which they obtained their supplies. All this miracle of energy would have been impossible but for the alliance with Great Britain, whose naval supremacy enabled supplies and materials of all kinds to be imported. The natural result of the transforma- tion of so many manufacturing plants into munition factories was to bring exports down to a very small figure, while imports increased by leaps and bounds. Simultaneously there was a decrease in the wealth derived from agriculture. Crops pro- duced, on the average, only about half the normal amount. The wheat crop dropped from 90,000,000 to 49,000,000 quintals. The ports, which were much too small to deal with the vast quantities of goods brought from abroad, became congested. The Government departments were unable to handle the prob- lems of supply which came before them. Under the pressure of necessity, supplies of all kinds were bought at any price. Ordi- nary notions of the value of money became obliterated. Freights, in consequence of the tremendous demand and the effects of the German submarine campaign, soared to fantastic heights and the Government was often forced to sign very costly contracts. The effect of all these abnormal conditions on the foreign trade of the country is shown in Table 22:
TABLE 22. Exports and Imports, 1914-8.
Exports
I mports
Francs
Metric quintals
Francs
Metric quintals
1914 1915
1916
1917 1918
4,868,834,000 3,937,369,000 6,214,594,000 6,012,698,000 4,722,694,000
126,638,240 40,910,750 37,300,150 30,111,240 37,181,380
6,402,169,000 ",035,794,000 20,640,419,000 27,554, 55,ooo 22,301,384,000
334,345,900 320,492,560 400,600,160 348,326,080 293,499,870
It appears from the table that the balance of trade which was 22% against exports in 1913, rose to 31% in 1914, 180% in 1915, 232% in 1916, 358% in 1917, and 372% in 1918.
Throughout the war France lived under a system of regulations and restrictions. It was absolutely necessary to prevent various kinds of produce, which were urgently needed in France, from leaving the country and international trade had to be interfered with so as to prevent the indirect supply of goods to the enemy, who tried in every possible way to neutralize the effects of the blockade. When hostilities ceased, it was found necessary to continue some of the war-time regulations and restrictions for a considerable time. The state of exhaustion, the collapse of production and the high cost of living, which the Government had to try to alleviate in every possible way, all made it impossi- ble to return at once to freedom of commerce. The Government remained the sole purchaser of raw materials and of the necessa- ries of life. The position, however, improved very rapidly. The instinctive industry of the French people reasserted itself, and favourable symptoms were observed. Commercial treaties having been denounced, the Government could choose the Customs policy required by the altered circumstances. A decree issued in June 1919 restored the former freedom of importation to nearly all the articles hitherto prohibited, but at the same time the principle underlying the Customs tariffs was subjected to a radical alteration. The specific duties were replaced by ad valorem duties, but it was soon found that these were not satisfactory. In July of the same year the specific duties were restored but with various additions, styled coefficients. These extra charges, which were moderate at first, were steadily increased as .the exchange and coal problems became more and more pressing. Actual prohibition was even resorted to (in April 1920). This policy the outcome of French manufacturers' apprehension of competition from countries with still more depreciated currency aroused great opposition, and finally increased coefficients superseded prohibition.
The revival in production was quite rapid in France, in spite of the coal shortage which prevailed in 1919 and 1920. Table 23 shows the improvement in the trade balance.
The result, which would have been still better but for the general economic crisis which occurred towards the end of 1920, show that a considerable effort towards recovery was made. The deficit in the trade balance, which was 201 % in 1919, was
TABLE 23. Exports and Imports.
Exports
Imports
Francs
Metric quintals
Francs
Metric quintals
1919
1920
11,879,600,000 22,434,757,000
55,643,800 124,673,464
35.799,267,000 35,404,951,000
384,471,685 509,296,203
reduced to 58% in 1920. For the first time there was a decrease in imports, under the head of values though not of weights.
If we compare the quantities and not the values of goods exported by France, it appears that the total weight, which reached 220,000,000 quintals before the war, and which fell to the lowest figure on record, 30,000,000 in 1917, was a long way in 1920 from the 1913 figures. The increase in values is more apparent than real if the greatly enhanced prices of all commodi- ties be taken into account. Although the tonnage entering French ports in 1920 was only 15% more than in 1913, the increase in values was 320 per cent. The export figures show a decrease of 44% in tonnage and an increase of 226% in values.
French trade with foreign countries in 1920 is shown in Table 24:
TABLE 24. Foreign Trade, 1920; in Francs.
I mports
from
. Exports to
England
6,74 6 -959.ooo
2 658 429 OOO
3,511,943,000
Belgium Switzerland Spain
2,568,665,000 8O2,94O,OOO
849 368 ooo
3,913,986,000 1,441,694,000 883 676 ooo
Italy United States Brazil
891,530,000 7,061,721,000 652 603 ooo
1,061,516,000 1,770,892,000 303 716 ooo
Argentine Republic Other foreign countries . Algeria Tunisia Morocco Other French colonies .
2,053,819,000 7,893,071,000 960,475,000 218,628,000 152,398,000 1,894,345,000
379,319,000
4,602,237,000 1,926,006,000 318,422,000
493,857,000 647,232,000
In brief, the situation at the end of 1920 was that exports had not returned to the pre-war level and the inflation of imports had been only very slightly reduced. Smaller quantities of food-stuffs had been pjurchased abroad but there was an increase under the head of manufactured articles.
These conclusions were modified by the statistics for the early part of 1921. In the first four months of that year, the exports actually exceeded the imports. Compared with the correspond- ing period of 1920, imports showed a decrease of no less than 5,720,089,000 fr. and exports an increase of 1,111,940,000 francs. These figures reflect the conditions which affected trade and industry all over the world. They show how greatly the depre- ciation of a national currency acts as a stimulant to exports and a check on imports. The decreased imports of raw materials (3,578,000,000 fr. during the first four months of 1921 and 5,861,000,000 fr. during the corresponding period of 1920) illustrate the extent to which the industrial activity of France was reduced. On the other hand, the difference is not so great as it seems, in view of the fall in prices.
The future of France's foreign trade seemed in 1921 to depend very largely upon the amount of wisdom that might prevail in regard to Customs policy. Only the future could show whether there was to be pronounced protectionism, accompanied by heavy duties, or a system of treaties of commerce concluded for reasonable periods and relating to specified articles. Arrange- ments of this kind had been made with Canada and Czecho- slovakia, and others were in course of negotiation (June 1921) with Spain, Switzerland and Poland. There seemed ground to hope that when the inflation of currency had been reduced and exchange returned to a more normal level, France would reap the fruits of the efforts she had made since the war to reconstitute her mercantile marine, improve her ports and navigable rivers, and stimulate her manufacturers to greater enterprise in foreign markets. Before the war, there was a tendency in France to attach exaggerated importance to the influence of capital. France was proud to be called " the banker
