NARES, SIR GEORGE STRONG (1851-1915), English Arctic explorer (see 19.240). In later life he acted as one of the conservators of the river Mersey. He died at Surbiton Jan. 15 1915.
NAREW, BATTLES OF THE (1915). The lower course of the river Narew, with, on the one hand, its affluent the Bobr, and, on the other, the line of the lower Bug into which it runs, forms, against an invasion of Poland from East Prussia, a barrier which played a considerable role in the eastern front campaigns of the World War. This barrier was reinforced by bridgehead fortresses at Osowiec on the Bobr, Lomzha and Rozhan on the Narew, and Zegrze and Novogeorgievsk (or Modlin) on the Bug the last named, a ring-fortress, bestriding also the Vistula and the Wkra and standing in close relation to the fortress of Warsaw. The course of the Bobr-Narew-Bug water-line is marked through- out by marshes, which, sometimes on one side of the water and sometimes on the other, but generally on both, vary in width from half a mile to 2 m. and at certain points broaden out into wooded marsh-basins, 6-10 m. in width or breadth.
Between this barrier and the S. frontier of East Prussia, inside which the western Masurian lakes offer lines of defence against Russian invasion, there were constant advances and retreats of each side during the first campaigns of the World War. The first Russian advance culminated in the disaster of Tannenberg (see MASURIA, BATTLES IN), and was followed by a gradual advance of minor German forces to the region of Wloclawek on the Vistula, Plonsk, Ciechanow, Przasnysz and Chorzelle, in conjunction with the main campaigns in West Poland. Then, early in 1915, the Russians prepared a great offensive, which was to take the same general direction as that of Aug. 1914. The Germans, however, by seizing the initiative early in Feb. delayed the development of this offensive. Their main effort, the winter battle of Masuria, was made on the E. front of East Prussia, while the S. front was guarded by an army group under General von Gallwitz, who carried out his task offensively, driving southward into the area N. of the Narew, where the Russians were assembling. This move led to very severe fighting, notably at Przasnysz; and Gallwitz, though reinforced by degrees, maintained himself with great difficulty against the onset of the Russian XII. Army. Then, gradually, the battle became stabilized, and, the great Austro-German offensive in West Galicia having from May i transferred the centre of gravity to the other wing, the country between the Narew and the western Masurian lakes was quiet for two months. It is a country of poor communications, sandy soil, low elevations, and numerous N.-S. streams affluents of the Bobr, Narew or Bug which occasionally turn into the E.-W. direction and offer partial lines of defence to either side. It is wooded, heavily so in its eastern portion, where the Narew and the Masurian lake zones converge.
Thus the Narew-Masuria battle-field, as it may be called, is triangular in shape, limited on the E. by the woods of the Pissek (or Pissa) region, lying between the Prussian Lake Spirding and the Russian fortress of Lomzha, on the S. and S.E. by the course of the lower Narew and lower Bug, and on the W. practically by the river Wkra and the fortress of Novogeorgievsk. Across this battle-field, in July 1915, the Russians held a front line roughly par- allel to the Prussian frontier and therefore oblique to the Narew. It ran from the outlying defences of Lomzha on the right, by Cie- riozy and Lipniki to Berdowelonki on the river Omulew, and thence by Cierpienta and Jednorozec on the Orzyc to Mchowko in front of Przasnysz; thence it continued a short distance west- ward to Grudusk, and at that point turned southwestward to the Vistula. This line was duplicated by rear defences, notably the " Bogate position " between Ciechanow and Krasnosielc; a switch-line connected Ciechanow and Przasnysz, another the centre of the Bogate position, and yet another the right of that position with the bridgehead lines of Pultusk. On the Narew itself, Lomzha, Rozhan and Pultusk (which already possessed works in peace) had been developed into large bridgeheads, and the modern permanent works at Zegrze on the Bug had been extended to include Serock at the Bug-Narew confluence. Novogeorgievsk, already a great ring-fortress in peace, had been surrounded by two enveloping rings of outer defences.
