election held in Dec. 1914 having resulted in almost a dead heat between the parties, a Reform-Liberal coalition was effected for the purposes of the war, with Mr. Massey as Prime Minister and Sir Joseph Ward, the Liberal leader, as Finance Minister. The national Government thus formed lasted throughout the war, and on its dissolution by the Liberals in Aug. 1919 Mr. Massey formed a new Reform party Cabinet. At the general election in the following Dec. he scored a decisive victory, due in a large measure to the very difficult position forced upon him at short notice by the dissolution of the Coalition. He was still in power at the close of 1921.
The portfolios held by Mr. Massey in his first two administra- tions as Prime Minister included those of Lands, Agriculture, Labour, Industries and Commerce, and Imperial Government Supplies. On Sir James Allen's retirement in 1920 he became Minister of Finance, holding also the portfolio of Mines and Railways. Besides enabling and encouraging the country to throw its whole weight into the war, Mr. Massey rendered im- portant service by representing it at the Imperial War Cabinet and War Conference meetings of 1917 and 1918, at the Peace Conference in 1919, and at the Imperial Conference of 1921. At the Peace Conference he faithfully represented the sentiment of New Zealand in pleading for the retention of German Samoa in British hands, and in his uncompromising attitude on the indemnities and reparations to be exacted from Germany. The energy which he displayed in securing the Dominion a share in the valuable phosphates of Nauru I. was also much appreciated. Mr. Massey did valuable work as the second British representa- tive on the Commission on Responsibilities for War and the Enforcement of Penalties, and as president of the sub-committee on Facts and chairman of the Drafting Committee.
He married in 1882 Christina (C.B.E. 1919), daughter of Walter Paul of Auckland, and had three sons (of whom Maj. F. G. Massey served in the war and won the M.C. and D.S.O.) and two daughters. He became a Privy Councillor in 1913, a freeman of London, Edinburgh and five other British cities, and hon. LL.D. of Cambridge and Edinburgh universities.
(A. R. A.)
MASTERS, EDGAR LEE (1868- ), American writer, was born at Garnett, Kan., Aug. 23 1868. At the age of 21 he entered Knox College, 111., but left after one year to read law in his father's office. He was admitted to the bar in 1891 and practised thereafter in Chicago. For several years he was associated with Clarence S. Darrow, known as counsel for labour leaders. He was a member of the National Institute of Art and Letters. The book that first brought him public notice was Spoon River Anthology, published in 1915, an extraordinary collection of epitaphs on members, in all walks of life, of a mid-western town. Within three years 50,000 copies were sold. Like much of the modern " realistic " literature it over-emphasizes pathological accidents and ignores the sane and permanent essence of life.
His other works include: The New Star Chamber, and Other Essays (1904) ; Blood of the Prophets (1905) ; Songs and Satires (1916) ; The Great Valley (1916); Toward the Gulf (1918); Starved Rock (1919); Domesday Book (1920) and Mitch Miller (1920); The Open Sea (1921); besides several plays, Maximilian (1902); Althea (1907); The Trifler (1908); The Locket (1910); and The Bread of Idleness (1911).
MASURIA, BATTLES IN, 1914-5.—The district of East Prussia known as Masuria, which practically coincides with the sickle-shaped region of lakes that rules the geography of the province, was the scene of several great battles in 1914 and the first half of 1915. For the reasons discussed under EASTERN EUROPEAN FRONT CAMPAIGNS (Part I.), the lake region was not so much a battle-ground itself as a barrier behind which the Germans could either resist with inferior numbers or manoeuvre for decisive battle at one or both extremities of it. In certain circumstances, the barrier itself could not only passively but actively contribute to the manceuvre, owing to its having sally- ports at Lotzen and elsewhere. Simple resistance was the func- tion of the barrier only in Oct. and Nov. 1914, when the Germans in East Prussia had to gain time, by defence with minimum forces, for a decision to be fought out in Poland. In other circumstances
it played its part in great offensive manoeuvres, and these German offensives Tannenberg in Aug. 1914, the " Masurian Lakes " in Sept. 1914, and the " Masurian Winter Battle " in Feb. 1915 form the subject of the present article.
I. TANNENBERG
As narrated under EASTERN EUROPEAN FRONT CAMPAIGNS (Part II.), the indecisive battle of Gumbinnen, N. of the lakes, combined with the oncoming of the Russian II. Army W. of them, led to a crisis in which the evacuation of the entire prov- ince by the German VIII. Army was only prevented by the ap- pointment of General-Oberst von Hindenburg, with Maj. -Gen. Ludendorff as his chief of staff, to retrieve the compromised situation by battle. The contemplated offensive had as its object the defeat of the Russian II. Army of Samsonov at or within the western extremity of the lakes, before the Russian I. Army of Rennenkampf, only momentarily checked at Gumbin- nen, could pass beyond their northern extremity, isolate Konigsberg, and flood the interior of East Prussia, without further regard to the defensive barrier. It ended in a success that was all the more brilliant because of its unpromising beginnings, and all the more inspiring to German patriotism as the name and locality of the battle recalled the historic defeat of the Teuton by the Slav in 1410 (see 21.905). Tfyus, it was natural, not only that Hindenburg should become at once the national hero of Germany, but also that a host of legends should arise in connection with the battle.
The most picturesque and therefore most widespread of these legends is that of the Russians being driven into the lakes which Hindenburg had personally reconnoitred in peace-time, with a view to such an operation, but though it is difficult to find the seed of this legend in any incidents of the battle, the magnitude of the success and the apparently perfect precision with which the plan was carried into execution undoubtedly lent weight to the idea that the scheme was long premeditated. In one sense this was true. The idea of double envelopment had penetrated throughout the German army since von Schlieffen had set up " Cannae " as the model. The manceuvre on interior lines behind the lake barrier was suggested, and even imposed, by geography. And in one at least of the numerous " war-games " in which the German general staff tried out the alternative types of defence against Russian invasion from the S., the map operations ran a course which was generally similar to that of the battle. It was not surprising, therefore, that the idea occurred both to Luden- dorff on his way from the western front and to the staff officers on the spot before the new commander and chief of staff arrived. At any rate, the proposal was at once made by the former and accepted by the latter. But the difficulty lay in the execution, and in reality, as will be seen, the battle was a series of changing situations which demanded ever new dispositions on the part of the Germans. These dispositions were throughout inspired by the same idea " Cannae " and restricted by the same unknown factor Rennenkampf.
On Aug. 23 General Samsonov's II. Army consisting of the VI., XIII., XV., and XXIII. Corps, one rifle brigade and three cavalry divisions, to which a few days later was added the I. Corps was within Prussian territory at and near the line Soldau-Neidenburg-Ortelsburg, with cavalry farther W. on the Lautenburg and Strassburg routes. To the E., the II. Corps, nominally of Samsonov's army, really 'acting in liaison with Rennenkampf, was advancing from Bobr by Grajevo to face the E. front of the lake barrier. Rennenkampf, for his part, was still on the Gumbinnen battlefield expecting a new battle on the line of the Angerapp and the northern lakes. Samsonov had disposed his four (five) corps in order from right to left, VI., XIII., XV., XXIII. (I.), with the right echeloned forward on Ortelsburg (in the hope of obtaining liaison with the II. Corps of Rennenkampf 's command), and the left kept back (in the face of a German offensive from the Vistula). His advance was slow and methodical, averaging perhaps 5 m. a day, and at every halt a position was entrenched, as national temperament and the experiences of the Manchurian War dictated. Opposed to
