were preceded by a dense barrage, whilst counter-battery work was vigorously carried out. The Germans were completely surprised. The first lines were thrown into confusion in the twinkling of an eye, exposing the batteries, which were captured. An advance of 8 km. was made with particularly brilliant results in the centre, where the ist and 2nd American Divs. cooperated with Dangan's Moroccan Div., some of the best storm troops.
On the river N. of the Aisne a little artillery preparation lasting three-quarters of an hour had been found necessary against a strong opposition. The i62nd Div. under Messiny had on their side attained the objectives which secured the flank of the main attack.
To the S., after a short artillery preparation, the VI. Army under Degoutte had likewise gone forward in a brilliant manner. On the left the rapidity of its advance had assisted the right wing of the X. Army, whose progress had been held up in the dense woods. It attacked without reinforcements, with its divisions in line, and was reenforced gradually by the American divisions which infused a new spirit into the troops and called forth a lively emulation. On the first day, 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns were captured by the X. Army, and 2,000 prisoners and 50 guns by the VI. Army.
Meanwhile Gen. Petain went with Gen. Fayolle to the post of observation where Gen. Mangin was following the develop- ment of the battle. General Petain considered that the results obtained exceeded his best hopes, but that their exploitation was necessarily limited by the means at his disposal and by the general situation; he took into consideration that the enemy was on the S. bank of the Marne. No more rcenforcements could be sent to the X. Army, and from now onwards it had to organize itself in depth in such a way as to be able to maintain itself, relying on its own resources, on the ground conquered. But Gen. Foch, warned by Gen. Mangin, gave orders for the advance to be continued. On the following day the X. Army was informed that four new divisions had arrived, two of which were British divisions taken from the reserves at the disposal of the Allied C.-in-C. Gen. Fayolle expressed the same view as P6tain's to the commander of the VI. Army, but the attack likewise continued on that part of the front.
The struggle continued. The VII. German Army had brought into action its three divisions in reserve, which were promptly reenforced by two more. The Germans recovered, and the struggle became intense. Having been compelled to give up his offensive in Flanders, Ludendorff sent to the Aisne all those divisions given to the Crown Prince of Bavaria. The X. French Army fought over open country against troops at least equal in number to their own and sometimes superior. The American divisions had been withdrawn; some gun crews had asked and obtained permission to prolong their stay with the French troops; they made use of the heavy guns captured from the enemy and they appeared to think it their duty at least to send back the supply of gas shells, which was considerable.
The British divisions came into the battle at the most dif- ficult moment. The isth Scotch Div., under Gen. Reed, covered itself with glory in the attack on the chdteau and park of Burzancy on July 28. The 34th British Div., partly com- posed of units which had come back from Palestine and were new to the fighting in France, surpassed all expectations when they took part in the attack on Grand Buzoy on July 29. On Aug. i this ridge, which overlooked all the country between the Ourcq and the Vesle, was carried by the X. Army.
The importance of this success was lost sight of at headquarters, and on the night of Aug. 1-2 the commander of the group of armies, who was anxious to husband his troops, wrote: " The X. Army will continue to act on the right in the direction of d'Arcy-Ste. Restitue; on the rest of its front it will maintain a defensive attitude. The forces which are in front of it are obviously of equal strength, and the only chance of making any headway is by dealing a succession of local blows, prepared in detail and always planned according to the capacities of the reduced force at its disposal. These forces will be further re- duced when the expected withdrawal of the British divisions
takes place." But the continued pressure on the enemy led to quite another result, and the general commanding the army sent the following telegram which was to be immediately com- municated to the troops on the whole front: " Forward! The victory of August ist consummated that of July i8th and has ended in pursuit. The roads are terrible, but if it is raining for us it is also raining for the Boche. Press hard on their heels, hustle them and break through the feeble centres of resistance when they will try to hold up your victorious advance. This evening the X. Army must be on the Vesle."
At " 1900 hours " (7 P.M.) the chasseurs of Villemot's division entered Soissons. The Aisne, as far as its confluence with the Vesle, and the whole course of the latter river, had been reached by the X. Army on Aug. 3, and by the VI. Army on the 4th. The I. American Corps under Gen. Liggett, which had gradually been brought into action during the battle, had taken an increasingly important part in the operations of the VI. Army, which included as many as six American divisions. The V. Army under Berthelot had attacked under most difficult con- ditions, as it had reestablished its front after some days' hard fighting, during which it had been compelled to give way a little; but always holding on to the Reims mountain. Although the V. Army had very difficult ground to cover, it arrived at its objective on the Vesle.
The Results. Gen. Mangin was able to say thus to his troops: " You have captured 20,000 prisoners, including 527 officers, 518 guns, 300 minenwerfer, 3,300 machine-guns, parks and ammunition dumps and everything that a large army compelled to retreat precipitately had to leave behind it. You have even taken back from the enemy the depots where he had gathered together the results of his thefts. You have saved from pollution by these civilized barbarians, Soissons, Valois, the whole of the isle of France, the cradle of our nation, with its harvests untouched, and its ancient forests. You have removed from Paris a most presumptuous menace and have given to France the consciousness of victory. You are most worthy of your country."
From the German point of view, this victory as a first result prevented the proposed offensive in Flanders, the preparations for which had already been started on the i6th. Reserves intended for this offensive had been used up between the Marne and the Vesle, where they had been exhausted to such an extent that their normal reorganization had become impossible.
" As in every battle," said Ludendorff, " the losses have been considerable in the engagements fought since July i8th. The i8th July in particular and the defensive engagements which followed cost us very dearly, although we had been able to recover our wounded, and the number of our men who had been taken prisoner was not great." (He ignored, however, the number of 30,000 for the X., VI. andV. P'rench Armies.) " The losses in the struggle were so important that we decided to break up about 10 divisions, 3 to assign their infantry as reenforce- ments to the other divisions."
Ludendorff, who with commendable care kept a record of each operation and generally drew therefrom very wise con- clusions, had only been moderately well informed on the last battle. He thought that it had been preceded by a short and heavy artillery preparation and by clouds of gas, all of which was pure imagination; he also pretended to discover a new invention. " Tanks were seen to be used for the transport of troops. They crossed our lines, and after unloading the occu- pants, who formed nests of machine-guns in our rear, returned to find further reenforcements." The passenger tank, however, still remained to be found.
The presence of the ist and 2nd American Divs., which at- tacked so brilliantly near Vierzy and Dommiers, themselves cap- turing 7,200 prisoners and 21 guns, appeared to have escaped Ludendorff altogether. He had the temerity to write: " The six American divisions which took part in the battle suffered heavily without obtaining any results."
Further, the reasons which he gave for giving up the offensive in Flanders were surprisingly indifferent. " Tha enemy had
