avoid non-explosion. Streamers, parachute tails, etc., did not solve the problem satisfactorily. Later on always percussion-fuzes were tried. In Germany the Papenberg fuze answered best. In Austria- Hungary, a suitable model was found in the Goldmann fuze.
As the handled grenade was on the whole satisfactory, neither Power failed to keep the output at a high level during the war. Austria-Hungary, indeed, introduced towards the end of the war a percussion hand grenade which differed from the handled in having the Goldmann fuze, but its merits had no final judgment. A few hand grenades were also loaded with chemicals, e.g. Staff.
Rifle Grenades. At first rodded rifle grenades were used, but with- out really satisfactory results, and eventually Germany took to the discharger cup and a grenade of the V.B. class.
Grenade Throwers. The grenade werfer (thrower), although not so simple, met much more fully the demand for a greater range. It was the connecting link with the minenwerfer, and indeed was more akin to the latter than to the rifle grenade. Early attempts with throwers of the most varied forms led to no useful results. The first service- able model was constructed by an Austro-Hungarian inventor. This grenade thrower, called in Germany Priesterwerfer , threw cast- iron bombs with percussion-fuzes (usually of the vane class). It is described and illustrated under BOMBTHROWERS.
The fundamental idea of the construction was the same as that of an English invention of the early loth century, but it seems to have been practically used for the first time in the World War. A much gteater rapidity of fire than could be obtained with this otherwise satisfactory thrower was got with the Granatschnellwerfer, also an Austrian invention, in which the grenades were driven by compressed air through a tube.
Small- A rms Munitions. Germany's normal infantry and machine- gun ammunition was a pointed bullet which, with a muzzle velocity of 900 m/sec., was ballistically superior to the round-nosed Austro- Hungarian bullet which had a muzzle velocity of 650 m/sec. The Ger- man cartridge case was cannelured, the Austro-Hungarian rimmed.
Cartridge cases were at first made of brass, but the consumption was so great, especially as the salvage of S.A.A. cartridge cases was small compared to that of artillery empties, that steps had to be taken to find a substitute for brass. This, however, was much more difficult than in the case of artillery munitions, and it was only in the very last stages of the war that it was achieved. The cupro-nickel envelopes of the German bullet were replaced by galvanized copper for the sake of economy.
In both countries a nitrocellulose disc powder was used for the propellant charge. This ammunition has answered well. Amongst the varieties of special ammunition should be noted the German A. P. ammunition (a pre-war design),, and the Austro-Hungarian XX. cartridge, likewise armour-piercing. The German bullet, instead of a lead filling, had a core of alloyed (later on unalloyed) steel embedded in lead, the two filling up the interior of the steel-casing. The Austro- Hungarian envelope bullet was similar a conical envelope with a steel pin in the lead filling. The German bullet penetrated a 9-mm. high-quality armour plate at a distance of 400 metres, the Austrian a 7'5-mm. plate at a distance of 350 metres. Germany possessed in her 13-mm. tank bullet (similar in design to her other A. P. bullets) a weapon which was effective at a distance of 400 metres against a 2l-mm. plate. The U. munition of Austria-Hungary was another special munition. This was, however, soon withdrawn. It was de- signed to facilitate ranging by giving on impact a good visible grey smoke. However, the incidental explosive effect brought it under the ban of international law ; it was therefore soon discarded.
Later on, for anti-aircraft purposes especially, a demand was made for a tracer-bullet. Both the German and the Austrian types of tracer-bullet were capable also of wounding effect. The German type showed the trajectory by means of a backward-stretching flame visible to about 1 ,000 metres. Austria-Hungary made use of different types, all constructed by the Adler firm; the F.Z. shell showed the trajectory between 100 and 6op metres.
