fellow of All Souls in 1888. From 1883 to 1889 he was a student of the Inner Temple, but abandoned law for the church and was ordained curate of Leeds parish church in 1890. He was fellow and dean of divinity at Magdalen College, Oxford, from 1893 to 1896, and at the same time vicar of the university church of St. Mary's. In 1896 he became vicar of Portsea, when his success in administering a large working-class parish led in 1901 to his nomination as bishop suffragan of Stepney in the East End of London. In 1908 he was made Archbishop of York. The con- firmation of his appointment was formally opposed on ritualistic grounds by the Protestant Truth Society (see 6.907). He was hon. chaplain to, and a personal friend of, Queen Victoria, and published several religious books, notably The Miracles of Jesus as Marks of the Way of Life (1900) and The Opportunity of the Church of England (1906). He was a member of the royal commission appointed in 1909 to inquire into the law of divorce, and with Sir Lewis Dibdin and Sir William Anson signed the minority report. As Archbishop of the Northern Province he took a conspicuous part in the social and economic, as well as the religious, questions agitating an industrial community, while in the House of Lords his eloquence and clear common-sense gave him an influence not confined to ecclesiastical matters. These same qualities proved of value in a mission which he undertook to the United States in 1918 in connexion with the war.
LANGLE DE CARY, FERNAND LOUIS ARMAND MARIE DE (1849- ), French general, was born at Lorient July 4 1849, entered the St. Cyr military school in 1867 and left at the head of his class in 1869, being commissioned to the Chasseurs d'Afrique. In the war of 1870, having been selected for staff employment, he was orderly officer to Gen. Trochu, commander-in-chief of the Paris forces, and at the last sortie from Paris (Buzenval, Jan. 19 1871) he was severely wounded, and decorated for bravery. In the years of peace his promotion was at first somewhat rapid, but later, owing to his political and religious opinions, it was slow; and though he had become chef de bataillon as early as 1885 it was not till 1900 that he was made a general of brigade, and not till 12 years later that he obtained the membership of the Superior War Council which carried with it the command of an army in war. When the World War broke out in 1914 he was appointed to the IV. Army, which underwent the vicissitudes and final disaster of the battle in the Ardennes; but, unlike Ruffey and Lanrezac, he was not relieved of his command. He continued at the head of this army though its strength was greatly reduced for the benefit of Foch's new IX. Army in the Marne and Aisne operations and in the trench- warfare fighting of 191 s, and in Dec. 1915 was made commander- in-chief of the centre group of armies. In this capacity he became responsible, amongst other duties, for overseeing the defensive readiness of Verdun. Already grave uneasiness existed in the army and in Parliament as to the capacity of Verdun to resist attack. The assurances given by the military authorities only half satisfied public opinion, and when the storm broke over Verdun in Feb. 1916 and the fears that had been expressed proved to be only too well founded, the command was radically reorganized, and Langle, who had already reached the age- limit for retirement, was replaced at the head of the centre group of armies by Petain.
LANGLOIS, HIPPOLYTE (1839-1912), French general (see 16.177), died in Paris Feb. 12 1912.
LANKESTER, SIR EDWIN RAY (1847- ), English biologist, was born in London May 15 1847, eldest son of Edwin Lankester (1814-74), a well-known physician and naturalist and F.R.S. He was educated at St. Paul's school, Downing College, Cam- bridge, and Christ Church, Oxford. In 1870 he was made Radcliffe travelling fellow, and in 1872 was elected to a fellowship at Exeter College, Oxford. During 1874-90 he was professor of zoology and comparative anatomy at University College, Lon- don; from 1891 to 1898 he was Linacre professor of compara- tive anatomy at Oxford; and from 1898 to 1907 he was director of the natural history departments of the British Museum. He was created K.C.B. in 1907. He received hon. degrees from most of the universities of Europe and became a member of many learned societies in England and America. His numerous publi- cations include Comparative Longevity (1871); Degeneration (1880) ; and the more popular Science from an Easy Chair (1910); Diversions of a Naturalist (1915); Science and Education (1919) and Secrets of Earth and Sea (1920).
LANREZAC, CHARLES LOUIS (1852- ), French soldier, was born at Pointe-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe, July 31 1852. Entering the military academy of St. Cyr in 1869, he fought in the latter part of the war of 1870-1 as a sub-lieutenant of infantry. Grad- uating from the Ecole de Guerre (staff college) in 1879, he held in succession various staff and instructional positions, in par- ticular at the Ecole de Guerre during the period in which, under the influence of Maillard, Langlois and Bonnal, the new French doctrine of strategy and tactics was being established. To the furthering of this doctrine Lanrezac himself contributed a study of Napoleon's spring campaign of 1813 (La Manoeuvre de Liitzen), but it was chiefly through his personal methods of instruction that his influence made itself felt. He became colonel in 1902, general of brigade in 1906, general of division in 1911, corps commander in 1912, and finally in April 1914 he succeeded Gallieni as a member of the Conseil Superieur dc la Guerre and commander-designate of the V. Army in case of war.
In this capacity, Lanrezac, as Gallieni had done before him, soon came to the conclusion that the V. Army, on the left of the French line, would be exposed to the weight of a decisive Ger- man attack coming through southern Belgium. But General Joffre and those members of the general staff who, under him, had prepared " Plan No. 17" for the war concentration of the French army, thought otherwise, and when war came at the end of July in the same year, the railway concentration of the army was carried out as planned, without the modifications in the defensive sense that Lanrezac's views, if accepted, would have required. Moreover, the later French doctrine of strategy and tactics, which had sprung up since 1910 and was cham- pioned by the younger school of staff officers, rejected the new Napoleonic theories of Lanrezac's generation, tended to the almost complete exclusion of the defensive as a mode of war, and its advocates were fully prepared to commit the fate of France to the chances of an immediate general offensive in Lorraine and Ardennes. This being presumed to succeed, events beyond the extreme left of Lanrezac's army might be ignored, and his fears might be (and undoubtedly were) put down to his predilection for that defensive-offensive which he had con- stantly taught. The Grand Quartier Gdneral thus began the campaign with a prejudice against Lanrezac's theories of war.
It was not until Aug. 15 that the reality of the danger to the V. Army began to be accepted by Joffre, and measures were taken to bring that army towards Namur and Charleroi; and even then the fact that the greater part of the German striking wing would be W. of the Meuse was not definitely admitted either by Joffre or, for that matter, by Lanrezac himself. Thus the battles of Charleroi and Mons were begun under the most unpromising conditions as regards unity of purpose. Moreover, Lanrezac's own subordinates allowed themselves to be carried away by the doctrine of the offensive, and engaged in a confused battle with Billow's II. Army in the tangle of suburbs and mining villages round Charleroi, in spite of Lanrezac's formal order to stand on the defensive on the open heights S. of the Sambre. And, lastly, tactical liaison with the British on the left and personal liaison with its commander, Sir J. French, were both imperfect. In such circumstances misunderstandings could hardly be cleared up or good relations established either with the distant Grand Quartier General or with French during the unexpected" and trying retreat of the Allied left wing which followed. But Lanrezac, aided by his chief-of-staff General Hely d'Oissel, managed to bring off his army, and so far to restore its normal organization and moral that it was able to take the offensive in the battle of Guise-St. Quentin without support[1] either from the IV. Army on its right or from
- ↑ As regards the British, Sir Douglas Haig, commanding the I. Corps, promised cooperation, but was obliged by orders from Sir John French to withdraw the promise before the battle.
