Brigade to guard the western exit from the hills. This movement
von Lettow had foreseen and had posted troops to meet an advance
in this direction. Meanwhile the rest of his men, with as
much of the stores as could be collected, were being moved
through the mountains to Kissaki. To prevent von Lettow’s
escape E. of Morogoro Smuts’s main force had crossed a waterless
desert 25 m. long, a move which the enemy had not expected,
and it was this march which caused the hurried evacuation of
Morogoro. Exhausted as were his men Smuts determined to
make another effort to corner von Lettow. For some three weeks
very bitter fighting continued in the Uluguru hills, in which the
Germans gained several successes, but on Sept. 15 Kissaki, with
considerable stores, was captured by the British. Von Lettow
could neither remain in the fertile and healthy hill region nor
escape W., but he was able to retreat S.E. towards the Rufiji,
where he formed an extensive camp on the further side of the
Megeta river, which he continued to occupy for months. In
short, the limit of endurance had been reached by Gen. Smuts’s
troops, further pursuit was impossible and the second rainy season
was approaching. “Gen. Smuts,” writes von Lettow, “realized
that his blow had failed. He sent me a letter calling upon
me to surrender, by which he showed that as far as force was
concerned he had reached the end of his resources.”
Von Lettow is entitled to his deduction, but by his energy and driving force Gen. Smuts had surmounted obstacles which appeared insuperable, and in conjunction with the Belgians and Northey had conquered fully two-thirds of the German protectorate, including the chief areas of European colonization and both the railway lines. This had been done in a period of seven months, and was a very considerable achievement. Civil administrations were set up in the conquered regions.
The operations of the Belgians had been carefully planned and were thoroughly successful. While such troops as were available were engaged in defending, as best they could, the Congo frontiers, a special force of a little over 10,000 The Belgian Advance to Tabora. men—all natives of the Congo—was raised and officered by Europeans. All supplies for this force, except food, had to be imported, a long and tedious process. A railway completed in Sept. 1915 from the upper Congo to Lake Tanganyika gave some help as, for example, when two small, fast and comparatively heavily armed British motor boats were taken from Cape Town to Tanganyika in sections. These boats took nearly six months to complete the journey of some 3,000 m. from the Cape to Tanganyika. Launched on the lake in Dec. 1915[1] they soon obtained mastery of its waters, by capturing, sinking or bottling up the enemy steamers. This achievement was of much assistance to the Belgian operations.
The organization of the new Belgian force was confided to M. Tombeur, acting Vice-Governor-General of Katanga, and an ex-officer, who in Feb. 1915 was made commander-in-chief of the Belgian Congo troops with the rank of Colonel (subsequently Major-General). All the fighting men were infantry and gunners—there were, all told, 60 machine-guns and 12 field pieces. The force was divided into a Southern Brigade (under Lt.-Col. Olsen) and a Northern Brigade (under Col. Molitor). Olsen’s brigade was stationed along the Rusizi river, between lakes Kivu and Tanganyika; Molitor’s N. of Kivu along the Congo-Uganda border. Tombeur’s headquarters were established at Kibate, just N. of Lake Kivu. Molitor’s brigade was partly stationed in British (Uganda) territory. It had the help of the Congo Carrier Corps, consisting of natives of Buganda (of whom 8,429 served in the corps), while Gen. Smuts made himself responsible for supply arrangements to Molitor’s headquarters, which were at Lutobo, 150 m. W. of Victoria Nyanza. This was a great advantage as from Mombasa to Lutobo is barely 1,000 miles.
The defence of the region had been entrusted to Maj.-Gen. Wahle, whose “western command” extended from Lake Nyasa to the Uganda frontier. Von Lettow had withdrawn part of the troops to strengthen his main force. Wahle, whose headquarters were at Tabora, was instructed not to risk a decisive action, but,
when compelled, to fall back on Mahenge. From about mid-July to the end of Oct. Wahle was cut off from his chief.
