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824
DEMOBILIZATION AND RESETTLEMENT


applications were received; 95,651 grants were made at a total expenditure of 2,675,665. In addition there was a special scheme for providing tools for workmen who had to return to their pre-war occupations. Under this scheme 21,562 was paid out.

(H. WF.)

UNITED STATES. United States troops continued to embark for Europe until the signing of the Armistice Nov. u 1918. At that time, according to the final report of Gen. Pershing, 2,071,- 463 officers and men had sailed to serve with the A.E.F. and only some 15,000 had returned to the United States. According to figures compiled by the War Department, the total number of officers and men encamped in the United States on that date was 1,634,499 an -d more than 300,000 additional men had been or- dered to be in camp before Nov. 30 1918. All draft calls were at once cancelled. On Nov. 26 orders were issued for immediate demobilization of the Students' Army Training Corps, which had been introduced Oct. i in about 500 colleges and universities throughout the country. This led to the discharge of some 150,000 students during December.

The question of general demobilization presented serious difficulties, and precedent offered slight help toward their solution. It was recognized that with peace would come a drastic curtailment of production in many industries, and it was feared that this curtailment and the sudden release of large numbers of soldiers would result in wide-spread unemployment and suffering. On the other hand the retention of a large army no longer needed would impose an unjustifiable financial burden upon the country. It was decided to discharge all emergency troops as rapidly as they could be dispensed with; but at the same time the Department of Labor was requested to watch carefully the labour situation, so that if desirable the rate of discharge might be reduced locally or as a whole.

The method of demobilization finally adopted differed from that employed by the European Allies. The plan of release by military " classes " based on age and length of service, natural in France and Italy, could not be applied in a country where the system of universal military service was unknown. It would have caused needless delay to attempt demobilization of the A.E.F. before beginning the release of men encamped in the United States. Neither was it feasible to follow England's system of " industrial demobilization." Profiting by the early mistakes of her Allies, America had not drafted indiscriminately into im- mediate service " key or pivotal men " from essential industries, but had placed them under deferred classification. Any attempt to demobilize by different occupations would have caused useless delay and might have impaired seriously military units overseas. It was therefore decided to demobilize by complete military units. In this way men returned to America under their own officers in orderly fashion. From the beginning, however, atten- tion was given to individual requests for discharge, especially from American camps, if it appeared that men were needed by their families or their service required for industries. Speed of return from overseas was governed solely by transport facilities. About one-half of the American troops had been carried across in British vessels, which now were needed for home and colonial service. At the time of the Armistice transports belonging to the U.S. Government had a capacity of only about 110,000 a month. This was now rapidly increased by the release of battleships and cruisers. Use was made also of German passenger ships, and arrangements were made for the use of Italian, French, Dutch, and Spanish vessels. On June 30 1919, 173 vessels were in use as transports. After the Armistice embarkation camps were organized at Bordeaux, Brest, and St. Nazaire, and later at Havre and Marseilles. Le Mans was selected as a centre of distribution for the ports, and accommodations were ordered there for 230,000 men. There was considerable complaint of congestion and inadequate care of troops, especially at Brest, where there were normal accommodations for only 55,000 men, although that port alone was available for the largest transports. In America, Boston, Charleston, Newport News, and New York City were chosen as ports of debarkation.

Troops began to land in America in large numbers Dec. 2 1918, when the " Mauretania " reached New York with 4,000.

By June 3 1919 there remained in France only 694,745 officers and men. The A.E.F. headquarters were closed in Europe in Sept. on the departure of Gen. Pershing. Practically the last remnant of the A.E.F. in France embarked with Brig.-Gen. Connor in Jan. 1920. There remained in Europe, besides the Graves Registration Service and special commissions, only the Army of Occupation in Germany. By June 30 1920 troops in Europe had been reduced to below 17,000.

Camps and cantonments in the United States formerly used for mobilization were converted into centres of demobilization, and to these were sent troops from overseas as well as those at home. Efforts were made to send each man to the demobilization centre nearest to his home or place of enlistment. Each man was given a rigid physical examination and those suffering from contagious dis- ease were detained until there was no longer danger of infection. Discharge papers were prepared, accounts carefully settled, and an allowance of five cents a mile made each man from camp to his home. To encourage immediate return a reduced railway fare of two cents a mile was conceded those who departed within 24 hours after discharge. During the first three months of demobilization discharge required from four to seven days, but this was soon reduced to an average of two days. Gradually it was possible to reduce the num- ber of centres, and beginning Nov. 25 1919 troops in America were discharged where stationed. Only two large centres were retained, Camp Dix, N.J., and the Presidio in San Francisco, for the use of troops returning from overseas, and even these were dispensed with after March 15 1920.

The following table prepared by the War Department shows the rapidity of general demobilization, month by month and cumula- tively during the first year.

1918.

Officers.

Cumula- tive.

Enlisted Men.

Cumula- tive.

Nov. 11-30. Dec 1919. Jan

593 37,043

2^."i6^

593 37,636

6l ,IQQ

43,000 609,000

^S.ooo

43,ooo 652,000

1,010,000

Feb March . . . April .... May .... June .... July .... Aug Sept. . Oct

14,913 ",479 12,185 14,622 13,588 16,404 15,986 8,716 8,690

76,112

87,591 99,776 114,398 127,986 144,390 160,376 169,092 177,782

263,000 263,000 298,000 383,000 391,000 361,000 151,000 73,ooo 33,000

1,273,000 1,536,000 1,834,000 2,217,000 2,608,000 2,969,000 3,120,000 3,193,000 3,226,000

The cost per rran of derrobilization varied from month to month because the uncertainty of the number of men to be handled required the keeping up of all the demobilization machinery; for March 1919 it was $69.95 Dut for June only $20.07.

At each detrobilization centre were stationed representatives of the U.S. Eirployrrent Service, and if the discharged man had no prospective job he was registered and a card given him for the local service representative nearest his own home. The Employment Service atten pted to coordinate and cooperate with various local organizations, such as chambers of commerce, boards of trade, and patriotic and welfare societies. In Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, New York, and sorre other large cities, large bureaus were created for securing work for returned soldiers, sailors and marines. It is in-possible to estin ate the number of places secured through these agencies, as few kept accurate records. But the Employment Service alone, during the 10 months from Dec. I 1918 to Sept. 27 1919, registered 758,474 rren and secured employment for 474,085. It was seriously handicapped, however, by lack of adequate appropria- tions in 1919 and its operations were practically suspended after October. Although there were some industrial centres which, imme- diately after the Armistice, experienced a degree of depression, busi- ness as a whole was prosperous with the result that the great mass of the returning soldiers, many of whom returned to their old jobs, had little difficulty in finding employment. There was, of course, a certain percentage of discharged men who found it difficult or irk- some to adjust themselves again to the conditions of civilian life; these were inclined to drift to the large cities, even though the opportunity for getting employment there was often less favourable than elsewhere. The surprising thing was not that a comparatively small number was unable to get work, but that so large a number could be absorbed without at any time causing an acute unemploy- ment problem. One method early proposed for helping discharged men was that of awarding a soldiers' bonus. The Federal House of Representatives passed a Bonus Bill May 29 1921 by a vote of 289 to 92. The bill carried an appropriation of $1,600,000,000. Protest, however, arose throughout the country, largely due to the prospect of a great increase in taxation, and the Senate took no action. At its national conventionsheld in 1920 and 1921 theAmerican Legion was al- most unanimous for a bonus for all who had served. Several states have acted on their own initiative and voted on the question of granting a bonus to their citizens who served. According to statistics gathered