2ND SQUADRON (Rear-Adml. Mauve) :
3rd Div.: 4th Dili.:
" Deutschland " (flag), " Hannover,"
" Hessen," " Schlesien,"
" Pommern " " Schleswig-Holstein "
(all 4 ll-in.). (all 4 n-in.).
4TH SCOUTING GROUP (Light Cruisers; Commodore von Reuter): " Stettin," " Miinchen," " Frauenlob," " Stuttgart," " Ham- burg."
DESTROYERS WITH MAIN BODY
" Rostock," light cruiser (Commodore Michelsen, First Commo- dore T. B. Forces).
IST HALF FLOTILLA (Comdr. Albrecht) : 639 and 5 boats. 3RD FLOTILLA (Capt. Bost): GIOI and 10 boats. 5TH FLOTILLA (Capt. Heinecke): Gil and 10 boats. 7TH FLOTILLA (Capt. von Koch) : 824 and 10 boats. ADVANCED FORCE
(Vice-Adml. Hipper). IST SCOUTING GROUP 2ND SCOUTING GROUP (Light
Cruisers) :
" Liitzow " (8 12-in.), " Frankfurt " (flag; Rear-
Adml. Bodicker),
" Derfflinger " (8 12-in.), " Pillau,"
" Seydlitz " (8 12-in.), " Elbing,"
" Moltke " (10 ii-in.), " Wiesbaden."
" Von der Tann " (8 n-in).
DESTROYERS WITH ADVANCED FORCE " Regensburg," light cruiser (Commodore Heinrich, Second Com- modore T. B. Forces).
2ND FLOTILLA (Capt. Schuur) : 698 and 10 boats. 6TH FLOTILLA (Capt. Max Schultz) : 641 and 10 boats. 9TH FLOTILLA (Capt. Gohle) : V28 and 10 boats.
The British fleet was decidedly superior in almost every material element of fighting strength except armour protection, in which Beatty's battle cruisers were inferior to Hipper's.
The following table gives the aggregate strength of the oppos- ing forces: ADVANCED FORCES
Dreadnoughts Battle cruisers Light cruisers Destroyers Seaplane carrier .
British
German
6
12 29
I
o 5 5 33 o
MAIN BODY
Dreadnoughts Pre-dreadnoughts Battle cruisers Armoured cruisers . i . Light cruisers Destroyers ...
British
German
24 o
3
8
10
53
16 6
o
6
39
The total fleet on both sides may further be classified thus:
British German
Dr.
Pre-
B.C.
Cr.
L.C.
T.B. D.
28 16
o 6
9
5
8
22 I I
82
72
On a tonnage basis the British fleet had a superiority of about seven to four. Its superiority in heavy guns was equally marked. The British had a total of 344 heavy guns (48 is-in., 10 i4-in., 142 i3-5-in., 144 12-in.) with a weight of discharge of 396,700 Ib. The Germans had'a total of 244 heavy guns (144 12- in. and 100 n-in.) with a weight of discharge of 189,940!^ The British fleet was also considerably superior in speed. Its slowest battleship had a sea-going speed of 20 knots, its fastest (the Barham class) could do 25. The German Konigs, in spite of a current belief that they could do 23 knots, did little more than 21, and the six Deutschlands of the 2nd Squadron only 16.
Neither submarine nor aircraft played any actual part in the battle. In spite of numerous reports to the contrary, there was not a single submarine with either fleet nor in the immediate vicinity. A single seaplane was flown from the " Engadine " (with Beatty's force) but its report never reached the " Lion." The Germans had five Zeppelins on reconnaissance work to the N.W. of Heligoland, but they saw nothing of the battle.
At 2 P.M. the forces were in the position shown in fig. i.
Beatty bore S.S.E. from Jellicoe. Criticism has been directed against the distance at which he was operating from the main
qJELLICOE '
! 551 Si 3 IS 19k 3.iS20k
'...,'_ 44 m 6HIPPER
6'* B.S ' 'ft "..TlV;5-
I'B.C.S '., GALATEA \
BEATTY
I
T.H \ \" "
ClfN
%SCHEER
HI,
JUTLAND
FIG.1 POSITION 2.30P.M.
DENMARK
Horns flee/ .
body. It may be said that, though the speed of the battle crui- sers and the presence of the sth Battle Squadron greatly dimin- ished the danger of operating so far apart, there was no real advantage in it; and had the distance of the battle fleet been reduced to 30 m., the battle would have been joined an hour earlier. The wide separation of the two forces introduced a fur- ther complication. No arrangements had been made for main- taining visual touch, with the result that a discrepancy arose between the reckonings of the two forces, which led later to un- certainty as to the " Lion's " position and that of the enemy.
Both Jellicoe and Beatty were behind time in reaching their positions. Jellicoe's fleet was in six columns disposed abeam i m. apart on a S. 50 E. course zigzagging at 15 knots, with the first C.S. and second C.S. some 6 m. ahead spread 4 m. apart. Hood and ths 3rd B.C.S. were some 20 m. ahead of him on the port bow. At 2:15 Beatty had reached his rendezvous and turned to N.E. to join the main body. The four battle cruisers of the ist B.C.S. were in single line, led by the "Lion" and screened by the i3th Flotilla; the sth B.S. was 5 m. off to the N.N.W. screened by the ist Flotilla; the 2nd B.C.S. was 3 m. E.N.E. of the "Lion." The 12 light cruisers of the ist, 2nd, 3rd L.C.S. were spread on a line bearing E.N.E. 8 m. apart, with the centre of the screen bearing S.S.E. 8 m. from the " Lion." Meanwhile Hipper's force of 5 battle cruisers, 5 light cruisers and 33 de- stroyers was on a northerly course some 50 m. ahead of Scheer and about 50 m. E. of Beatty. His light cruisers, with a num- ber of attendant destroyers, were spread in a semicircle about 10 m. ahead. The German main fleet of 22 battleships, coming on behind him, was in line ahead, steering N. at 14 knots with the seven Konigs in the van, the Heligolands led by the " Friedrich der Grosse " in the centre and the Deutschlands in the rear. The battleships were 763 yd. and squadrons 3,800 yd. apart.
The battle which followed may be divided conveniently into three principal phases:
Phase I.: 2:15 to 5:40 P.M. The battle-cruiser action between Beatty and Hipper. Hipper's junction with Scheer and the run the north.
Phase II.: 5:40 to o P.M. The junction with Jellicoe, the de- ployment of the British battle fleet at 6:15; Scheer's turn-away at 6:35. Scheer's return and second turn-away at 7:17 P.M. The British turn-away at 7:22 P.M. Beatty's engagement at 8:17 P.M.
Phase III.: 9 P.M. to 3:30 A.M. The British fleet steers south. Scheer shapes course to the S.S.E. across its stern, breaks through the British destroyer flotillas and reaches Horn's Reef.