When, after the break-through of tke Russian positions at Gorlice-Tarnow, Radymno and Grodek (see DUNAJEC-SAN, BATTLES OF THE), Mackensen's armies swung northward to reach the rear of their opponents in Poland by way of the upper Bug, a similar blow upon the N. side was planned by Falkenhayn for the armies under Hindenburg. As to the direction of this blow, there was acute controversy between Falkenhayn on the one hand and Hindenburg and Ludendorff on the other (see EASTERN EUROPEAN FRONT CAMPAIGNS, Part III.), and it was only by the pure assertion of authority that Falkenhayn imposed upon them the offensive on the Narew which is here described. Hindenburg and Ludendorff objected that, against so strong a series of posi- tions as those of Przasnysz, Bogate and the Narew, there was no hope of such rapid progress as would enable Gallwitz to come in upon the rear of the Russians in West Poland in time to cut them off. The other arguments for and against a Narew offensive were of a more purely strategic character, and are not here considered, but it must be noted that each of these arguments, taken in itself, was proved by the sequel to be well founded. The view taken by Falkenhayn and that of Hindenburg and Ludendorff as to their relative importance in the ensemble differed fundamentally, Ludendorff's ideal being the cutting-off of the entire Russian army by the pincers closing from N.E. and S.E. on its rear, whereas Falkenhayn's object was more limited to deliver a blow that would relieve pressure on Mackensen's front and so enable him to penetrate to Brest Litovsk from the south. To achieve this object, the offensive must, according to Falkenhayn, threaten the rear of the Russian positions in Poland at the earliest possible moment, and, therefore, by the nearest and shortest line of operations, since Mackensen was practically unable to start his movement along the upper Bug till the strength of the Rus- sians in front of him had been materially reduced (see BREST LITOVSK, BATTLES ROUND).
Thus, although the record of Gallwitz's offensive on the Narew is one of slow frontal advances which aimed at the Russian communications but never reached them till the retreating enemy had passed on although finally he could only join the German frontal armies in the general pursuit the battles de- scribed below must be considered as successful or otherwise in relation to the object for which they were really fought. In the last analysis, they were, like the battles of the British army in Flanders in 1917, a relief-offensive, which in securing their object might, if fortune so willed it, secure other results as well.
Forces and Positions. The portion of the front selected for attack by Gallwitz was that between the river Orzyc and the village of Grudok, in the middle of which lay Przasnysz; and the date chosen for the attack was July 12, afterwards changed to July 13. As already mentioned, the original cordon of troops along the S. front of East Prussia had grown by reinforcements during the spring battles in the Przasnysz region to the strength of an " army group," and for the July offensives it was given additional forces, though it was not till later that the title XII. Army was assigned to it. It consisted, from left (river Skwa) to right (river Vistula), of the I., XIII., XVII., XL, XVII. Res. and Dickhuth's Corps. Of these, the XIII., XVII., and XI. lay opposite the selected front with their divisions thus disposed. On the XIII. Corps front were the 4th Guard, the 3rd and the 26th Divs., with, oh the left astride the Orzyc, a liaison detachment of the I. Corps under von Falk. On the XVII. Corps front, which extended from the Murawka stream to opposite Pavlovo- Koscienie, were the 36th Div. its left facing Przasnysz and the ist Guard Res. Division. On that of the XI. Corps, which ran from the Russian salient N. of Pavlovo-Koscienie to Grudusk, the 86th Div. (of Landwehr and Ersatz units) and the 38th Division. From Grudusk southwestward, astride the Mlawa-Ciechanow-Novogeorgievsk railway lay the i4th Land- wehr Div. and 85th (Landwehr units) of the XVII. Res. Corps. In army reserve were the 35th Div., Pfeil's Bde. of the i4th Landwehr Div. and (after the first day) the 5oth Res. Div.; later the 83rd Div., Menges's Div. and the 54th Div. were placed at Gallwitz's disposal by Hindenburg. .In the attack sector between Orzyc river and Grudusk the
