for securing army meat from abroad was also found necessary from the beginning; this involved control of refrigerated tonnage under the Board of Trade. A system for obtaining weekly reports on retail prices (mainly through the staff of the Labour Exchanges) was put into action at the outbreak of the war; these reports yielded material for subsequent estimates of the increase of the cost of living. The use of cereals and sugar for brewing was limited by an Output of Beer Restriction Act, coming into force on April 1 1916. Apart from this, food supplies were allowed for two years and more to take their course.
By the autumn of 1916, prices, which had risen more or less steadily from the beginning of the war, reached a level which began to evoke acute discontent, and the prospects of an intensified submarine campaign caused anxieties for the future. Two important steps were taken. The first was the establishment in Oct. 1916 of a Royal Commission on wheat supplies, parallel to that on the sugar supplies. This Commission almost immediately took on an international character through the signing in Nov. 1916 of the “Wheat Executive Agreement” between Great Britain, France and Italy, under which the purchase, importation, distribution and shipping not only of wheat but of all cereals was arranged on a common basis for the three Allies, the administrative work being undertaken in London. The Wheat Executive gradually extended its activities to other allies and even to neutrals. The Wheat Commission and the Sugar Commission retained their existence as separate bodies even after the appointment of the food controller, but the latter in practice decided questions of policy and became responsible for supplies of cereals and sugar as of all other foods.
The second step was the making of an Order in Council under the Defence of the Realm Act (Nov. 16) which practically empowered the Board of Trade to introduce a complete system of food control, by regulating the importation, production, distribution, prices and quality of all kinds of food or articles necessary for the production of food. Food control actually began under this Order in Council, immediate steps being taken to lengthen compulsorily the extraction of flour (i.e. increase the proportion of the wheat berry which was made into flour, and so into human consumption, as against that which was left as “offals” to be used as feeding-stuffs for animals), to fix milk prices and to restrain extravagance in public meals. The Government of the day at the same time announced their intention to appoint some person with adequate authority to exercise these extended powers, in other words a “Food Controller.” Before a suitable candidate for the post could be prevailed upon to accept it, the Government itself fell. The new Coalition Govern- ment of Dec. 1916 included among its novelties a food controller to whom full powers were given under a “New Ministries Act.” The first holder of the new post, Lord Devonport, gave valuable support to the Wheat Commission in securing adequate tonnage and foreign credits, and carried a stage further the policy of conservation of cereals already embodied in the Output of Beer Restriction Act and the order lengthening the extraction of flour. To facilitate this the whole of the flour-mills were taken over and run on Government account as from April 1917. An appeal to the public to ration themselves voluntarily on the basis of 4 lb. of bread per head per week, 2½ lb. of meat and ¾ lb. of sugar was issued in Feb. 1917, and, backed by an extensive advertising campaign, produced a definite though limited effect on the bread consumption, particularly of wealthy and middle-class households who were better able to obtain alternative foods; for the working-classes alike in industry and in agriculture the suggested ration of 4 lb. a head was impracticably low and among them the appeal met with little response. The failure of the potato crop gave trouble and a first illustration of the dangers of price fixing. Considerable thought was expended by successive committees in devising better methods for the distribution of sugar, but before any could be adopted Lord Devonport resigned (June 1917).
During the spring of 1917, the submarine menace was growing. The very possibility of feeding the people seemed to be threatened. Meanwhile, the people themselves were mainly disturbed by the rise of prices and the bad distribution of sugar. The reports of the Commissioners on Industrial Unrest, received in June 1917, emphasized these two points above all as the causes of unrest. With the coming of the second food controller, Lord Rhondda, the food problem had reached a more serious stage and was met by far more serious measures.
Lord Rhondda prepared himself and the Ministry of Food to deal thoroughly with all three aspects of supplies, prices and distribution. First he attacked prices. In Sept. 1917 the price of bread was lowered from 1s. or 1s. 1d. to 9d. for the quartern loaf , the difference being paid by the Government as a subsidy. At about the same time there was fixed a scale of prices for meat and for live stock, descending month by month from 74s. per cwt. in Sept. 1917 to 60s. in the following January. The fixing of meat and live-stock prices needed to be and was intended to be accompanied by measures for regulating slaughter and marketing, but for various reasons the latter measures did not become effective till the end of 1917. The scale of prices standing by itself gave the farmers a strong inducement to hurry on their beasts to market, so as to profit by the early high prices and avoid the later low ones; too many beasts were thrown on the market before Christmas and too few were kept for the new year; how the ensuing shortage, aggravated by large purchases of home-grown meat for the army and by other circumstances, was dealt with by rationing in the early part of 1918 is described elsewhere.
On the general principle of controlling supplies of all essential foods as a condition of fixing prices Lord Rhondda never hesitated. This policy was carried out most completely in the case of imports. Cereals and sugar were already being imported by the two commissions. Under Lord Rhondda all bacon, ham, lard, cheese, butter and similar provisions, all oils and fats (edible and otherwise), condensed milk, canned meat and fish, eggs, tea and even such extras as apples, oranges, jam and dried fruits, brought into this country, came to be directly imported by the Ministry of Food or requisitioned on arrival. All home-produced meat and cheese and most of the butter passed through the hands of the Ministry as also, through the control of flour-mills, did all the wheat and most of the barley. Even the whole potato crop of 1918 was taken over under a scheme framed in the time of Lord Rhondda, though not put into force till after his death. Ultimately 85% of all the food consumed by civilians in Great Britain was actually bought and sold by the Ministry of Food. The only important exceptions were milk, fresh fish and fresh vegetables. The total turnover of the Ministry's trading (including the two Royal Commissions) was nearly £900,000,000 a year.
Lord Rhondda made a budget of the food required for the country as a whole, and then took steps to see that that amount of food was available. This was partly a matter of securing imports; for this was needed, on the one hand tonnage, and on the other finance, that is to say, foreign credits; the Ministry of Food acting through or with the Governments concerned made bargains with the producers for the whole exportable surplus of Canadian cheese or Australian wheat or American bacon. It was partly a matter of encouraging food production at home. A vigorous food production campaign was started under the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Food coöperated with the agricultural departments, in fixing only such prices as appeared likely to secure adequate supplies. In effect, in fixing prices for home produce, it made bargains with the farmers as to the prices at which, with whatever show of reluctance or grumbling, they would be able and willing to produce and to deliver their produce to the Ministry or its agents. The legal power of the Ministry to fix any prices it thought good was absolute; the prices for home produce were actually fixed only after apparently interminable consultations, and were prices which could be expected to produce the required supplies, and did.
The largest single source of imported supplies was the United States. Here a special department of the Ministry was established (Oct. 1917), to purchase on its behalf all food-stuffs other than cereals, for which an organization already existed in the Wheat Export Co.; a branch in Toronto dealt with Canadian supplies. The department speedily grew into an international organization of vast scope; the “Allied Export Provisions Com-
