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FINLAND
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is true, a Swedish branch of the Social Democratic party and also a number of purely Swedish capitalists, yet on the whole the Swedish element was bourgeois and its desire for independence economic since it foresaw the inevitable bankruptcy of Russia.

The Social Democrats, on the other hand, saw in Russia the pos- sible social revolution and intended to go faster than any Miliukov or even Kerensky. Under such conditions the Diet which assembled on April 5 could do as little as the cumbrous governing body of six Social Democrats and six bourgeois representatives.

As far as the Swedish party was concerned, conciliatory relations were to be maintained with Russia until the Peace Conference, but the party congress which was held in May made it clear that in- dependence was the final aim. Even before that the Hufoudstadt- bladet argued that nothing short of complete independence suited the country's needs, and the Finnish Government in the Diet solemnly proclaimed that such was its policy. But this Diet, containing 80 % of Social Democrats, 12 % of Old and Young Finns, 6 % Swedes and 2 % Agrarian labourers, the bourgeois did not consider to be truly representative of the nation, on the ground that, at the time of its election in 1916, most people still boycotted the Diet by way of protest against Russian manipulation of the elections; it was only the Socialists who never gave up the class war.

The struggle between the Provisional Russian Government and the Finnish Diet crystallized around the declaration which was embodied in what became known as the " Law of July 18 1917." In this, the Diet resolved that it alone decided, confirmed and put into practice all laws of Finland, including those relating to home affairs, taxation and customs. It made the final decision regarding all other Finnish affairs which the Emperor-Grand Duke decided according to the arrangements hitherto in force, though the provision of this law expressly stated that it did not apply to matters of foreign policy, to military legislation and military administration. The Diet was to meet for regular sittings without special summons and to decide when these were to be closed. Until Finland's new form of govern- ment was determined, the Diet was to exercise the right of deciding upon new elections and its dissolution. It asserted its control over the executive power in Finland which was, for the present, to be exercised by the economic department of the Finnish Senate whose members were to be nominated and dismissed by the Diet. This law reflected the standpoint of the Social Democratic majority of the Diet which demanded complete internal and economic freedom for the country, but was always ready to recognize Russia's supremacy in military matters and in foreign policy. The radical group of the Swedish Popular party, aiming further, proposed the following amendment:" The Diet, which regards it as its right and duty to demand full independence in the name of the Finnish people and reserves in this respect its full freedom of action, resolves, etc." This amendment, however, was rejected by 125 votes to 63, but the motion of the main committee not to submit the new law to the Provisional Russian Government for its sanction was passed by 104 votes to 86. An address was, however, forwarded to the Russian Provisional Government, in which it was expounded that, Finland having always been in relation with the Tsars of Russia but not with any Russian Government, the overthrow of Tsardom had automat- ically set the country free.

The Russian Provisional Government met this explanation by passing a resolution at the end of July, declaring that under no cir- cumstances would it consent to the separation ofFinland from Rus- sia, wherefore it dissolved the Diet and ordered new elections for the beginning of October. The Finnish Diet, however, in its turn, dis- puted the Russian Provisional Government's right to exercise the prerogative of dissolution, and a deadlock ensued!

Pourparlers in Aug. between the Gov.-Gen. Stakoyich and the Finnish leaders proved of no avail, although the Russian Federalist Congress in session at Petrograd on the I7th and i8th of that month sought " to work out a basis upon which the Federalists could unite and then prepare for the elections to a Constituent Assembly." Thus the plan for a republic of all the Russias guaranteed autonomy in everything but matters relating to a whole and united Russia.

But it was precisely that which the Finns did not want, anxious as they all were, regardless of party, to avoid taking any part in Russian affairs. Even the Socialists, willing as they were to concede the con- trol of foreign policy and the conduct of military affairs to the larger Power, yet met any kind of representation upon any sort of Russian governing body with a categorical refusal.

In its domestic policy the Social Democratic majority of this Diet was similarly averse to any comprehensive measures of collective reorganization pending events in Russia. Thus the capitalist de- velopment of the country was allowed to follow its course. The reform bills passed in recent years and held up by the Tsar were passed en bloc, among these the total prohibition of alcohol and the eight-hour day. The municipal councils were democratized and a war bonus was added to the wage of all workers, part being paid by the State and part by the employer. The fixing of maximum prices for food and the control of the supply of fuel, bread, milk, sugar and butter were merely the extension of the work initiated by the pre-revolutionary Senate.