A special development of infantry tracer-bullets was the phos- phorus (P) bullets; they were primarily to set on fire the petrol tanks of aeroplanes, but effect was given in the indication of the trajectory on account of which incidentally they gave good tracer effect so that the old tracer-bullet could be discarded in its favour. The P bullet was not designed solely for air warfare; for short range up to about 1,000 metres it could be fixed on wires with ordinary ammunition. It had a filling of yellow phosphorus, which was heated by the friction of the shell in the gun-barrel. At 80 metres from the muzzle it burst forth from a small opening previously closed by wax or a thin solder and ignited in the air. This phosphorus effect extended to about 400. metres. Both the indication of trajectory and the incendiary effect against fuel tanks were quite Satisfactory, but against balloons its value was not conclusively proved. The difficulties of producing small-arms ammunition never assumed great proportions. It was found that the real daily demand per infantry rifle remained considerably below the peace-time estimate. The variety of weapons issued and the almost uninterrupted continuance of trench warfare in fact left less and less work for the rifle. The machine-gun alone gained and gained enormously in importance.
The Production of Munitions. The constructive development of munitions by the Central Powers shows how they succeeded
in adapting the available raw materials and in finding sub- stitutes. The behaviour of the ammunition remained good, and even the demands imposed by the ever-changing tactical methods were able to be met. What influenced production much more strongly were the difficulties due to shortage of imported raw materials and to the unexpected volume of the demand. The peace preparations were certainly insufficient, but even if the great demand and the long duration of the war could have been foreseen, it would have been frankly impossible to cover more than a comparatively small proportion of the needs. Had every workshop in the land been given over to the requirements of war, and even an approximately sufficient supply of war stores and imported raw material been accumulated, the national wealth would have been decimated. A higher state of peace preparedness would, indeed, without overstraining the national strength, have smoothed the initial difficulties of production and eased the first munitions crisis. But all else the actual stress of war had to bring about. It alone could force everything into its service. This happened at the moment it became clear that it had become a question of a struggle for economic existence. But both States had neglected to organize the war administration in peace-time and to bring science and industry into the mo- bilization plan, as had been done with the railways.
In proportion as it came to be recognized that not only the industries actually producing war material, but also all the other departments of economic life, were bound up together by count- less veins and formed each a limb of one corporate body, cen- tral management came into force.
This did not take place all at once, however, and at first only those regions in which there was a deficiency from the very first were covered. Nor had the Central Powers agreed upon a joint war-industrial policy; indeed, even at the end of the war complete unity of economic control had not been achieved within each State itself. Here political reasons came into play. In Austria-Hungary it was especially difficult, as the Dual Monarchy comprised two economically independent States of different structure.
Of the war needs, the greatest in extent, as also the most imperative, was that of munitions. More and more the enormous consumption made inroads into all the departments of general economic life. Its needs embraced almost all the important raw materials. The peace-time preparation of munitions had been limited to maintaining the supply in the specialized State and private factories at a level sufficient to guarantee to cover the presumed needs of the first three months' campaigning. These selected factories were also kept at a standard level as regards installation, strength of skilled workers, and supplies of raw materials. In some State works arrangements were in existence for expansion. The peace-time supplies of munitions available, calculated on the basis of the numerical demands of the General Staff, were supposed to guarantee a continued supply to the army, for a several months' campaign, until war production should become effective. Before the war 600 to 1,000 rounds were considered sufficient for light guns and somewhat less for heavy guns. These figures were not in every case fully attained, especially in Austria-Hungary. The production which was in- tended to be secured within the first three months was approx- imately equal to the actual war-material stocks.
At the beginning of the war this proposed production was immediately put in hand. In Austria-Hungary, however, the output of the peace-time demand was not fully realized, because the proposed new works for the production of shrapnel were not yet ready and the arrangements for the production of explosive (trotyl) had not yet been taken in hand.
Later on the monthly production in Germany reached 1,000 rounds per light gun, that in Austria-Hungary about 600 rounds, and this though meantime the number of guns had multiplied. By the beginning of 1917 the capacity of the munitions industry had in fact increased enormously it was twenty times greater than during the first months of the war. This was due to technical science, which succeeded in procuring substitutes for the most important raw materials which were lacking.
