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LODZ-CRACOW, BATTLES OF
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try Divs. and the ist and nth Landsturm Bdes.). Although it proved possible to repulse all the Russian attacks with the exception of one at Brzesko, where an infantry regiment's position was crushed in and although the Austro-Hungarian troops were offering a most stubborn and enduring resistance, Ljubicic decided, in view of the numerical superiority of the Russians (they had 2 corps, i reserve division and 2 cavalry divisions), to retire on Nov. 24 to Bochnia-Muchowka.

On the N. bank of the Vistula, similarly, no real success was achieved. The E. wing of the IV. Army had certainly obtained some fine results up to this point, but a new situation seemed to have been created on the N. bank of the Vistula by the bringing into action of the Russian XXI. Corps, which made furious onslaughts on the Austro-Hungarian XVII. Corps.

Meanwhile the Russians had apparently intended to break through on the inner wings of the I. and IV. Armies at all costs, but all their attacks were in vain. On the S. wing of the I. Army they threw themselves on the V. and X. Corps' front without any result. Von Arz achieved some minor successes with counter- attacks by the IV. Corps on the N. wing of the IV. Army, but was not able to push through to Skola.

When the Russian III. Army came into action on both banks of the Vistula, and particularly when it advanced against Ljubicic on the S. bank with a force more than twice as strong as his, the right flank of the Austro-Hungarian IV. Army seemed to be dangerously involved. There were already 2 corps fighting against Ljubicic, and 2 divisions of the Russian X. Corps were still coming up. Should Ljubicic be forced to retreat, a reper- cussion on the right wing of the IV. Army was inevitable.

In the meantime Brussilov had pressed hard upon Boroevic's army in its retreat to the Carpathian ridge, and the Russian XXIV. Corps had pushed forward on Homonna.

The danger attaching to Radko Dimitriev's advance led the Austro-Hungarian Higher Command to decide definitely on a new plan of operations. Ljubicic's group was in no case to be exposed to a check, but was to yield gradually to the Russian pressure and fall back on the last-prepared position Wieliczka, Dobczyce and the Kamienik height. In accordance with this retreat the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was to take back Kritek's (i7th) and Roth's (i4th) groups, which were heavily engaged on the right wing, and Arz's group was to refuse its flank. The consequent shortening of the IV. Army's front, however, enabled Kritek's group to move back to the S. bank of the Vistula, thus placing Ljubicic's group in a position to offer an obstinate resistance on the line mentioned.

Up to this point the decision had been sought N. of the Vistula, but Conrad von Hotzendorf, whose one anxiety had been to resume the offensive, now planned a blow to be delivered from the S. against the left flank of that part of the Russian III. Army which was advancing against Ljubicic.

This flank attack was to be carried out by the XIV. Corps (3rd and 8th Infantry Divs.), the i3th Landwehr Infantry Div. and the German 47th Reserve Div. (Lt.-Gen. von Besser) from the Mszana-Tymbark area in the direction of Bochnia. The Austro-Hungarian formations were brought up by train from the IV. Army supply area through Cracow and Sucha to Cha- bowka. The 4yth Reserve Div. came up by train to Cracow from the western theatre of war. Further, the orders issued by the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command contained instructions to General von Woyrsch to prevent any withdrawal of troops from the Russian IV. Army front opposed to him, and to associate himself with the attack just begun by Mackensen on Lodz and Lowicz, as soon as the German division should have arrived on the field from the western front.

The Austro-Hungarian I. Army was to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Under its command were placed the left wing of the IV. Army, Arz's group with the isth and 2 7th Infan- try Divs., and also the Honved infantry div.

The IV. Army was to give way before the Russian pressure and be drawn back gradually to the ring of forts round Cracow. Ljubicic's group, to which Kritek's Corps (the XVII.) was to be added, went to its command area with Nagy's cavalry group.

On Nov. 25 the whole IV. Army front and Ljubicifi's group were sharply engaged, and on the 26th Ljubicic, to avoid expos- ing his group to the approaching great Russian attack, retired to the line Niepolomice-Szarow-Gdow-Dobczyce, the nth Infan- try Div. being hard pressed by the Russians in the retreat.

