On Aug. 29 1916 Hindenburg was made chief of the general staff of the whole army, and Ludendorff, who had been advanced to the rank of general of infantry, remained in closest association with him, as chief quartermaster-general. The tale of his work in conjunction with Hindenburg, of his successes and failures, be- longs to the military history of the World War. In particular his name will always be associated with the great German offen- sive of the spring and summer of 1918 and with the collapse of that brilliant and audacious enterprise, followed by the disastrous German retreat, the overtures for an armistice and the dissolu- tion of Germany's military power. Ludendorff 's attitude towards the Government of Germany and his repeated political inter- ventions form a very important chapter in the events which led up to the German collapse in the autumn of 1918. The motives of his political action are clearly revealed in his book Meine Kriegserinnerungen (1919). He maintains that he never desired to interfere in internal politics. He even complains in his book that successive chancellors and ministers forced him and Hindenburg into a false position by constantly adducing their approval for ministerial measures. The truth is that the whole German system, especially in time of war and in the absence of a commanding political personality like Bismarck, inevitably led to encroachments of military influence. Ludendorff denies that he brought about the fall of Bethmann Hollweg; but he was in communication with those leaders of parties whose views approximated to his own, and, after the Crown Prince, who was also in frequent communication with him, had seen the political leaders and had satisfied himself that they would offer no objec- tion, the Emperor accepted his Chancellor's resignation. Luden- dorff asserts in his book that he did his best to keep on terms with successive Imperial Chancellors. But he recalls that the machin- ery of the Government worked slowly, while he and his officers at the front were full of ardour and eagerness. There was often a delay of weeks in getting urgent things done, " and thus," he says, " the tone of communications between the front and Berlin sometimes became stern (hart)." In another place he speaks of " the struggle with the Government to obtain what the army required in order to achieve a final and decisive victory." Of Count Herding he says, " Herding was no War Chancellor." The kind of War Chancellor Ludendorff would have liked is revealed in his exclamation of despair: " Who was going to be Imperial Chancellor after the Emperor had repeatedly declared against Prince Billow and Grand Adml. Tirpitz ? " Ludendorff seemed to forget that the country, as represented by the majority, of the Reichstag, would have none of either of these candidates and that the Emperor, in addition to being himself alienated from Billow, was becoming more and more dependent upon public opinion and more and more afraid of it. Ludendorff, on the other hand, whenever he refers to the Reichstag or to the leaders of parties, shows that in his conception their business was to rouse patriotic feeling in the country and to get the masses into a mood which would make them support the military leaders' conduct of the war through thick and thin. Thus he pointed out to the politicians of the Reichstag in July 1917 that the so-called Peace Resolution would have a depressing effect throughout Germany, and that in enemy countries it would produce an impression of German weakness. Perhaps he was right. In any case it was impossible for the Allied and Associated Powers to be content with the status quo ante; and the German supporters of the Resolution themselves departed from the principle of " no annexations and no indemnities " whenever successes of the German arms encouraged them to believe that Germany might be able to make more advantageous terms. Instances of this were the Peace of Brest Litovsk and the Peace with Rumania. In the negotiations for the first of these Ludendorff was impatient of Count Czernin's Austrian policy as regards Poland, and he desired the extension of German territory and influence on her eastern frontiers both as a military precaution and as a defence against the spread of Bolshevism.
In pursuance of his idea of improving the spirit of the army, Ludendorff caused to be organized under the superintendence of a Lieut. -Col. Nicolai a scheme for giving what was called " patriotic
instruction " to the soldiers at the front. The services of a large number of invalided officers and others were enlisted to carry out this scheme. It ultimately developed in many instances into a' system of espionage upon the political opinions of the soldiers, and the removal of Nicolai and other officers who were engaged in this work was one of the demands which the leaders of the major- ity in the Reichstag had put forward when, in Oct. 1918, they compelled the Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, to break with Ludendorff and to bring about his resignation. Ludendorff had further attempted to extend his system of " patriotic instruction " to the interior of the country through the medium of the generals in command of the reserve corps formations. This home propa- ganda brought him and his subordinates into conflict with the Social Democrats, who were daily strengthening their hold upon the masses and were influencing them in favour of a " peace by understanding." The Independent Socialists were going still farther and were agitating in the trenches and on the ships of the navy for a military strike, such as actually took place at Kiel in the first week of Nov. 1918 as a prelude to the German Revolution. There were similar demonstrations at various points on the western front, where new recruits abused regi- ments going into action as " strike-breakers " and " black- legs."
The most debated episode of Ludendorff's career is his action on Sept. 30 and Oct. i 1918 in pressing upon the Government the immediate necessity of making overtures for an armistice. The view of the German republicans is that the retreating Ger- man armies on the western front were on the brink of a great disaster, that Hindenburg and Ludendorff were aware of this, and that they urged the necessity of an armistice in order to escape the worst. Ludendorff's contention amounts to a plea that he wanted an armistice on reasonable terms in order to enable the German army to be withdrawn to the frontier, where it might have time to reconstitute itself if necessary, with a view to resisting oppressive terms of peace by standing on the de- fensive. He seems to imply that he did not realize that neither the Allied Powers nor President Wilson would have agreed to an armistice of this kind. When Ludendorff saw the kind of terms which the Allied and Associated Powers were going to impose, he changed his attitude and desired the German Government to hold out. He had also, he says, formed the conviction by the end of Sept. that the Allied and Associated Powers were not in a posi- tion to press home an immediate and decisive attack. It was mainly the attempt to urge his changed views upon the Govern- ment of Prince Max of Baden that led to that Government's insistence upon Ludendorff's resignation being accepted by the Emperor on Oct. 26 1918. The immediate occasion of what amounted to his dismissal was a General Army Order, which had been issued on Oct. 24, informing the troops that President Wilson's final terms for an armistice were dishonourable to Ger- many and that the army must fight to the last gasp. This order was contrary to what Ludendorff knew to be the policy of his Government and he finds it necessary in his book to make excuses for having caused it to be promulgated. It was really as far back as Aug. 8 1918, as Ludendorff himself testifies, that he had lost confidence in the possibility of compelling the Allies by military pressure to accept what they would have regarded as a " German peace. " After the German lines between the Somme and the Luce had been broken through by the British on Aug. 8, he had a conference (on Aug. 13) in the presence of the Emperor with the then Foreign Secretary, Adml. von Hintze, and advised over- tures for peace, which Hintze proposed to initiate through the mediation of the Queen of Holland. According to Ludendorff, it was the delay of the Government in prosecuting these overtures that had made him impatient at the end of Sept. when he urged the immediate necessity of an armistice. It has even been alleged that in Aug. 1918 Ludendorff, under the influence of events at the front, had had a complete nervous breakdown.
As a military organizer and resourceful man of action in the field, Ludendorff has, perhaps, had no equal since Napoleon. He did not, however, possess Napoleon's insight into the necessities of domestic politics, while he shared Napoleon's inability, under
