future attack ? The question may be considered under two heads : firstly, means to increase mobility; secondly, tactical doctrine.
Mobility. Almost every mechanical advance means a step towards greater mobility. Every arm and branch of the service is becoming more mobile or else decaying under the influence of the petrol era. In the transport of an army the horse has al- ready given way to the road motor, and this in turn promises to yield to a cross-country tractor with caterpillar tracks. The heavy artillery is already motor-drawn, and the lighter field artillery will probably follow suit before many years have passed. A further possibility is that the latter may disappear altogether, and the field-gun be either accommodated permanently in an armoured tank, or carried in one in such a way that it can be quickly mounted on the ground. Mobility is the foundation stone of the value of infantry. Its unique position has always rested upon the fact that it is more universally mobile than other arms. But on the normal field of battle, if it is to maintain its unrivalled position as the " handyman " of war, its mobility must keep pace in proportion with that of the other arms. To give it increased mobility two problems must be solved. Firstly, means must be devised for bringing infantry to the scene of its action more quickly and with less fatigue than by the use of its legs. Napoleon declared that he won his victories by his soldiers' legs: that is, by their marching powers, endurance and mobility. This was true so long as the foot-soldier's only competitor was the horse, but the manoeuvring power of armies now rests on the speed of railways and petrol engines. In the second place, infan- try equipment must be lightened. The soldier must not again be treated as a beast of burden other means than piling loads on the soldier's back must be devised.
Transportation. Whilst it is no longer true to say with Napoleon that " marches are war," because of the development of mechanical transport, yet truer than ever is the completion of his sentence that " aptitude for war is aptitude for movement." This problem has been approached in the past by the introduction of mounted riflemen and cyclists. The former were handicapped by the necessity of leaving a considerable proportion of their strength to look after the horses. Cyclists suffered from the defect of being tied to the roads and the lack of means to bring on their mounts after an action on foot. Therefore, in order to gain the maximum effect from available infantry, it will be necessary to move them from point to point and from resting- place to within range of the enemy by mechanical transport.
Equipment. If infantry is to possess an adequate agility, its weapons and ammunition must be lightened to an appreciable extent or they must be carried for him. In fact, the infantryman of the future must be regarded as an athlete. Every article which he does not need in the combat itself must be discarded or carried for him on accompanying transport. It is likely that a lightened form of the present web equipment will be worn in order to sup- port his cartridge pouches, smoke bombs and side-arms. Leather as a material is too much affected by exposure to rain. The ideal to be aimed at in the design of the equipment is that no straps should hinder the freedom of the wearer's chest. The bandolier is inconvenient and uncomfortable; nor should any great quantity of ammunition be carried. In the British army it is probable that puttees will be retained. They are more flexible, less rigidly binding, less hot than leggings, whilst they give greater protec- tion from weather and abrasions than do stockings. This argu- ment also applies to boots rather than shoes which do not support the ankle but a lighter pattern might be supplied.
Tactical Methods. Infantry to-day has at last shaken itself free from the morass of methods based on theories of mechanics rather than of human nature, and has got its feet firmly placed on bed-rock principles of fighting. But in the attack particularly there remains a problem unsolved. The infantry unit has learned how to deal with any centre of enemy resistance which it encounters in a way which is true to human nature. But in a large-scale battle each infantry unit is only an interdependent and subordinate working part of a vast machine. The need is to devise a method by which its action can be fitted in and dove- tailed with the movements of the neighbouring units and of the
machine as a whole. Cooperation between units of the same arm even more than between the different arms is the key- stone of modern war. These minor units are the moving parts of the car which is the whole force. The car itself, under the control of its driver, the general commanding, may alter its direction, vary its speed, change its gears, but the actual moving parts within it execute their share on a definite system comprising a certain limited number of cycles of movement which are almost uniform. The essential requirement for the smooth running of the car to its journey's end victory is that each moving part should fulfil its role in harmony with the others. But the path to victory is a winding one, the car has to round steep corners, and a differential is needed which will compensate the movement of the respective wheels without friction, lest a sideslip ensue. In battle, now that the defence is distributed in depth, it is rarely possible to tell beforehand at what points and moments th different units will encounter the organized resistance of the enemy. The attackers of to-day are faced with the problem breaking through successive positions, each composed of irregular series of posts, extending back in layers to a depth of several miles. It is reasonably certain that some units will encounter fewer posts and less resistance in their path than others. A system is therefore needed which will ensure that the progress and momentum of the attack as a whole is not lost, nor friction developed between the moving parts, when delays occur to overcome obstacles in the path of certain sub-units. The minor cycle of the sub-unit must be reconciled with the greater cycle of the superior unit, and with that of the whole force.
A method by which this combination may be achieved has been put forward under the title " expanding torrent." It is based on the fact that where, as in the British army, a unit consists of four parts or sub-units, its forward body will be formed of two of these. Let us take the example of a company. It will happen that one forward platoon is advancing whilst the other forward platoon is checked or delayed in clearing an enemy post If the platoon which can advance waits for its neighbour, th pressure on the enemy will be relaxed and the chance of exploitir success lost. If it is allowed to go on, tactical unity may be lo and its flanks will be exposed to counter-attack. Hence it suggested that the commander of the company should follow automatically in the wake of his platoon, which is making prog ress, and after passing through the gap will push forward one of his manoeuvre platoons to take over the frontage of the delayed platoon and lead the advance in its place. At the same time he might use his other manoeuvre platoon to assist by a flank attack the originally held-up one to overcome its enemy. The moral effect of being outflanked however is often sufficient. Directly the enemy post has been cleared, the company com- mander reorganizes and pushes ahead without delay.
The method is equally applicable to the battalion and to higher commanders and is described colloquially as exploiting and enlarging the soft spot by automatic action resembling an expanding torrent. The advantages claimed for it, besides that of maintaining the momentum and breadth of the advance, are: firstly, that the leading infantry will be automatically composed of those who are freshest and are best supplied with ammunition, because they are those which have encountered least opposition; secondly, that it will no longer be necessary to fix definite topographical objectives for each small infantry unit, for to limit the advance of unexhausted units which can make progress is a violation of economy of force and the exploitation of success; thirdly, that the coordination and control of the advance will rest with the superior commander rather than depend on cooperation between the platoons themselves. The driver will keep control of his car, instead of losing it as in the past.
Wanted: a Battle Drill. A further development in tactical methods which has been mooted is a controllable system of movement on the battle-field. At present armies retain drill movements for the parade-ground and throw them aside when they go on active service. As human nature in battle retains only that which has become instinctive habit, it is scarcely sur- prising that in movements of crisis one has seen men advancing,