The IX. Army also began its retreat on Nov. 26, but without being molested by the Russians. Even the XVII. Corps, on the right wing, reached the W. bank of the Kosielniki brook, N. of Niepolomice, without interference, and was able to begin placing its reserves on the S. bank of the Vistula during the night.

On the 27th the Russian pursuit began to make itself felt. Vigorous attacks were made on Ljubicic's centre and N. wing, and he retired before them by order of the IV. Army Command to the prepared position near Cracow: Rybitwy-Prokocim- Soboniowice-Siepraw-Kamicnik-Lubien. By the evening of the 27th the entire XVII. Corps had arrived on Ljubicic's right wing.

North of the Vistula the IV. Army had by the evening of the 28th come in behind the ring of forts.

To the S. of Ljubicic's group, in the meantime, Nagy was to have repulsed a Russian cavalry corps concentrated at Neu Sandec. As, however, the loth Cavalry Div. was involved in difficult fighting on Ljubicic's right wing, Nagy could not get his whole force together and had to limit himself to obstructing a possible Russian line of advance at Tymbark with the 6th and nth Cavalry Divs., a group of the Polish volunteer legion and 2 Landsturm battalions. But, on being attacked there by infantry detachments and the Russian cavalry corps in superior numbers on Nov. 27, he withdrew to a strong position, which he was able to hold, on the Dobra heights. During the retreat of the IV. Army the io6th Infantry Div., and ist and nth Landsturm Bdes., as well as the 45th Landwehr Infantry Div., were drawn in to reenforce^ the fortress garrison, while the German 47th Reserve Div. was detraining at Cracow. On the left wing of the IV. Army the VI. Corps, between Kosciol and Zieloniki, formed a link with the I. Army. One brigade of this corps came to Olkusz behind the right wing of the I. Army. On Nov. 28, the XIV. Corps sent off the i3th Landwehr Infantry Division.

The Russian III. and IX. Armies made their way slowly and cautiously up to the ring of forts, coming to a halt N. of the Vistula in an arc from Niepolomice by Point 3 20 (W. of Wierbzno) , and Michalowice to Skala. South of the Vistula the Russian XI. and IX. Corps were pursuing Ljubicic's group.

Meanwhile, on the Austro-Hungarian I. Army's front, the N. wing of the Russian IX. Army and the IV. Army had been fairly quiet, whereas Woyrsch's and Bohm's armies went through some fierce fighting in connexion with Mackensen's army.

On Nov. 26 the N. wing of the Austro-Hungarian II. Army (Hauer's cavalry corps) had attacked in the direction of Szczer- czow, in order to relieve Mackensen's right wing, which was fighting at Wola Wiezowa. At the same time the IV. and XII. Corps of this army were fighting hard, on both sides of the road leading from Dzialoszyn to Nowo-Radomsk on the line Koscielec- Struza, against the Russian Grenadier Corps and XVI. Corps.

Hauer's attack and the advance of the German general reserve brigade, to the N. of it, were successful. Hauer's cavalry drove the Russians out of the Sosnia hollow, and the general reserve brigade took possession of Nowa Wies and Leczyska. But on the arrival of Russian reenforcements the attack came to a standstill before Szczerczow.

The Russians, who were concerned above all to prevent Mackensen's S. wing and the Austro-Hungarian II. Army from advancing on Piotrkow and Nowo-Radomsk respectively, had actually detrained 2 new divisions (7th and loth Infantry Divs.) and set them on the march towards Belchatow as became known from a captured report. In view of these reenforcements, which threatened the N. wing of the II. Army, Woyrsch and Bohm had to divert some of their forces towards the north. The i6th Infantry Div. of the XII. Corps which was replaced by the 35th Reserve Div. was withdrawn from the front and sent to Brzeznica on the Nowo-Radomsk road under the protection of the Austro-Hungarian 35th Infantry Div. The main force of the IV. Corps remained in its position N. of this road, but 11 bat-