Such action, however, did not strike at the root of the evil, for it was easy to see that a famine threatened the country. Nothing was done to avert it save that large quantities of grain were pur-

chased from America which, owing to difficulties of transit, could not be delivered until starvation and civil war menaced Finland. From about March 1917 to Feb. 1918 there was a veritable strike mania; every trade, every municipal body, every committee even, flung down its job and the Diet and the Senate alike were unable to cope with the situation. The long printers' strike brought it about that from the beginning of July to the middle of Aug. no Moderate papers appeared, though the Social Democrat journals continued to be published. The trouble lay in the dilatoriness of the Russian Provi- sional Government in confirming the measures passed by the Diet and the Senate which had been hung up by the Tsar since 1910. The All-Russian Congress of Workers and Soldiers, which was already under Bolshevist influence, had met early in July and urged the Provisional Government to grant full autonomy to Finland and all executive power to the Diet, which action gained it the sympathy of the Finnish Socialists. A " general strike " was called for against the wishes of Tokoi and Manner, and the Diet was to reassemble de- spite the threats of the governor-general that its doors would be guarded and sealed. After two or three days of disturbances, this ill-considered move collapsed, but the Russian Provisional Govern- ment proposing that the economy department of the Finnish Senate should have the supreme power, Tokoi dissolved the governing body composed of six Social Democrats and six Bourgeois representatives because it was too evenly balanced for effective administrative work. Thereupon the Socialist senators resigned while the Moder- ates were induced to form a Senate. This was regrettable, as the Russian Provisional Government now gave way, and on Aug. 24 ratified a number of the reform measures passed by the Diet and Senate between 1911 and 1914. A day later the Moscow conference, under Menshevik influence, expressed its desire to retain all power over Finland which the restored constitution allowed.

Meanwhile the failure of the general strike and the appointment of Nekrasov as governor-general in place of Stakovich influenced the elections for the Diet which, completed by Oct. 2 1917, proved a setback to the Social Democrats and caused the Old and Young Finns, the Swedes and the Agrarians to form a Moderate bloc of 1 08 members. The absorbing controversy, whether the Senate (through its economy department) was to hold the supreme power or the Diet, was settled on Nov. 15 by Alkio, the leader of the Agra- rians, in favour of the latter, and on Nov. 28 a Moderate Senate of eleven members was elected. Still, however, nothing was done to increase the food production. Though countered by the Moderate coalition, the Social Democrats were still the strongest individual party in the House, and would have had the bulk of the people behind them if they had been able to seize and nationalize the land. The economic conditions, beyond a doubt, rendered this task very difficult, for in Finland, as in Russia, the cultivation of the soil was carried on individually and the transfer to the State would have been a delicate operation.

The Bolshevist advent to power in Russia between Nov. 4 and 15 1917 deepened the pro- Russian sympathies of the Finnish Social Democrats who had been alienated by Kerensky's equivocal policy, while the bourgeois parties, arguing that there was now no settled government in Russia, desired complete independence. On Dec. 6 1917 the Diet and the now bourgeois Senate drew up a very old- fashioned declaration of independence which, however, historically marks the birth of Finnish freedom. As the Socialists still sought an understanding with Russia, the bourgeois bloc, which governed the situation since it had furnished the new administration at the begin- ning of the month, acting with great haste sent the declaration to Sweden and Germany at once. Both these Powers replied that Finland must first obtain full recognition of her independence from Russia. The Diet then decided to approach the Constituent Assembly in Russia through a friendly manifesto which explained that the assertion of independence was not a hostile act and that a joint committee would settle outstanding questions so that Russia could proceed with her war without fear of trouble from Finland. But as the Constituent Assembly was not allowed to meet, the Finnish Senate finally appealed to the Bolshevist Government and was informed on Jan. 4 1918 that the steps taken conformed with the policy and programme of the Bolshevists. Immediately afterwards the Swedish Government recognized the independence of Finland and was followed by the other Scandinavian countries. Recognition by France preceded recognition by Germany.

The Finnish Civil War Feb. May igi8. At this time the social and economic differences between the political parties were too deep to admit of an easy settlement. The possessing classes, that is to say primarily the Swedo-Finn and Finno-Finn bourgeoisie, but espe- cially the first-named rather than see the wealth amassed during three years of the World War taken from them by the rising Social Democrats, were jeopardizing the newly won independence, now by intrigues which aimed at the cession of the Aland Is. to Sweden, now by manoeuvres which tended to set Finland under the heel of Ger- many. The Moderate bloc to which the Swedo-Finns adhered was anyhow determined to break away from Russia, and its leaders openly discussed the chances of union with Sweden on the one hand and the adoption of some German prince as grand duke on the other.

Apart from that, there were some Finnish contractors who had allowed the Russian Government credit for the provision of war material, food and clothing, and did not desire to incur the loss