the whole defensive position in the Argonne and toward Verdun. A shortening of the German position from Chateau-Thierry through Chalons to St. Mihiel would have been infinitely valuable.
On the other hand the 44-m. front required such large forces to occupy it that, contrary to the original intention, it was necessary to fall back on some of the divisions set aside for the Hagen attack in rear of the Rupprecht group's front. The in- evitable consequence was the postponement of the date pro- visionally fixed for the Flanders attack to the beginning of August. Also the preparations for the combined Marneschutz-Reims attack proved so extensive and took up so much time that the date had to be put forward to July 15 at the cost of preserving secrecy. Once more the execution depended upon surprise.
Through carelessness and treachery the German plans became known to Foch to a great extent during the first half of July. He had found time for adequate preparation of his defence, which was skilfully adapted to meet the German conduct of the attack. In this way the offensive in the case of the I. and III. Armies came to a standstill everywhere in front of the French main position. The VII. Army succeeded, after a successful crossing of the Marne, in shattering the main line of defence in several places. But here, too, far-reaching results were unob- tainable. On July 15 the German Supreme Command ordered the cessation of the attack for the III. Army, and on the i6th refused to allow the I. Army to continue after an attempt had proved vain. The VII. Army continued to advance with great difficulty until July 17 in some places. The offensive blow had in fact completely failed, because it fell upon an enemy who was not taken by surprise but was prepared to offer a resistance as obstinate as it was skilled.
Ludendorff lost no time in drawing his conclusions from the unexpected turn in the general situation, and immediately ordered the withdrawal of the right attacking wing of the VII. Army behind the Marne. He was determined to regroup his forces with all possible speed for the Hagen attack in Flanders. Hardly had the necessary steps been taken, however, when, on the morning of July 18, Foch's flank attack fell on the insuffi- ciently supported W. front of the VII. and IX. Armies. Owing to the disproportionate initial success of this attack, the execu- tion of the Hagen attack had to give place to the pressing neces- sity of putting fresh forces into the VII. Army and bringing it back behind the Vesle. This was the turning point in the conduct of the war in 1918, and at the same time in the whole of the World War. The German offensive had met first with a sudden interruption, then with its final close, owing to the initiative of the opponent. From this time onward the German Supreme Army Command was subject to the strategical law of the enemy.
If we pass in review the many plans of attack entertained by the German Supreme Command the Flanders attack, for in- stance, was, if circumstances permitted, to be followed by an of- fensive on Paris or Amiens the impression is easily formed that the leader of the German operations was no longer pursuing a definite operative aim, as at the beginning of the spring offensive and for some time afterward, but had as his sole object the shat- tering of the enemy by independent hammer-blows delivered one after another at tactically advantageous points. But all these hammer-blows represented not the end but the means by which the final decisive operation should be prepared, facilitated and brought to a successful issue with the highest degree of certainty and the least effort. One misgiving undeniably arises in considering this method. The limitation of the available attacking forces and fighting material made it impossible to make the individual blows follow each other so quickly that the enemy would have no time to recover between each, to a certain extent, to make good the losses he had suffered, to prepare his defence against fresh blows, or even recover so far as to proceed to counter blows himself. The question is therefore whether a different procedure, after the close of the May-June offensive at latest, might have had more chance.
Possibly the necessary forces for the Hagen attack in Flanders, which was to have been the decisive operation, might have been mobilized by 'the middle of July if it had been decided to sacrifice
the whole of the territorial gains, which were exhausting and difficult to maintain permanently, made up till then in the Michael and Bliicher offensives, by a retreat movement on a large scale by which the fronts of the XVII., II., XVIII. and VII. Armies would return to their starting positions. With these forces a new and overwhelming surprise attack in a totally different form might have been sprung on the enemy, which would prevent his throwing his released forces straight on to the Flanders front and there avoiding a crash. What Hindenburg and Ludendorff had achieved with unexampled skill in Nov. 1914, immediately after the great retiring movement through S. Poland, by ad- vancing from a newly selected position to a flank attack on the right wing of the Russian main army, could have been repeated in the summer of 1918 on French-Belgian soil when the general situation was strategically favourable.
In view of the complete failure from the outset of the attempt to realize their daring and far-reaching projects, there has been too much of a tendency to accuse the German Supreme Command of misjudging the situation, overestimating the working value of their own instrument of war and underestimating the enemy. Yet it was under no illusions as to the difficulties that it was essential to overcome. It was clearly recognized that time was now, more than ever before, a factor on the side of their enemies. The British had regained their strength, the French were not yet sufficiently shaken, and the Americans were bringing unex- pectedly large masses of troops to France with amazing rapidity. To set against these factors the German commander-in-chief could count on no more reenforcements of any kind. No addi- tional force for attacking purposes could be extracted from the divisions left in Russia and Rumania, which had already given up all their men under the age of 32. The drafting reserve from home was becoming more and more meagre, bringing in only 28,000 -men for the infantry in June as against 44,000 in May. It was composed mainly of returned lightly wounded men, and those who had recovered from sickness. The average strength of the German battalion in the field had sunk by the middle of July from the original 850 men to 660. The actual front strength was even considerably lower than this number. The process of disintegration within the army caused by the prevalence of revolutionarily minded elements, did not escape the notice of the Supreme Command. Taking all in all, there was no doubt that the fighting value of the troops was no longer on the same level as at the beginning of the spring battle.
In spite of this there was no compelling reason to doubt the adequate striking power of the jagged though not blunted weapon of the German army, so long as its intentions and plans were kept absolutely secret, as before, and the blow was once again aimed at one of the enemy's weak spots.
Unfortunately for the Germans, their method of attack had now lost its magic effect on the enemy, who had found times and means to organize his resistance accordingly. The July offensive had been made with the greatest circumspection and thorough- ness of preparation, just as before; and the attacking forces were certainly not deficient in courage or endurance. But an essential factor in the success of the undertaking was lacking no commander-in-chief can do without luck. Hitherto the luck had been generally with Ludendorff. Now, at the decisive moment of the World War, it deserted him, and went over to his oppo- nent his equal in determination and will-power, and now his superior too in strength. If Ludendorff had had the luck at Reims in July 1918 which attended him at Tannenberg, history might have acclaimed him the greatest commander of all time, because he had remained true in spite of everything to himself and his belief in his star. But this was not to be. (W. F.)
IV. THE ALLIED OFFENSIVES OF 1918 The fourth and last phase of the war was ushered in by the failure of the German Champagne-Marne attack of July 1 5 and the success of the Allied counter-attack at Soissons on July 18, the results and far-reaching consequences of which came as a surprise to German and Allied commanders alike. Von Hertling, the German Chancellor, has written: " We expected grave events
