and the Aegean, and operations on the Syrian coast engaged the services of a few more. The Japanese cooperated heartily; their 14 destroyers did yeoman service, and during 1918 the system was entirely dependent on them for the escort of troop transports. The general allocation of British escorting craft in that area in Oct. 1917 was as follows: -
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Destroyers
Sloops
Armed Trawlers
Yachts
Gunboat
Aegean Malta Egypt Gibraltar .
8 6
2
6 ii ii
5
6
35 28
i
i 3
i
It will be seen that sloops played an important part in the convoy system in the Mediterranean, and as they could not make the voyage from Gibraltar to Port Said without refuelling, it was necessary to provide complete reliefs for the escorts of O.E. and H.E. convoys as they passed Malta. This involved a severe strain on the convoy system, though it was eased later by the addition of some patrol gunboats.
The control of the escorts was at first under a British admiral of patrols, with patrol commanders acting for him at the various ports, who arranged for the formation of convoys and issued route instructions and sailing orders. The principal convoys were the Bizerta-Alexandria (British), Bizerta to Malta (Brit- ish) , Marseilles to Bizerta (French) , Marseilles to Algiers (French) , Milo (Aegean) to Alexandria (Br. and Fr.), with fast through convoys between the United Kingdom and Port Said under British escort. The system of patrols was retained by the French for a time on the Algerian coast, and the losses there were heavy. The defects which had existed at British home ports exhibited themselves abroad. The staff work was defective; intelligence was not freely and quickly distributed, and action was not taken on it. This led on March 20 1918 to a convoy running right into an area N. of Alexandria where warning had been given of the presence of a submarine waiting for it, with the result that four ships of the convoy were lost.
The Mediterranean remained one of the worst areas for losses. For instance, in Nov. 1917 out of 41 British ships lost, 14 had gone down in the Channel and ii in the Mediterranean. The losses in the Channel had been stopped by the Dover barrage and Rear-Adml. Roger Keyes; and the First Lord (Sir Eric Geddes) and the Director of Naval Intelligence now proceeded in person to the Mediterranean to consult with the commander- in-chief there and make arrangements for a complete reorgani- zation of his staff. The admiral of patrols was abolished, and a director of shipping movements instituted. Wireless directional stations were established at suitable points, and the losses were reduced to a reasonable figure. In Nov. 1917, 381 sailed in convoy in the Mediterranean, with a loss of nine or 2-35 per cent. In Sept. 1918, 979 ships sailed in convoy with a loss of eight or 0-82 per cent.
Troop movements were one of the most important branches of the convoy system, and it is interesting in this connexion to note the total numbers moved by sea during the war, which amounted to 22,114,0x30 from Aug. 9 1914 to Sept. 28 1918, made up as follows:
Troops moved by sea, Aug. 1914 to Oct. 1918,
Cross Channel to France 15,576,107
From U.K. to Medit., India, Persian Gulf, Russia . . 938,562
From North America i, 334, 173
From Australia 391.043
In Mediterranean, less 560,000 included above . . 1,363,976
Between India and Egypt 1,500,204
Various 1,010,694
22,114,759
In the English Channel most of the work in 1917 was being done by small fast packet-boats, of which there were 16 on the Southampton-Havre route and eight on the Folkestone to Bou- logne. During 1915 the average daily number of transports from Southampton was three to four, and the daily average requiring escorts was five to six in 1918. Of loaded troop and
ambulance transports only two were sunk, the " Donegal " on April 17 1917, from Southampton to Havre, with 600 troops and 38 casualties, and the ambulance transport " Warilda " on Aug. 3 1918, from Havre to Southampton, with 125 casualties. The Folkestone to Boulogne route was controlled by the vice- admiral at Dover. Here the principal danger was mines. Vessels crossed only in daylight, and from two hours after to three hours before high-water. The average daily number of transports in the latter part of 1917 and 1918 was some half- dozen in each direction. In the last five months of the war the average daily troop traffic in the Channel was 11,254, viz. 5,500 at Southampton, 3,700 at Folkestone and 2,500 at Dover. The number of troops moved by fast steam-packet vessels in the Channel was enormous, and cannot have been much less than 12 millions, with casualties of less than 1,000. At Dover in the latter part of 1917 three to four destroyers and three to four P. boats were usually employed in cross-Channel escort work.
On the Atlantic route fast troop convoys came into use in April 1918, and during 1918 (up to Nov.) 1,037,000 men came over in them. Three large transports, the " Olympic " (23 knots), " Mauretania " (25 knots), and " Aquitania " (24 knots), also worked singly and independently, with escorts of three or four destroyers to bring them in and take them out. The " Olympic " was attacked on several occasions, but never successfully, and in May 1918 it rammed and sank a submarine (UiO3). Only three transports were lost on the Atlantic route, the " Tuscania " with 2,400 U.S. troops, torpedoed and sunk seven m. N. of Rathlin Is. on May 2 1918 with a loss of 211 troops, the armed merchant steamer " Moldavia," escorting HCi and carrying troops, torpedoed and sunk in the English Channel on May 23 1918 with a loss of 64 .troops, and the " Otranto," escort to HXso, wrecked on the coast of Islay after collision on Oct. 6 1918, with a loss of 362 troops. The total loss of troops was 537. The losses in the Mediterranean were much heavier, and three-fourths of the troopships sunk went down there though only 10% of troop movements took place in that sea. Submarines worked there under specially favourable circumstances, while the narrow waters gave little opportunity of altering the routes to any great extent. In 1915 some 330,000 troops were conveyed in 242 transports, all of which arrived safely except three the " Royal Edward," torpedoed and sunk on 13/8/15 in the Aegean with a loss of 865 troops, the " Ramazan " in the Aegean on 19/9/15 with a loss of ii troops, the " Mar- quette " approaching Salonika on 23/10/15 with a loss of 128 troops. In 1916, 220,000 troops were conveyed in 143 transports, all of which arrived safely.
During 1917 and 1918 the troop movements were principally to Salonika, Egypt and Syria, and 14 transports were lost as follows:
Losses.
1917: "Ivernia," Marseilles'to Egypt, 1/1/17, off C. Mata-
pan 120
" Georgian," Alex, to Salonika, 8/3/17, off C. Sidero 53 " Cameronian," Marseilles to Basra, 15/4/17, 150 m.
E. of Malta 223
" Arcadian," Sal. to Egypt, 15/4/17, off Milo. . . 279 " Transylvanian," Mars, to Egypt, 4/5/17, Gulf of
Genoa 434
" Cameronian," (French service), 2/6/17, ff Alexan- dria 63
" Aragon," Mars, to Egypt, 30/12/17, off Alexandria . 426 " Osmanieh," Taranto to Alex., 31/12/17, off Alexan- dria 225
1918: " Kingstonian," Alex, to Mars., 11/4/18 . 9
" Omrah," 12/5/18, off C. Spartivento . I
" Leasowe Castle," 26/5/18, 104 m. from Alexandria 99
" Missir," 29/5/18, 80 m. from Alexandria 44
" Hyperia," 28/7/18, 84 m. from Port Said 52
" Anhui," 12/8/18, off Cyprus ... 4
There was thus a total loss in the Mediterranean of 17 trans- ports and some 3,036 troops. It will be seen that the total loss of transports was about 20, with a loss of some 4,563 troops, or about one in 5,000, of which 60% occurred in the Mediterranean.
