these minor operations the Germans had the advantage of a
central position, interior lines and better means of communication.
The railway from Dar-es-Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika
had been completed about six months before the war
began, and during Aug. the small steamer “Hedwig von Wissmann,”
manned and armed by German sailors from Dar-es-Salaam,
sank the only hostile boat on the lake, a small Belgian
vessel. Thus the Germans had command of the 400 m. of
waterway on Tanganyika. On the two other lakes, Nyasa and
Victoria, the British, however, early obtained command.
The operations in all theatres other than on the British East Africa frontier were regarded by both sides as subsidiary. At first the British had to consider purely defensive measures. At the outset the East Africa Protectorate Force was under the command of Lt.-Col. L. E. S. Ward. Volunteers were called for, and two regiments, one mounted, were at once formed by the white settlers in British East Africa. The King’s African Rifles were recalled from Jubaland and were in action by September. An Arab detachment was raised on the coast by Lt. (subsequently Maj.) A. J. B. Wavell (an adventurous soldier who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca), and it rendered good service until its gallant commander was killed in action Jan. 6 1916. But outside help was needed, and the Government of India consented to send a force, officially known as “Indian Expeditionary Force B.” The first regiment, the 29th Punjabis, arrived at Mombasa at the end of Aug., and with them Brig.-Gen. J. M. Stewart, who took over the command.
Plans for an offensive were now formed. It was decided that the bulk of the force from India should land at Tanga and occupy the Usambara Highlands, the most healthy and most developed region of German East Africa, and in which lived the majority of the German settlers. The landing The Tanga Episode. finished, it was intended to advance along the railway from Tanga to Moshi. At the time Tanga was attacked Gen. Stewart was to demonstrate against Taveta, and to sweep round by Longido (N. of Kilimanjaro) to Moshi. Brig.-Gen. A. E. Aitken was selected to command the Tanga expedition. India was then being heavily drained of troops for service in France, and for East Africa troops that were not all of first-class quality had to be employed. The strength of the force was about 7,000, including one British unit, the 2nd Batt. Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. The force sailed from Bombay towards the end of Oct. and the transports arrived off Tanga harbour early on Nov. 2. The attack had been expected, news of the expedition having reached the Germans through captured Indian mails, and at the end of Oct. von Lettow had arranged with the district commissioner, Auracher, that Tanga should be defended, whatever were the instructions of Dr. Schnee. On receiving a summons from the commander of H.M.S. “Fox” for unconditional surrender Herr Auracher went on board, stated that Tanga was an open and undefended place and said that he must obtain special instructions. The British, therefore, refrained from bombarding the town, and meanwhile von Lettow was hurrying down reënforcements by rail. On the evening of Nov. 2 Gen. Aitken landed one and a-half battalions at Ras Kasone, two m. east of the port. It advanced through dense jungle to the outskirts of the town, became heavily engaged and had to fall back. The British were reenforced and the fight was renewed on Nov. 3. It was indecisive, but in the evening the officer in command, Capt. Baum- stark, believing that Tanga could not be held against another attack, had collected his force four m. W. of Tanga, leaving patrols only in the town. That evening von Lettow arrived, passed through deserted Tanga, and reconnoitred the British camp at Ras Kasone. Von Lettow’s plans for the morrow were, while defending Tanga itself, which he reoccupied with two companies of Europeans, to place most of his troops in the bush along the Ras Kasone-Tanga road and attack the enemy in flank. The fight was renewed on the fourth. The British and Indian troops advanced through coconut and rubber plantations and entered Tanga town. By this time fighting was severe and general, and soon after 3 P.M. von Lettow delivered his counter-attack on the British left, which, he states, he was able to outflank by means of his two reserve companies. Supported by machine-gun fire, this outflanking force was able to push its attack home, and soon the British were in full retreat to Ras Kasone. The fight continued in the dense bush till after nightfall, the Indian and British troops eventually getting back to their camp. The next day, Nov. 5, they were reembarked, and taken to Mombasa. The attack on Tanga had been a complete failure. The casualties in Aitken’s force were, according to an India Office statement, 795, including 141 British officers and men. Sixteen machine-guns were lost. Von Lettow gives the German force engaged as " little more than 1,000." Fifteen Germans and 54 askaris were killed. The number of wounded was not stated. After this action Aitken was removed from his command, but in Dec. 1920, after a fresh investigation by the War Office, he was declared " not guilty of culpable negligence . . . and should not be held responsible for the failure."
The simultaneous attack on Longido, N. of Kilimanjaro, also failed. The Germans about 800 strong were strongly posted, and covered the only permanent water supply available. Stewart’s attacking force numbered about 1,500. After a night march of 15 m. across a waterless region, the action began on the morning of Nov. 4 and continued till 7:30 P.M. The whole movement typical of many operations in this theatre of war was tersely summed up by an officer who wrote, " We marched all night, attacked at dawn, fought all day, and then having failed to turn the Germans out, came back here as we had no water."
Following the failure at Tanga no new general offensive was undertaken by the British until the early months of 1916. The intervening period was one of preparation on both sides, with, on the part of the Germans, frequent and sometimes successful attempts to raid the UgandaPeriod of Preparation. railway, and on that of the British, defensive and retaliating raids of the same kind. Of the engagements of this period that at Jassin was the most notable. Following the failure of the German march on Mombasa, the British force on the coast advanced S., crossed the German frontier and occupied (Jan. 2 1915) the buildings of Jassin plantation, which was garrisoned by some 300 Indian troops. Von Lettow thinking that a land attack on Tanga was intended got together a force of 1,500–1,600 men, and attacked Jassin on Jan. 17. After 48 hours' fighting, the Indian troops, having expended all their ammunition and being without water, surrendered. Attempts by the King’s African Rifles (in camp 10 m. distant) to relieve them failed. But the German losses, especially in European officers, were serious, and the expenditure of ammunition made a heavy inroad on von Lettow’s small stock.
The period of preparation was spent on the British side largely in raising new troops and in the organization of transport. In April 1915 Col. M. I. Tighe, Indian army, with the local rank of Major-General, was appointed to command the troops in East Africa and to prepare for the new offensive. His force was increased by two newly raised white regiments, the 2nd Rhodesian and “Driscoll’s Scouts” (25th Batt. R. Fusiliers). While parrying the raids on the Uganda railway—which were numerous and daring, but taken as a whole, ineffective—Gen. Tighe organized occasional offensives, such as the successful attack (June 1915) on Bukoba, the German base on Victoria Nyanza for operations against western Uganda. This raid was made by Gen. J. M. Stewart, and it affords an illustration of the great distances to be covered in the East African operations. Nairobi, headquarters, was 327 m. by rail from Mombasa, the base, and 237 m. from Kisumu, railhead on Victoria Nyanza. Thence Stewart’s force had to go by steamer 240 m. before reaching Bukoba. To aid his operations Gen. Tighe began the building of a railway and pipe line across the 70 m. of desert between Voi, on the Uganda railway, and his advanced posts near Taveta.
The other theatres of operation in East Africa were much worse off for means of communication. To reach the German frontier bordering Nyasaland, Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo was a journey of from 2,000 to 3,000 m., including hundreds of miles to be covered on foot or by animal and mechanical transport. This involved the employment of vast numbers of carriers
