in India, to incite the independent tribes to rise and to follow up their raiding parties with his Afghan regular forces. His designs miscarried. The frontier tribes were slow to move. Aggressive movements of his troops in the Khyber were countered by the rapid mobilization of the army in India early in May, the oc- cupation of the Afghan advanced base at Dacca and the bombing by aeroplanes of Kabul and Jalalabad. By the middle of May the Afghans asked for a cessation of hostilities and threw out feelers for peace. Dilatory negotiations followed before the Amir could bring himself to ask for terms. In June he reluctantly accepted the conditions of armistice offered to him. In July his representatives attended a conference at Rawalpindi and on Aug. 8 a treaty of peace was signed. The terms proposed were lenient as the object was to reestablish friendly relations with Afghanistan. The Amir lost his subsidy and the privilege of importing arms through India. Another article expressed the willingness of the British Government to resume friendly rela- tions with Afghanistan, if in the next six months the Afghans proved by their conduct that they were sincerely anxious to regain its friendship. A concession to which the Afghan delegates attached much importance was conveyed in a separate letter, which officially recognized the freedom of Afghanistan from foreign control. Doubts have been expressed as to the wisdom of this concession. But control over the foreign policy of Afghan- istan has always been nominal rather than real, and the with- drawal of the subsidy in itself implied the rescission of the reciprocal obligation. The policy embodied in the treaty has been slow of fruition. After many delays the Amir sent delegates to India in 1920 to discuss the basis of a permanent friendly agreement, and as a sequel to these discussions a British envoy proceeded to Kabul to confer with the Afghan Government. The progress of Bolshevism in the countries to the N. of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the state of Bokhara may have disposed the Amir to seek a renewal of friendship with the British power, but in 1921 nothing was settled.
Waziristan Expedition. The Rawalpindi treaty did not end the troubles on the frontier. The independent tribes of Wazirs and Mahsuds, who occupy a large block of country S. of the Khyber line between Afghanistan and the British districts to the E., had risen in May at the instigation of the Afghans, raided the adjoining British districts and achieved some temporary successes over the tribal militia and levies by whom the border is policed. As their raids showed no abatement, the Indian Government determined to undertake the permanent pacification of the country. It was a serious undertaking, as the tribes could place some 30,000 well-armed men in the field, of whom a number had served in the Indian army. A strong force was assembled on the frontier in Oct. and an ultimatum given to the tribes. They were required to make reparation for damages, to surrender arms in specified amounts, and were informed that the Govern- ment intended to make military roads through their country and occupy certain positions. The Wazirs in the Tochi Valley were soon subdued, but the Mahsuds held out and fought with dogged obstinacy and great skill. There were two considerable encounters (on Dec. 21 1919 and Jan. 14 1920) in which the British casualties were heavy. In the end the Mahsuds accepted the terms imposed upon them and operations closed on May 7 1920." This frontier campaign is officially described as one of " unparalleled hard fighting and severity. The enemy fought with a determination and courage which have rarely, if ever, been met with by our troops in similar operations." They were well armed, and many retired regular soldiers and deserters from the Indian army and tribal militia were present in their ranks. It was later found necessary to occupy the central portion of the Mahsud country while road-making, one of the most pacifying influences, was in progress.
Army Inquiry. The Indian Government suffered both in purse and in military reputation from the Afghan War. That war and the Waziristan campaign cost the Indian taxpayer 15,000,000. The hurried mobilization of a large army on the frontier at the beginning of the hot weather and the carrying out of operations in an inhospitable country during the hottest months of the
year severely strained the war-worn military machine and revealed defects in its working. The hardships experienced by the troops and the shortcomings of the supply and medical departments provided material for press attacks on the Indian military system and a repetition of the Mesopotamian breakdown was freely predicted. An inquiry into the organization and administration of the army in India was overdue, and in the autumn of 1919 the Secretary of State appointed a committee, with Lord Esher as chairman, to undertake it. The committee visited India in the winter and reported in the following May. Their recommendations covered much ground, from the relations of the High Command in India to the War Office and the India Office, the duties and position of the commander-in-chief in the Government of India, the administration of the army in India as part of the armed forces of the Empire, to the pay and pensions of officers and men of the Indian army. Some of these recom- mendations raised large questions of policy. Others involved a considerable increase in the Indian military budget. The report was unfavourably viewed in India. It was thought to harbour < design to increase the control of the War Office over the military forces of India and to place them at the disposal of the home Government. The Legislative Council expressed these apprehen- sions in a series of resolutions which the Government of India undertook to lay before the Secretary of State. The Government of India also undertook to effect all possible economies in military expenditure.
The Non-Cooperation Movement. In Dec. 1919 the scheme of constitutional reform became law by the passing of the Government of India (Amendment) Act. Its importance was signalized by the King's proclamation of Dec. 23, which dwelt in eloquent and arresting language on the political advancement conferred upon the Indian peoples, authorized the Viceroy to extend the royal clemency to political offenders in the fullest measure compatible with the public safety, and announced that the Prince of Wales would visit India to inaugurate the new constitutions. Unfortunately, the effect of these gracious words was marred by the excitement and racial feeling generated by the sittings in the Punjab of Lord Hunter's Committee which wa then inquiring into the disturbances of the preceding April. The National Congress met at Amritsar and passed resolutions de- nouncing the Government's action in the Punjab, demanding the recall of Lord Chelmsford and condemning the reform scheme as disappointing and unsatisfactory. This hostility towards the administration and rejection of the reforms by the extreme section of the nationalists developed in the ensuing months into a definite " non-cooperation " movement organized by Mr. Gandhi. Mr. Gandhi had already identified himself with the grievances of the Indian Mahommedan community with regar to thfe terms imposed on Turkey by the Allies and the question of the Khalifat. In connexion with the " Anti-Peace Celebr tions " Committee organized by the Moslem leaders he an- nounced a hartal and days of mourning and exhorted his Hindu followers to support the Mahommedan claim that Turkey should be reinstated in the position it held before the war. The cam- paign was viewed with indifference by the vast majority of Hin- dus, but fell in with the nationalist policy of uniting the two communities against the Government. In the summer of 1920 the movement was strengthened by two events. The publication of the Hunter Committee's report, and of the correspondcnc between the Government of India and the Secretary of State regarding its findings, and tKe subsequent debates in Parliament renewed the bitterness and indignation which the Amritsar proceedings had aroused in India. About the same time the terms of the Sevres Treaty became known to Indian Mahom- medans and added flame to the Khalifat agitation. In Aug. Mr. Gandhi proclaimed in a letter to the Viceroy his adoption of non-cooperation as a remedy against a Government for which he retained " neither respect nor affection " on account of its " un- scrupulous, immoral and unjust " action in the matter of the Khalifat and its failure to punish adequately the officials re- sponsible for " the wanton cruelty and inhumanity " with which the disorders in the Punjab were suppressed. The end of
