forced, that of Berthelot by one British and two Italian divi-
sions, and those of Gouraud and Degoutte (in the sector attacked)
each by an American division. As a factor of strength on the
French side it should be noted that Gen. Gouraud had excep-
tional prestige and influence with his men. In the matter of
intelligence service the French staff had learned iis lesson from the
bitter experience seven weeks before in the surprise attack on
the Chemin des Dames. In spite of the utmost endeavour of
the Germans to maintain secrecy regarding their preparations
for attack, every phase of them was sought out, chiefly through
air observation, plotted on maps and carefully studied to de-
termine the time, place, extent and method of the next German
effort. The information thus gained was supplemented by
statements of prisoners so completely that not only were the
approximate time and place of attack known to the French more
than a week in advance, but on the eve of attack even the time
of artillery preparation and of infantry assault were learned.
The French plan to meet the attack was to abandon their front lines, leaving in them only small detached posts backed by occasional wired strong points, and to take up a position far enough in rear to be beyond the ready interference of the German artillery, thus causing the superior German artillery to waste its preparatory fire on virtually abandoned trenches and neutralizing its influence on the infantry combat. The execution of this plan in the sector of the IV. Army was greatly favoured by the existence, several kilometres in rear of their front lines, of a complete system of trenches which had been carefully constructed and occupied during preceding years. It was from these rearward trenches that the French had ad- vanced in 1917 to gain their present lines. Thus not only could the army change its position back to them swiftly and secretly, but the Germans could have no means of learning, by direct observation, that such a shift had been made.
The battle began on the i sth shortly after midnight, accord- ing to the German plan, with an intensive artillery and trench- mortar fire on the French trenches believed to be occupied. In the IV. Army sector of Gouraud, thanks to his dispositions, little damage was done to the personnel, though the abandoned trenches were mostly wiped out by the gruelling fire. In the other sectors under attack, while the same policy prevailed in theory, there does not appear to have been the same consistency in its execution and some of the Allied troops suffered severe losses. The French counter artillery preparation had begun an hour before midnight, but, owing to the relative weakness of their artillery arm, and the rearward positions taken up by the IV. Army, does not seem to have made its influence felt. The infantry advance began at 4:15 A.M. In the sector E. of Reims the assaulting troops, preceded by a barrage, walked almost unopposed through the abandoned French position ex- cept that the French artillery constantly increased the intensity of its fire. After the German protective barrage had been lifted, to enable the infantry to pass beyond its limits, the real battle began fresh French infantry in a prepared position well supported by guns, against unsupported German infantry in the open. The Germans tried to bring up some accompanying guns, mostly by hand, but without success.
As to position it was a drawn battle, but the heavy losses completely discouraged the Germans. During the night they attempted to reorganize their attacking line and arrange artillery support and thereby to renew the assault on the i6th, but the attempt proved abortive, and by noon Ludendorff had ordered its abandonment and directed the troops of the I. and III. Armies to be redisposed for the defensive.
In the VII. Army sector of attack the Marne was successfully forced, and, except in the sector occupied by the American division, the heights on the S. bank were occupied to a depth of 5 kilometres. The direction of attack was then shifted eastward on Epernay, but being beyond the range of effective artillery support from the N. bank, and not being able to get artillery across the river to any material extent, the attack soon slowed down. North of the Marne the attacking troops soon encoun- tered the deep ravines and rocky, forested heights of the mountain
of Reims. Progress was made in the Marne and Ardre valleys; but on the wooded heights, where effective artillery support of advancing troops was impossible, the attack was easily checked. On both banks of the Marne the attack was renewed on the i6th in the direction of Epernay, with resulting slight gains of ground, and again on the I7th without result except increasingly heavy losses for the attackers. On the afternoon of the i7th, on orders from German G.H.Q., the VII. Army also passed to the defen- sive and the battle came to an end.
As an incident of the battle S. of the Marne might be men- tioned the defence of the sector S. of Jaulgonne, which has been termed the most brilliant single feat of American arms in the war. The 3oth U.S. Infantry, under Col. Butts, had prepared for the attack by building numerous trenches for the German airmen to photograph and for the artillery to register on, and more numerous rifle pits and machine-gun nests carefully camou- flaged or concealed. By day the trenches were occupied, by night the rifle pits. The German artillery preparation had wiped out every trench, but the infantry in its pits arid nests, despite heavy losses, accounted for more than its numbers in German dead and turned back the attack of a division.
The result of this battle was the beginning of a great moral reversal which was to find its completion in the ensuing counter- attack at Soissons. Until the attack of July 15 the Germans had been confident of success. The attack showed them that they could no longer command it. The Allied troops, on the contrary, were buoyed up by the fact that not only had a way been found to stop the German attacks, but they had been stopped with far lighter losses to the defenders than to the attackers. From a tactical point of view it may be said that the German attack had all the strength and all the weakness of the German war machine. The general staff had invented a stereotyped normal attack which was here applied on the western front for the fourth time, virtually without change of method. The same artillerist travelled from front to front, to conduct the artillery battle. Infantry units received identical training. The system produced a powerful onslaught, but killed inde- pendent initiative and discarded participation in the planning by subordinate commanders. Its failure in the Champagne may be ascribed to its inherent inapplicability to the situation and to the terrain. German G.H.Q., preoccupied by German internal questions Russian, Austro-Hungarian and many other problems, had not the time nor the patience to study out the special requirements of the Champagne problem, nor did it permit subordinates to make the plans. The same rigid point of view speeded the military downfall of Napoleon.
On the Allied side great credit must be given to Gen. Petain and Gen. Mangin for their skilful measures to foil the German plan after it had become known. The Germans were superior in numbers and, at the start, probably had higher moral. The victory was on the side of superior leadership, both higher and lower. (A. L. C.)
VII. THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE OF JULY 18 1918
On July 18 1918 the Allies regained the initiative, and the offensive passed to their hands, thereby assuring them of victory. It is generally thought that the aim of the attack carried out on that day by the French X. Army was to clear the front of the IV.,V. and VI. Armies, which had been attacked since July 15, and that this had indeed been its first result. Herein lies a double error. At first, the success gained on July 15 by the IV. Army under Gouraud had, by checking the I. and XIII. German Armies, nullified the success of their VII. over the V. Army under Berthelot and Degoutte's VI. Army, a success which, being limited, was dearly bought. Ludendorff informs us that after July 17 he issued orders to those elements which had es- tablished themselves on the left bank to recross the Marne; this difficult withdrawal was due to take place on July 20. He gave up the idea of renewing the attack on Reims, which would necessitate the immobilization of powerful forces for a subsidiary venture. Accordingly, he diverted all his strength towards Flanders, where a new offensive on a large scale was
