Hindenburg implored General von Arz to arrange for an im- mediate offensive by the Austro-Hungarian armies in Italy, to relieve the German army in its difficult decisive battle. After some hesitation Arz replied on March 27 that he would rally all the means at his disposal and deliver a blow against Italy at the end of May which should completely break her.
Germany was thus left to carry out the decisive battle on French soil on her own resources. There were three enemies to be reckoned with: England, France and America. The British had borne the chief burden of the fighting during the latter half of 1917, when the great battle in Flanders had towered over all other events in significance. In spite of the lost ground in the Ypres sector, and the unavoidably heavy loss in fighting power, it could in the end be registered as a German victory in so far as the English had failed to achieve their strategic aim, the destruc- tion of the German submarine base in Flanders. For the estima- tion of future prospects, at least as important as this happy issue was the apparent failure of the British attack system with its unreserved employment of masses in a battle of materiel, and its methodical conduct of the offensive as a series of thoroughly prepared attacks with objectives limited in space and, once chosen, rigidly adhered to. It was believed that this system revealed a lack of capacity for operative manoeuvring inherent in British leadership and in the British army. The tank battle at Cambrai in Nov. was looked upon as a further proof of this. Should the Germans succeed in bringing about a war of movement again in the west, their conviction was that they would prove themselves superior to the British.
Contrasted with the powerful effort that the British had put forth to gain the victory in Flanders, the ends for which their French allies were striving in the second half of 1917, after the failure of the great Aisne offensive, were apparently more modest. The local attacks to which they confined themselves at Verdun and later in the Laffaux corner turned out favourably for them, it is true, and inflicted considerable losses on the Germans. But on the whole their cautious strategy led to the deduction that the moral depression of the French nation and the army, which had set in after the battle of the Aisne, and was not hidden from the Germans, had not been overcome. Not that the German Com- mand was likely to regard the spirit of France as permanently paralysed; on the contrary it was considered certain that the French army, in the following spring, would enter the struggle for final victory completely refreshed and stronger than before. In comparison with England she was the militarily stronger op- ponent, more skilled in strategy and tactics, and more dangerous.
When it had to be decided upon which of the two the German blow was next to fall, a success over the British therefore sug- gested itself as being more easily and certainly obtainable. Added to this there was the consideration decisive from a political standpoint that the principal enemy, England, would probably be more inclined for peace when she herself had suffered a crush- ing defeat. In this respect the estimated value of the respective opponents had altered considerably from that made by Falken- hayn, which had passed muster two years earlier. The war in which England was fighting with her own forces on the European continent was, since the battle of the Somme, no longer a " side show." She was, on the contrary, now conducting it with all her available forces, with the utmost tenacity and with her own wea- pons. For the rest it might be assumed that when the German " hammer blow " fell on the one enemy, the other would not stand idly looking on, but would either directly assist his ally or proceed to a relief offensive. One hammer blow would not suffice. A general battle was therefore launched. Ludendorff dwelt on this in making his report to the Kaiser on Feb. 13 1918 at Schloss Homburg, when he said:
" The battle in the west which the year 1918 will bring presents the biggest military problem ever set before an army. France and England have grappled with it in vain fora years. . . . It must not be imagined that we are going to have another such offensive as in Galicia or Italy. It will be a stupendous struggle, beginning in one place and continuing in another, and will take up a long time."
As regards the relative strengths of the two sides, the German High Command cherished no illusions as to any marked numerical
superiority for their own forces. The strength of the German army in the west was brought up to 194 divisions by the addition of divisions brought up from the eastern and Italian theatres. The Entente forces in France in Feb. 1918 were estimated at 167 divisions. If the n French-English divisions in Italy, which were easily available, were added to these, there remained only a slight superiority in the number of divisions on the German side. In artillery the German western army was not even quite as strong as its opponents. Ludendorff based his decision on the theory that the totals of the two fighting forces would balance each other. A factor which counted for much with the Germans was the physical condition of the army. An offensive attack best suited the character of the nation and the tradition and training of the troops. It was the more powerful form of warfare. Ger- many owed to it all her previous tangible successes. The ordinary citizen could see, through all his heartfelt longing for peace, that his efforts could only be rewarded when Germany had overthrown her enemies. Here and there, it is true, the same disintegrating influences which were undermining the war spirit at home could be seen at work in the army. But the influence of the good ele- ments, which far outweighed the rest, stamped the whole as an excellent body of men. Their " will to win " was not indeed inspired purely by victory for its own sake. The attack was longed for also as a deliverance from the terrible battering which they had endured for years with resignation and with courage.
It now became supremely important to find out the precise moment at which the American forces would actively intervene. In a review of the situation drawn up by the German Supreme Command in the winter of 1917-81! was stated:
" The United States are forming an army of about 50 divisions, of which three only have as yet landed in France. One of tin at the front to be trained. The two others are in need of more training behind the front. By the spring of 1918 the American forces in France may reach a strength of about 15 divisions. The mass of the divisions will only be suitable for use on quiet fronts. Only the 3 divisions now in France may be expected to take part in a spring offensive. The corps of officers is not yet trained for war on a large scale. On these grounds the independent use of large American units in difficult positions will be out of the question at present. The drafting of reserves and the arming and equipment of the American troops are good. Training is still inadequate. But the first regiment put in at the front fought well during a German attack, and it is therefore to be expected that the American soldier, after more training and experience, will prove himself a worthy opponent."
In another calculation, made in Dec. 1917, the Supreme Command estimated the whole of the American forces that had been landed in France up to the spring at 450,000 men at most. A larger number was not to be expected on account of the lack of shipping for transport. The mass of this army could not be ready for an attack by the spring of 1918. The value of the Americans at first would therefore lie in their power to set free English- French divisions on quiet fronts. As a matter of fact this calcula- tion of the American strength was too generous. The total number of Americans landed in France up to the end of March 1918 has been stated by the American Secretary of War at just under 370,000. Of these only 144,000 were included in the 5 fighting divisions. The fact that the Germans did not at once realize the full extent of the increase in American transports, from April onward, in response to the urgent demands of England and France, does not actually affect their review of the situation at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918. When Hindenburg and Ludendorff resolved on the decisive attack they were entitled to hope for so crushing a victory over the English and the French by beginning operations early that the palm of victory could not be snatched from them again even by very considerable masses of American troops, whose intervention would only become effective in the later war of movement. Supposing as a basis for the actual starting-point of the offensive the Germans to be in possession of the line Doullens-Amiens by the beginning of April, which was within the realm of possibility, the annihilation of the British army might be completed within that month. Meanwhile the battle against the French would have broken out in full force. During the months of May and June a decisive defeat had to be inflicted on them also. If that succeeded, the
