieces of the heaviest guns with flat trajectory were also pushed far forward, almost into the line of the other batteries, so as to be able to bring under fire the detraining railway stations lying far behind the enemy line and the quarters of the higher staffs.
In contrast to the procedure in the former attack all registra- tion was to be abandoned, in order to surprise the enemy as completely as possible. Effective bombardment was to begin immediately; and the first object was to be a thorough gassing of the hostile positions right down into the Aisne valley. The bombardment was divided into three phases. The first consisted in a general surprise artillery attack against infantry positions, batteries, mine-throwers, command posts, central telephone stations, camps, and headquarters, with all batteries and as far as practicable with gas munitions. The second phase was directed to an intensified action against artillery, for which purpose the field batteries attached to the infantry were also drawn in, in order to put the opposing batteries out of action at as early a stage as possible. The third phase was directed especially against infantry and artillery positions and targets in the distant rear of the front.
The beginning of the attack, in contrast to former procedure, was timed before day-break in the earliest morning twilight. This was done with the less hesitation, as the preliminary registration had been abandoned and there was no need to wait for daylight. The beginning of the attack before dawn, moreover, offered substantial advantages for the success of the infantry attack and its exploitation, for which the whole light day was thus made available.