The terrain for the first part of the Belgian operations was extraordinary. North of Kivu rise the Mfumbiro mountains, a range of lofty, active volcanoes; farther N.E. extends a tangled mass of hills, for the most part heavily wooded, and numerous small lakes and rivers. On the German side was the mountainous, fertile, and thickly populated region of Ruanda—but newly conquered and still preserving its native government. A narrow passage between Lake Kivu and the Mfumbiro mountains afforded the only practicable route for the invasion of Ruanda from the N. side of the lake; from the S. side there was an easier approach. Col. Molitor’s plan was to attack from both sides of Kivu and to make a third advance from Lutobo. The campaign began on April 4 with holding attacks by Maj. Rouling at the N. end of Kivu, where the Germans, under Capt. Wintgens, held very strong positions at Kissenji along the little river Sebea. Then the two other columns were set in motion, and to avoid being trapped Wintgens had to evacuate the Sebea lines. By the middle of May the Belgians by their converging movements had “nipped off” Ruanda. They next repeated the manœuvre on a larger scale. Olsen crossed the Rusizi at the N. end of Tanganyika and pressed E. ; Molitor sent columns S.W. to join up with him and at the same time sent other columns S.E. to Victoria Nyanza, which was reached on June 27. Capt. Godovius, the German commander in Karagwe, who for nearly two years had conducted guerrilla warfare with the British Lake Detachment near the western Uganda frontier, falling back, tried to pierce the Belgian lines. His detachment sustained very heavy losses, and Godovius, severely wounded, was taken prisoner. The detachments under Wintgens, though badly mauled, escaped the Belgian cordon. By the middle of July the Belgian columns had secured the Tanganyika-Victoria Nyanza line and were ready for a further advance. Olsen’s brigade marched S. parallel to Lake Tanganyika on Kigoma—the lake terminus of the railway from Dar-es-Salaam and the port of Ujiji.
In its harbour was the “Graf von Gotzen”—launched in 1915 and the biggest boat ever seen on Tanganyika, the “Adjutant” (the vessel brought in sections from Dar-es-Salaam), and the tug “Wami.” From June onwards they had been bombed by British seaplanes manned by Belgians. Olsen’s brigade occupied Kigoma on July 28 and Ujiji on Aug. 2, the German garrison retiring by the railway to Tabora, 200 m. east. Other Belgian detachments now crossed Tanganyika S. of Ujiji, and these and Olsen’s brigade advanced on Tabora.
Molitor’s brigade, whose objective was also Tabora, had the coöperation of a British column under Brig.-Gen. Sir Charles Crewe, a South African soldier, who was on Gen. Smuts’s staff. With a force of about 1,800 men Crewe captured Mwanza, the German port on the southern shores of Victoria Nyanza, on July 14. Thereafter the Molitor brigade marched W. and Crewe’s column E. of the road leading from Mwanza to Tabora. Both forces suffered from transport difficulties, excessive heat and lack of water, and both had to fight several stiff actions. Tabora[2] was the most important and the largest place in the interior of German East Africa. The Arabs had a large colony; there were Greek, Genoese and Indian traders and representatives of many African tribes. To lose the place would be a severe blow to the
- ↑ The Belgians also launched a small vessel on Tanganyika.
- ↑ The Germans had sent the enemy civilians they interned and also many of their soldier captives to Tabora. The British Europeans interned numbered over 200, a large proportion being missionaries, women as well as men. All the Europeans there were Belgians, Italians, French and Russians as well as British were harshly treated, but the British were subjected to calculated indignities, with the object of lowering British prestige in the eyes of the natives. The Indian and African prisoners of war were treated with open brutality. One Brandt, commandant of Tabora, was directly responsible, but his action appears to have been approved by Dr. Schnee, and it was not till the Belgians were approaching Tabora that Schnee ordered better treatment of the prisoners. Von Lettow seems to have had no responsibility for the ill-usage of the prisoners. There was, however, first-hand evidence that at the prisoners' camp at Chiwata he took no steps to put an end to the inhumanity with which the Indian prisoners were treated.
